IRAQI LEADERS DEBATE EXTENSION OF UNSCR MANDATE ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003901

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI LEADERS DEBATE EXTENSION OF UNSCR MANDATE ON
MNF-I


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In separate meetings on October 16, President
Talabani and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih informed the
Ambassador that the second session of the extended Policy
Committee on National Security (PCNS) meeting focused almost
exclusively on the question of whether to extend the UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on the presence of
Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I). While Salih and
Talabani gave different perspectives on the tenor of the
meeting - with Talabani being more upbeat in his report - in
the end both agreed that the Iraqi leaders had understood the
necessity of maintaining the MNF-I presence in Iraq. The
Ambassador thanked both Talabani and Salih for their support,
and emphasized the need to resolve the UNSCR extension issue
by the end of October. Toward this end, he suggested that
reopening the Resolution for debate would be
counterproductive, with which both immediately agreed. It
was important, however, not to dismiss the concerns of the
Iraqis. The Ambassador and Talabani then agreed that sending
a separate, formal, letter to the UN - in addition to
extending the UNSCR - would be the best option. For now,
both Talabani and Salih noted that there was no need for the
Council of Representatives (CoR) to be involved. Post will
continue to press for a timely resolution to this issue. END
SUMMARY.

Two Different Perspectives: Salih Concerned
--------------


2. (S) In separate meetings on October 16, President Talabani
and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih informed the
Ambassador that the second session of the extended Policy
Committee on National Security (PCNS) meeting focused almost
exclusively on the question of whether to extend the UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on the presence of
Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I). (Note: Iraqi
officials told the Embassy in septel the decision by the PCNS
to hold an extended "open session" until all outstanding
security and political issues are resolved. END NOTE).
According to Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, the
discussion on the UNSCR extension was marred by negative
statements by Sunni Arab officials and some Shia party
leaders. Salih reported that Sunni Arab Vice President Tarik
al-Hashimi had initially resisted extending the mandate,
citing concerns over Iraqi sovereignty. Sunni Arab Deputy
Prime Minister Salam al-Zawbai also expressed his concerns
over the increased violence in the streets linked to the
presence of MNF-I forces, and stated forcefully that the
Council of Representatives (CoR) would not agree to the
extension. Predictably, the Sadrists insisted that the
Iraqis should reject the extension, and even the Prime
Minister's position had shifted significantly, Salih noted,
from requesting additional bases to wanting to limit the
authority of the Coalition Forces.


3. (S) Salih did praise the statement of Shia Vice President
Adil Abd al-Mahdi, stating that his calm and measured
approach did much to soothe the tensions and move the PCNS
members toward a plan to extend the UNSCR mandate, as well as
pursue a separate bilateral agreement with language
incorporating more of the Iraqi concerns. His argument that
opening the UNSCR to debate by other international players
would be counterproductive to Iraq's interes was well
received. Iraqiyya's Ayad Jamal al-Din also played a good
role, he said, chiding some leaders for seeking to use
Coalition soldiers as though they were "mercenaries." In
the end, the Shia parties understood the need for MNF-I's
continued presence, and even al-Hashimi admitted he only
fully trusted the Coalition Forces, Salih said.

(While Talabani Reassures
--------------


4. (S) In a more upbeat assessment, President Talabani
claimed that everyone - including the Sadrists and al-Hashimi
- had expressed his support for the extension of the UNSCR
mandate. Talabani also praised Abd al-Mahdi's leadership,
and reported that he had specifically asked the PCNS members
if any objected to extending the UNSCR mandate, and that no
one had spoken. In response to the Ambassador's statement
repeating Salih's more negative report of the meeting,
Talabani brushed aside the "minor disagreements" and noted
that in the end all the parties had recognized the need for
the Coalition's continued presence in Iraq.

Assessing the Various Options

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5. (C) The Ambassador thanked both Talabani and Salih for
their support, and emphasized the need to resolve the UNSCR
extension issue by the end of October. Toward this end, he
suggested that reopening the Resolution for debate would be
counterproductive, with which both Kurdish leaders
immediately agreed. It was important, however, not to
dismiss the concerns of the Iraqis. The Ambassador and
Talabani then considered the following options:

-- Joint US-Iraqi statement: This statement would take into
consideration the papers presented by the Iraqis with their
demands, including reconsidering immunity and increasing
Iraqi sovereignty.

-- Letters to UN: Incorporating Iraqi concerns into the U.S.
and Iraqi letters to the Security Council requesting the
extention. Talabani noted that the PCNS agreed that the
Government would now be charged with moving the negotiations
forward with the US.

-- US-Iraqi Exchange: In addition to the formal letters
requesting extension sent to the UNSC, the Governments of the
U.S. and Iraq could exchange formal correspondence addressing
the Iraqi concerns, or reaching an agreement or "protocol".

-- Iraqi Letter to UN: In addition to requesting the
extension, Talabani would send a formal letter to the UN,
with the US's support, laying out Iraqi concerns.

After a brief discussion, Talabani determined that the last
option - sending a separate, formal, letter to the UN - was
the best way to ensure the timely extension of the mandate
while continuing to express Iraqi concerns and demands.

Role for the CoR ?
--------------


6. (C) According to Salih, CoR Speaker Mahmud al-Mashadani
had insisted during the PCNS meeting that the CoR needed to
have the final word on the UNSCR extension, but Talabani,
Salih, and others all agreed that there was no need for
parliamentary approval if it was to a straightforward
extension of the mandate. Talabani noted that Maliki had
explicitly stated during the PCNS meeting that all the
political leaders who had agreed to the extension of the
UNSCR that evening must uphold their support - and ensure
their various political blocs followed their example - if a
vote was called for in the CoR. Responding to the
Ambassador's query, Talabani stated that only Maliki could
decide whether the issue would even come to the CoR for a
vote.
SPECKHARD