Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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06BAGHDAD3760 | 2006-10-10 20:32:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO4873 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3760/01 2832032 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 102032Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7330 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003760 |
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met on October 8 with Iraqi State Minister for National Security Shirwan Wa'ili, the GOI's counterpart to Special Envoy Ralston in the trilateral U.S./Iraq/Turkey anti-PKK efforts. Wa'ili is in the process of gathering information and talking to the various actors, after which he says he will be prepared for a trilateral meeting; Wa'ili is ready to meet with Ralston on October 16. The Ambassador gave Wa'ili a readout of a recent discussion about the PKK with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani. Wa'ili and the Ambassador agreed to the importance of political leadership in reducing violence in Iraq. Wa'ili denied that his ministry is under Iranian influence and requested USG assistance for his ministry. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- Wa'ili on His New Responsibility -------------------------- 2. (C) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili for his assessment of the security situation and of his new responsibility as the GOI's representative to trilateral U.S./Iraq/Turkey anti-PKK efforts. Wa'ili told the Ambassador he is in the process of gathering information on the PKK. This is his second meeting with U.S. Embassy officials, but he is awaiting his first meeting with the Turkish Embassy. Wa'ili anticipates meeting with the GOI KRG representative to the trilateral process, Karim Sinjari, later in the week. Wa'ili is aware of the October 16 Ralston visit and is available to meet with him. Wa'ili said he would travel to the KRG for consultations as well. After he speaks separately to all parties and tries to narrow differences, he will be prepared for a trilateral "workshop." 4. (C) Wa'ili pointed out the GOI issued a statement "diplomatically" calling the PKK a terrorist organization and saying the PKK should not be present in Iraq. Wa'ili said the GOI is committed to closing PKK offices, noting that "there are even offices in Baghdad." -------------------------- Getting Sequencing Right -------------------------- 5. (C) The Ambassador told Wa'ili he had just been in the KRG and discussed the PKK issue with KRG President Barzani, who told him there is now a window of opportunity to resolve the problem. Barzani told the Ambassador he met with PKK leader Cemil Bayik and pressed Bayik to declare a ceasefire, which the PKK did. 6. (C) According to Barzani, the PKK is ready to lay down arms permanently if there is "flexibility" on the Turkish side. The PKK seeks a "federal" structure in southeast Turkey, cultural and political rights, and peaceful political settlement of its dispute with the Turkish government. The Ambassador noted that Turkish CHOD Buyukanit had stated previously there is no purely military solution to the problem; Buyukanit had served in Turkey's southeast region and understood the issues. 7. (C) The challenge, the Ambassador told Wa'ili, is getting the sides to agree on the sequence of steps, to which Wa'ili agreed. The Ambassador noted that all sides have internal political constraints on what they can do, and when they can do it. The U.S. is ready to do whatever it can to help the process. -------------------------- Security -------------------------- 8. (C) On security, Wa'ili noted the difference between the work done and the results on the ground. According to Wa'ili, GOI security agencies have done a good job. Wa'ili blames the lack of results not on operational or intelligence failures by security agencies, but on poor political leadership. He believes some political figures are behind sectarian violence, which makes the violence difficult to contain and requires a political solution. 9. (C) The Ambassador said the USG sees four sources of violence in Iraq: terrorists like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates; insurgents attacking Coalition Forces; sectarian violence; and in the south, tensions between militias. He agreed the key element is political, as this is the reason why the USG is urging reconciliation and resolution of major political issues that divide people. The October 2 four-point agreement on ending sectarian violence is encouraging; continuing sectarian violence threatens to undermine U.S. public support for Iraq. 10. (C) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili why some tribes had not attended the October 7 Anbar tribes meeting in Baghdad. Wa'ili attributed their absence to their objections to the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) participation. The Ambassador suggested that Wa'ili reach out to tribes that did not attend. -------------------------- Request for U.S. Help to the Ministry -------------------------- 11. (C) Wa'ili told the Ambassador that as a state ministry, his Ministry for National Security has many responsibilities but no fixed budget. Wa'ili said he thought there is an impression in the USG that the ministry was under Iranian influence; the Ambassador replied he had heard others say this. Wa'ili denied this, saying his was "an Iraqi ministry" which selects independent officials. He asked why there is no USG support for his ministry and requested a USG point of contact to liaise with the his ministry. He also asked for support to relocate the ministry to a larger building. The Ambassador told Wa'ili he would look into Wa'ili's requests. KHALILZAD |