Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD3928
2006-10-20 07:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE ON DDR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO5303
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3928/01 2930727
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200727Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7573
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003928 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE ON DDR

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003928

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE ON DDR

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: National Security Advisor Muwafak al-Rubaie
told MNF-I and Emboffs on October 14 that Prime Minister
Maliki has mandated a new committee to address security
sector reform and DDR issues. The committee has been charged
with producing a report with recommendations on security
sector reform by November 15, after which it will plan a way
forward for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
of Iraqi militias. While the formation of a new structure to
study these issues can be construed as a step forward, we are
concerned by reports of a plan to "reform" the security
sector by instituting a quota system, which likely would lead
to Shia control of the Ministry of Defense and Iraq's
National Intelligence Service. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
A NEW COMMITTEE FOR DDR AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
-------------- --------------


2. (C) MNF-I and Emboffs met with National Security Adviser
Muwafak al-Rubaie on October 14 to offer the US assistance to
Iraq's Demilitarize, Demobilize, and Reintegrate (DDR)
program and to determine whether the GoI intends to
re-establish the Transition Reintegration Implementation
Committee (TRIC) -- an administrative body called for by CPA
Order 91 to oversee DDR implementation. (NOTE: The Ambassador
wrote to Prime Minister Maliki in late September to stress
its importance. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Rubaie conceded that no progress has been made on
re-establishing the TRIC, but asserted that the Prime
Minister had decided earlier in the week to move forward with
DDR and national security sector reform. He said that PM
Maliki has signed a directive establishing a new group --
the "Committee for MoI and MoD Reform" -- which will oversee
implementation of (1) MoD, MoI, and INIS reform, and (2) DDR
issues. The committee is comprised of the Ministers of
Defense and Interior, the Minister of State for National
Security, and chaired by the NSA. In addition, it will be
supported by four sub-committees (yet to be established) that
will review and make recommendations on the following reform
and DDR-related issues:

-- The "balancing" of Shia-Sunni-Kurd employment by quota
within the security ministries;
-- "Political and security" vetting of employees;
-- "Training, supplying, and rehabilitating the security
forces"; and
-- The charters for, and organization of, the MoD, MoI, and
INIS.


4. (C) The committee's first order of business will be
reaching agreement on how best to reform the national

security sector. Its findings and recommendations will be
presented to the Ministerial Committee for National Security
on November 15. The committee then will consider DDR. The
reason for this sequential approach, according to Rubaie, is
that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) must be reformed so that
its bad elements are removed and prevented from obstructing
future DDR efforts from within the government's very own
corridors. Only when decisions have been made on security
sector reform will the committee take up DDR. Rubaie
indicated that the DDR effort will cover CPA Order 91
militias, but provided no clarity on whether it will cover
other armed formations as well.

--------------
LEVERAGING US DDR SUPPORT
--------------


5. (C) MNF-I and Emboffs reviewed with Rubaie the preparatory
work that the US has accomplished on DDR, including:
-- Establishing a notional multi-year DDR budget;
-- Organizing a USAID office to assist with future DDR
activities;
-- Coordinating with Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on
vocational training opportunities.

MNF-I's Rear Admiral Van Buskirk stressed to Rubaie that the
GoI should capitalize on the US Mission's hard work to ensure
that the current momentum on DDR is not lost. Van Buskirk
emphasized that re-establishing the TRIC, along with a
secretariat, could serve as a useful vehicle to coordinate

SIPDIS
all DDR-related issues.

--------------
THE BADR CORPS
--------------

BAGHDAD 00003928 002 OF 002




6. (C) Acknowledging that the GoI will have to be more
pro-active on DDR, Rubaie directed the discussion towards
Badr Corps, and the need for the MoI, MoD, and the Coalition
Forces to honor their agreements with Badr Corps leader, Hadi
al-Amiri, to admit 627 Badr officers into the ISF ranks.
Despite USG concerns over admitting large numbers of Badr
Corps militia into the ISF, Rubaie stressed that it was
essential that we honor this commitment lest al-Amiri pull
the Badr Corps out of CPA Order 91 entirely, leaving both the
GoI and Coalition Forces with a bigger problem.
Interestingly, Rubaie added that al-Amiri's recent push to
incorporate Badr forces into the ISF did not merely reflect
his own interest, but equally, if not more so, those of his
Badr Corps lieutenants, who have been pressing al-Amiri for
the agreed upon ISF positions that they believe is their due.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (S) While the formation of a new committee to move forward
reform in the security ministries as well as DDR efforts is a
positive step, the intent to create a sub-committee with the
stated purpose of establishing a Shia-Sunni-Kurd quota system
within security sector ministries seems likely to foster
further sectarian tension. This quota system will ensure
that Shia interests are paramount within the security
ministries, and could shift control of the MoD and INIS
towards Shia parties. This could damage relations with Sunni
and Kurd parties and national reconciliation efforts and is
likely to further delay DDR progress.
SPECKHARD

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