AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL CASEY URGE PM MALIKI TO ACT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003858 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL CASEY URGE PM MALIKI TO ACT DECISIVELY TO END VIOLENCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 3693 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3757 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During an October 14 meeting, Ambassador Khalilzad and MNF-I Commanding General George Casey urged PM Maliki to take decisive political and military steps to curb ethno-sectarian violence. Maliki pushed back against the use of military force, arguing that three years of Coalition military options had resulted in increased terrorism. He said that military operations always needed to be linked to the "political background." Maliki said that implementation of his four-point plan to reduce violence in Iraq had been stalled by the assassination of Deputy President Tariq al-Hashimi's brother; al-Hashimi was losing confidence in the government and was hesitating in moving forward with the plan. Maliki was more optimistic about relations with Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, suggesting Sadr might be prepared to publicly back the government. Maliki blamed the lack of movement on economic issues to systemic problems in Iraq's economy. When Maliki expressed concern about critical articles in the US press, the Ambassador and General Casey assured him that he continued to have President Bush's full support. Ambassador and General Casey strongly argued against the use of ethnic quotas in the Iraqi security forces. END SUMMARY. Decisive Action Needed to Stop the Violence -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Referring to a chart on civilian casualties in Baghdad, MNF-I Commanding General George Casey told PM Maliki in an October 14 meeting that it was important that the GOI take actions to stem the growing tide of ethno-sectarian violence. Casey said he was working with his commanders to come up with options for stemming this tide before the end of Ramadan, with the hope that Eid could be used as a cooling off period. He promised to present these options to Maliki on Wednesday, October 18. ¶3. (S/NF) The Ambassador agreed with General Casey's analysis, adding that a sense is developing both in Iraq and Washington that decisive political and military action needs to be taken in order to stop the violence. Noting that Iraqis respect a decisive leader, he warned that -- if action is not taken soon -- a perception might develop that Maliki is unable or unwilling to deal with the situation. ¶4. (S/NF) Maliki pushed back, arguing that the political context needed to determine the use of military force. He said that the Coalition had used military force for over three years, but terrorism had only increased. He also warned against the appearance that Coalition forces were favoring one group over another. Pressing his point, Maliki said that any military operation in Sadr City would disproportionately impact innocent civilians, alienating them from the government and/or driving them into the hands of the JAM extremists. (Note: The PM estimated that only about five percent of Sadr City residents were JAM.) He also complained that while the GOI is held publicly responsible for security issues, its security forces are sometimes prevented from entering contested areas by the Coalition. Referring to the chart Casey had shown him, Maliki suggested that the issue of civilian casualties was being overblown by the media. Implementation of the Four-Point Plan -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador stressed the importance of moving forward with the implementation of the PM's four-point agreement to reduce violence in Baghdad (ref A),adding that a bad impression was being created by the lack of quantifiable results from the plan. Maliki said that implementation had been delayed by the assassination of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's brother. Al-Hashimi was very upset by his brother's death and was becoming disenchanted with the government. Noting that his brother's "blood was not even dry," al-Hashimi was hesitating on moving forward with the four-point plan. When the Ambassador said that he would be seeing al-Hashimi later in the day, National Security Advisor Rubaie asked him to ask al-Hashimi to "stop bad mouthing the PM." Maliki also said al-Hashimi had asked for an FBI investigation into the assassination. The Ambassador told him that the US had already set up an BAGHDAD 00003858 002 OF 002 interagency team to help in the investigation. Sadr -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Maliki was more optimistic about relations with Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, suggesting that al-Sadr might be close to announcing his support for the government in a joint press conference. Maliki said he had been planning to travel to Najaf for meetings, but communication problems at the airbase (which he linked to the handover to Iraqi control) had prevented him from using his aircraft. The Ambassador and General Casey agreed to provide him whatever support he needed for his travel to Najaf. Ambassador Presses Maliki on Economic Issues -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Maliki that he also needed to act decisively with regard to economic issues. For example, he said many contractors do not want to do business with the GOI because of the perception that it does not pay its bills. He recommended that Maliki consider creating a structure for economic issues similar to the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). ¶8. (S/NF) The Prime Minister said that Iraq suffered from systemic problems in its economic system and admitted that the work of the economic committee needed to be improved. He said he had asked the committee to conduct a workshop with outside experts on how to create a comprehensive economic policy. He also suggested the possibility of a national economic conference. U.S. Support for Maliki -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Maliki said that the situation in Iraq was exacerbated by recent articles in western media that were critical of him and/or that suggested the US might reexamine its policy if violence does not diminish dramatically over the next couple of months. On the one hand, he said that some groups that had been looking to join the national reconciliation project were now waiting to see how things would develop; on the other, terrorists and others opposed to the regime were increasing their attacks in an attempt to drive the Coalition out and topple the government. ¶10. (S/NF) Reassuring Maliki that he still enjoyed strong support from President Bush, General Casey urged him to ignore the "chatter" about Iraq that will fill the U.S. media in the run up to the U.S. congressional elections. The Ambassador did agree to conduct press interviews where he could reinforce U.S. support for the Maliki government as it makes the difficult decisions needed. MoD/MOI Reform/Militia Policy -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Maliki said the first meeting of the committee created at the October 8 MCNS (ref B) to look into MOI/MOD reform and militia policy had taken place. Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Waeli chaired the meeting. The Ambassador informed Maliki that he had hired a senior person to coordinate Coalition engagement on the militia policy. ¶12. (S/NF) Discussing the Iraqi Army's ten divisions, Maliki said that five division commanders would be Shia and the other five would be divided between Sunnis and Kurds. General Casey told Maliki he objected to a quota system for the security services, arguing that competence should be the overriding consideration. Maliki said reliability should also be considered, arguing that potential candidates should have their backgrounds vetted. The Ambassador noted Sunni concern that the PM was making changes in military leadership without the constitutionally required approval of parliament. Maliki deflected the concern, arguing that recent changes were only interim appointments on which the CoR would have to decide. KHALILZAD