Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD3730
2006-10-08 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SCIRI LEADER RAISES SECURITY CONCERNS WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3282
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3730/01 2811119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081119Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7285
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003730 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SCIRI LEADER RAISES SECURITY CONCERNS WITH
AMBASSADOR; ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT U.S.


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003730 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: SCIRI LEADER RAISES SECURITY CONCERNS WITH AMBASSADOR; ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT U.S. Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph seven. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: SCIRI leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim agreed with the Ambassador on the need to move forward and bring closure on key outstanding issues such as federalism, oil, constitutional review, and militias. Al-Hakim noted that the Council of Ministers, Council of Representatives (CoR),and particularly the Policy Council on National Security, provided adequate mechanisms to address these issues. But he stressed that security was the most pressing issue and raised several particular concerns with the Ambassador. Thanking the Ambassador for extending an invitation to visit the US after the November 7 elections, al-Hakim said he would make a visit and asked his staff to look into possible dates. He also welcomed the opportunity to develop a more sustained and strategic dialogue between SCIRI and the US. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Political Process Advancing; Security the Major Concern -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told al-Hakim, the leader of one Iraq's key Shi'a political parties, in an October 2 meeting that it was vital to move forward on the key issues facing Iraq, including federalism, oil, constitutional review, militias, de-Baathification, the elections commission, and provincial elections. If Iraqi leaders produced a timeline for addressing these issues, the Ambassador continued, it would help the US public see commitment and progress. Al-Hakim replied that the Council of Ministers, Council of Representatives (CoR),and particularly the Policy Council on National Security, provided adequate mechanisms to address these issues. He noted that the constitution also has clauses that outline procedures and timelines for addressing most of the issues. Taking the issue of federalism as an example, al-Hakim observed that the constitution mandated a law on regions formation by October 22. "But there is no need to implement the law right away," he hastened to add, "and it cannot be implemented without understanding the position of the United States and other important states." Al-Hakim lamented that his opponents were trying to "distort the issue by claiming that we want to break up Iraq," when in fact the principle of federalism was written into the constitution. ¶4. (C) Al-Hakim named security as the most pressing issue facing Iraqis. He said that there had been a good meeting on October 1 with the Prime Minister to discuss security that resulted in an agreement to form a committee, but "we need more than committees." (NOTE: Al-Hakim was apparently referring to discussions that led to the issuance on October 2 of a four-point agreement on ending violence (septel). END NOTE.) Al-Hakim expressed concern about the security of the International Zone (IZ) after the recent arrest of a member of a CoR member's security detail. He also noted that when U.S. forces declared a place "stable" it caused terrorists to target it. The Ambassador shared his assessment that Al-Qaida in Iraq was under pressure thanks to better intelligence and opposition from the tribes. ¶5. (C) Turning to militias, the Ambassador said that the Prime Minister was working on a plan in conjunction with the coalition to dissolve and reintegrate militias and suggested that Badr Corps members covered under a separate agreement could be part of this plan (see septel on conversation between Badr leader Hadi Al-Amri and PolCouns). Al-Hakim said that including these Badr members in a new plan was "not correct" and "would complicate matters." The Ambassador noted that there were reports that some Badr members were participating in death squads, allegations that al-Hakim firmly denied. -------------- -------------- Visiting the U.S. and Building a Strategic Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador then invited al-Hakim to visit the US after the November 7 elections, offering to help al-Hakim and his staff to develop a full program beyond official meetings with senior USG officials. Al-Hakim thanked the Ambassador, said he would like to make a visit, and directed his staff to look into possible dates. The Ambassador also said that the Embassy hoped to open a strategic dialogue on long-term issues with SCIRI, noting that he had previewed this idea with Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi. Al-Hakim welcomed the opportunity and designated Abdel Mehdi as the point of BAGHDAD 00003730 002 OF 002 contact on the SCIRI side. ¶7. (SBU) Action request: Please provide post with proposed dates for an al-Hakim visit to Washington and a notional sketch of what the visit might look like. KHALILZAD

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -