CHAIR OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE OUTLINES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003808 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: CHAIR OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE OUTLINES VIEW ON EXTENSION OF UNSCR 1546 IN IRAQ Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chair of the Council of Representatives (CoR) Committee on Security and Defense Hadi Al-Amri said that the Policy Council on National Security (PCNS) has decided that the Iraqi government needs a mandate from the CoR in order to request an extension of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546. Al-Amri stated that he supported a "middle way" whereby the Iraqi government would request an extension after negotiating with MNF-I a timetable for building the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and delineating MNF-I, ISF, and Iraqi government authorities more clearly and transparently. Al-Amri made an urgent plea for MNF-I or ISF presence in several "deserted" areas, where, he said, the levels of violence and absence of security forces were fertile ground for terrorists. Finally, Al-Amri complained that MNF-I was delaying implementation of an agreement to integrate former Badr Corps members into the ISF and raised the Shi'a perception that the US was "tilting" toward the Sunnis. END SUMMARY. -------------- Extension of UNSCR 1546: Headed to the CoR -------------- ¶2. (C) Hadi Al-Amri told PolCouns on September 28 that the PCNS, of which he is a member (as head of the Badr Organization),has decided that the Iraqi government needs a mandate from the CoR in order to request an extension to UNSCR 1546. (NOTE: UNSCR 1546 of June 8, 2004 established the mandate for MNF-I. The Security Council extended the mandate until December 31, 2006 in Resolution 1637 of November 11, 2005. END NOTE.) Al-Amri said that some members of the PCNS believe that the resolution should be extended "without conditions," and others believe it should not be extended at all. Given the divisiveness of the issue, Al-Amri suggested, the Iraqi government needed the support of the CoR's elected representatives in order to request the Security Council to extend the resolution: "We need to get parliamentary approval to prevent future allegations that the Kurds and Shi'a are selling the country to the US." (NOTE: According to the PM, the PCNS has made no decisions about how to handle this issue. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Al-Amri said that he did not believe the time was right for the Iraqi government to ask MNF-I to withdraw because "Iraqi forces are not yet capable of handling certain domestic and foreign challenges." MNF-I assistance was necessary to train Iraqi security forces (ISF),he said, a process that could take years. Unlike some other politicians, Al-Amri continued, he understood how long it takes to stand up security forces, pointing to his own experience in standing up and leading the Badr Corps. Yet Al-Amri also noted that if good relations were to prevail between ISF and MNF-I, it was critical to have a better definition of authorities of MNF-I, ISF, and the Iraqi government. "When I read Resolution 1546 and the letters of Ayad Allawi and Secretary Powell to the Security Council," Al-Amri said, holding copies in his hand, "I see foggy areas, places where authorities are not defined clearly and transparently enough." ¶4. (C) Al-Amri then proposed a "middle way" between the extremes. According to Al-Amri's vision, the Iraqi government would ask the UN for a one-year extension of UNSCR 1546 (with the potential to renew) based on two conditions: (1) a defined timetable for building the capacity of the ISF; and (2) greater clarity and transparency in the roles of MNF-I, the ISF, and the Iraqi government. Asked by PolCouns how he would deal with likely Sadrist opposition, Al-Amri said that he had begun to "pave the way" for this solution in talks with Sadrists and Sunni Arabs and expressed his hope that "logic would prevail." Agreeing with PolCouns that media tirades against the MNF-I were not helpful in resolving the issue, Al-Amri noted that "the same Sunnis who tell the American Ambassador privately that withdrawal would be a disaster then publicly demand an end to the occupation." He later specifically cited CoR and National Dialogue Council (Tawafuq) member Abd Al-Nasr Al-Janabi as an example. ¶5. (C) Al-Amri urged that discussions begin as soon as possible between the concerned parties to develop an agreement on the two conditions and begin the groundwork for raising the issue in the CoR. Regarding the first condition, he suggested the formation of an ISF technical committee to set a timetable for building ISF capacity, as "the Iraqi armed forces know best what they need." He also added that MNF-I needed to train and equip the ISF at a faster pace. He BAGHDAD 00003808 002 OF 002 stressed that in the end it was the Iraqi government that would decide whether the MNF-I should stay. PolCouns thanked Al-Amri for his frank exposition of his views on the issue, agreed with him on the need for serious discussions, and emphasized the USG did not want the American troops to stay one day longer than necessary to help build a stable and democratic Iraq. -------------- -------------- A Plea for MNF-I and ISF Presence in "Deserted" Areas -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Al-Amri then asked PolCouns to relay several messages to the Ambassador. The first message, he said, was that the following areas needed urgent attention from MNF-I or the ISF: Al-Basam (near Taji); Arab Al-Jabour, Sayafia, and Diraeya (near the town of Suwera south of Dora); Al-Wasifiya (west of Mahmoudiya); and Khan Beni Said (between Baghdad and Diyala). He described these areas as "deserted" by MNF-I and ISF and as "bases of terrorism outside of Anbar." He said that in the absence of legitimate security forces, the people in these areas were turning to militias such as Jaysh al-Mahdi as their saviors: "What is happening is the building of militias at the expense of Iraqi forces." He described a vicious circle of violence which began with "Saddamists and takfiris" attacking Iraqi Shi'a. If MNF-I and ISF did not stop these attacks, he continued, then the Shi'a would ultimately turn to militias to protect them. -------------- Badr Integration and Perceptions of U.S. Bias -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Amri's other messages dealt with the reintegration of Badr Corps members into the ISF and with Shi'a perceptions of the U.S. On the reintegration issue, Al-Amri, who leads the Badr Organization, said that he had signed an agreement five months ago with representatives from MNF-I, the Prime Minister's Office, MoD, and MoI to integrate 1,117 Badr Corps members into the Iraqi army and other security forces at the officer level. Five months later no action had been taken, Al-Amri said, and MoD officials were telling him that the U.S. was objecting to moving forward with implementation. "I have concluded that delaying implementation of our agreement was a political decision of the U.S. Embassy," Al-Amri said, warning that the frustrations of these unemployed Badr Corps members could boil over. ¶8. (C) On the issue of Shi'a perceptions, Al-Amri argued that in certain instances the performance of MNF-I was "not good" and was causing the perception that the U.S. was tilting toward the Sunnis. "The Shi'a are saying that the MNF-I takes weapons away from the people," he continued, "and then the terrorists come and attack the area." PolCouns emphasized the U.S. commitment to establishing democracy in Iraq, a democracy in which the Shi'a group would have the largest voice by virtue of its size. She noted that although 70 to 80 percent of coalition activities were against terrorists, takfiris, Ba'athists, and Saddamists, there were admittedly some Shi'a involved in death squad activities and that MNF-I had to take action against these criminals and murderers. Al-Amri acknowledged that "U.S. politicians" had consistently affirmed that there was no change in the U.S. stance vis-a-vis the Shi'a, but argued that "we must have one common understanding of the enemy" as Saddamists and takfiris. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Al-Amri has clearly thought through a strategy on the issue of extending UNSCR 1546. He was prepared and on message, repeating his position several times over the course of the conversation. His portrayal of his position as a "middle way" between the "extreme" views of no extension and extension without conditions is likely a preview of the political strategy of the non-Sadrist elements of the Shia Coalition to address this divisive issue in the public arena and in the CoR. As a member of the PCNS, chair of the CoR committee on security and defense, and leader of the Badr Organization, Al-Amri will be a key player as this issue comes to a head. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD