Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD3725
2006-10-07 17:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION AND OTHER
how-toVZCZCXRO3190 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3725/01 2801755 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 071755Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7277 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003725
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION AND OTHER
TOPICS WITH AHMET CHALABI
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003725
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION AND OTHER
TOPICS WITH AHMET CHALABI
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad met October 2 with
Ahmet Chalabi, who chairs Iraq's Higher National
De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC). Chalabi appeared open
to de-Baathification reforms such as redrafting
de-Baathification guidelines and granting some mid-level
ex-Baathists pensions and job reinstatement. Chalabi
lamented GOI contracting problems and corruption, but opposes
giving more power to the Commission for Public Integrity
(CPI). Instead, he recommends reviving the role of auditors
and the Cabinet Contracts Commission, and training a corps of
professional contracting officials. Chalabi claims Iraqi
army and police are not capable of holding areas cleared
under the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). END SUMMARY.
--------------
Muqtada al-Sadr
--------------
2. (C) Chalabi said he is in touch with some factions loyal
to Muqtada al-Sadr. The Sadr sloganeering about not engaging
with the US until Coalition Forces (CF) withdrawal is
beginning to ring hollow, he claimed; some are ready to
engage. However, PM Maliki has no relations with al-Sadr and
cannot be an intermediary.
--------------
Shia Coalition Problems
--------------
3. (C) Chalabi asserted there is "great tension" within the
Shia coalition UIA. He agreed PM Maliki is solid and
decisive, but added that he is surrounded by a weak cabinet
that hurt the day-to-day running of the GOI. There are
competent people, Chalabi said, but they are not in the
ministries. Chalabi expressed disappointment with recent
articles in the U.S. media critical of PM Maliki.
--------------
De-Baathification
--------------
4. (C) Chalabi confirmed he has resumed working on the
Higher National De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC) and
claimed he is proposing changes consistent with
reconciliation. Chalabi said he had asked the PM to send a
representative to the HNDBC. Asked by the Ambassador what
the U.S. could do to help the HNDBC, Chalabi suggested U.S.
technical assistance in drafting reformed de-Baathification
guidelines.
5. (C) A South African-style truth and reconciliation
commission "will not fly" in Iraq, according to Chalabi.
Sadrists and SCIRI would oppose this, fearing it would help
the Baath party return.
6. (C) According to Chalabi, most Baath party members were
not affected by present de-Baathification. Chalabi suggested
that amending present procedures to allow some mid-level
party members to receive pensions and be reinstated in jobs
is "doable" and would "take care of 90 per cent" of the
problems. The Ambassador asked whether a public statement by
Chalabi saying that Baath who had not committed crimes are
welcome back into Iraqi society would help. Chalabi insisted
he had already made such a statement but he could repeat it;
he insisted that he personally had not objected to several
former Baathists appointed to relatively high positions in
the new GOI.
7. (C) The Ambassador asked what Baath could expect from the
HNDBC; whether they could, for example, form their own party.
While Chalabi left the door open to the possibility, he
doubted Baathists could form their own party, even under
another name, as this would run afoul of Constitutional
prohibitions against the Baath party and could turn members
into "targets." They would do better to join existing
parties. Chalabi predicted some ex-Baath would join the
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Hewar - Sunni); other
would be attracted to liberal cross-sectarian parties.
--------------
Contracting Problems
--------------
8. (C) Chalabi lamented the failure of ministries to provide
basic services, noting they have large quantities of unspent
funds. The Ambassador agreed, noting that GOI officials
worry that making decisions on budget allocations will open
them to charges of corruption and arrest by the Commission
for Public Integrity (CPI). Chalabi said corruption remains
BAGHDAD 00003725 002 OF 002
a major problem in Iraq; he cited food imports as an example.
Corruption among customs inspectors has choked imports and
threatens food supplies in Iraq's state-run food distribution
system.
9. (C) At the same time, Chalabi said the CPI's power to
detain suspects pending investigation is being used too
broadly. Instead of expanding the CPI's powers, he
recommended that more authority be given to the Board of
Supreme Audit (BSA),which Chalabi says is led by "the best
public servant in the country," Dr. Abdul-Basit Al Turki.
Chalabi also suggested that the Cabinet Contracts Committee,
which had been used during the Jaffari government, should be
revived.
10. (C) In defense contracting, Chalabi said that the GOI
should work with the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) to procure equipment. Doing so would remove
the "onus of corruption." He said GOI officials should be
trained in the U.S. on defense procurement procedures,
creating a corps of procurement and contracting professionals.
--------------
Iraq's Army and Police
--------------
11. (C) Chalabi said violence is returning to areas cleared
under Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) because the Iraqi Army (IA)
and Iraqi Police (IP) are not up to the task of "holding"
these areas. The IA is perceived as pro-Sunni, the IP as
pro-Shiite. Chalabi advised that BSP should not proceed too
hastily, adding that effective intelligence gathering would
be key to BSP's success. He also urged that the U.S.
re-think the criteria for judging IA and IP units fully
prepared.
12. (C) Chalabi said he recently had a long discussion with
Interior Minister Bolani. According to Chalabi, Bolani is
hampered by his inability to fire deputies, a move that would
cause problems in Iraq's unity government. In addition, he
said the MOI is severely under strength.
--------------
Intelligence Reform
--------------
13. (C) Chalabi said that reform of the intelligence sector
would help solve many of Iraq's problems. He suggested as a
first step adding an intelligence-related line item in Iraq's
annual budget.
--------------
Iran Visit
--------------
14. (C) Chalabi said that his visit to Iran went well. He
provided few details, other than that he had met with top
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani for two hours.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION AND OTHER
TOPICS WITH AHMET CHALABI
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad met October 2 with
Ahmet Chalabi, who chairs Iraq's Higher National
De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC). Chalabi appeared open
to de-Baathification reforms such as redrafting
de-Baathification guidelines and granting some mid-level
ex-Baathists pensions and job reinstatement. Chalabi
lamented GOI contracting problems and corruption, but opposes
giving more power to the Commission for Public Integrity
(CPI). Instead, he recommends reviving the role of auditors
and the Cabinet Contracts Commission, and training a corps of
professional contracting officials. Chalabi claims Iraqi
army and police are not capable of holding areas cleared
under the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). END SUMMARY.
--------------
Muqtada al-Sadr
--------------
2. (C) Chalabi said he is in touch with some factions loyal
to Muqtada al-Sadr. The Sadr sloganeering about not engaging
with the US until Coalition Forces (CF) withdrawal is
beginning to ring hollow, he claimed; some are ready to
engage. However, PM Maliki has no relations with al-Sadr and
cannot be an intermediary.
--------------
Shia Coalition Problems
--------------
3. (C) Chalabi asserted there is "great tension" within the
Shia coalition UIA. He agreed PM Maliki is solid and
decisive, but added that he is surrounded by a weak cabinet
that hurt the day-to-day running of the GOI. There are
competent people, Chalabi said, but they are not in the
ministries. Chalabi expressed disappointment with recent
articles in the U.S. media critical of PM Maliki.
--------------
De-Baathification
--------------
4. (C) Chalabi confirmed he has resumed working on the
Higher National De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC) and
claimed he is proposing changes consistent with
reconciliation. Chalabi said he had asked the PM to send a
representative to the HNDBC. Asked by the Ambassador what
the U.S. could do to help the HNDBC, Chalabi suggested U.S.
technical assistance in drafting reformed de-Baathification
guidelines.
5. (C) A South African-style truth and reconciliation
commission "will not fly" in Iraq, according to Chalabi.
Sadrists and SCIRI would oppose this, fearing it would help
the Baath party return.
6. (C) According to Chalabi, most Baath party members were
not affected by present de-Baathification. Chalabi suggested
that amending present procedures to allow some mid-level
party members to receive pensions and be reinstated in jobs
is "doable" and would "take care of 90 per cent" of the
problems. The Ambassador asked whether a public statement by
Chalabi saying that Baath who had not committed crimes are
welcome back into Iraqi society would help. Chalabi insisted
he had already made such a statement but he could repeat it;
he insisted that he personally had not objected to several
former Baathists appointed to relatively high positions in
the new GOI.
7. (C) The Ambassador asked what Baath could expect from the
HNDBC; whether they could, for example, form their own party.
While Chalabi left the door open to the possibility, he
doubted Baathists could form their own party, even under
another name, as this would run afoul of Constitutional
prohibitions against the Baath party and could turn members
into "targets." They would do better to join existing
parties. Chalabi predicted some ex-Baath would join the
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Hewar - Sunni); other
would be attracted to liberal cross-sectarian parties.
--------------
Contracting Problems
--------------
8. (C) Chalabi lamented the failure of ministries to provide
basic services, noting they have large quantities of unspent
funds. The Ambassador agreed, noting that GOI officials
worry that making decisions on budget allocations will open
them to charges of corruption and arrest by the Commission
for Public Integrity (CPI). Chalabi said corruption remains
BAGHDAD 00003725 002 OF 002
a major problem in Iraq; he cited food imports as an example.
Corruption among customs inspectors has choked imports and
threatens food supplies in Iraq's state-run food distribution
system.
9. (C) At the same time, Chalabi said the CPI's power to
detain suspects pending investigation is being used too
broadly. Instead of expanding the CPI's powers, he
recommended that more authority be given to the Board of
Supreme Audit (BSA),which Chalabi says is led by "the best
public servant in the country," Dr. Abdul-Basit Al Turki.
Chalabi also suggested that the Cabinet Contracts Committee,
which had been used during the Jaffari government, should be
revived.
10. (C) In defense contracting, Chalabi said that the GOI
should work with the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) to procure equipment. Doing so would remove
the "onus of corruption." He said GOI officials should be
trained in the U.S. on defense procurement procedures,
creating a corps of procurement and contracting professionals.
--------------
Iraq's Army and Police
--------------
11. (C) Chalabi said violence is returning to areas cleared
under Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) because the Iraqi Army (IA)
and Iraqi Police (IP) are not up to the task of "holding"
these areas. The IA is perceived as pro-Sunni, the IP as
pro-Shiite. Chalabi advised that BSP should not proceed too
hastily, adding that effective intelligence gathering would
be key to BSP's success. He also urged that the U.S.
re-think the criteria for judging IA and IP units fully
prepared.
12. (C) Chalabi said he recently had a long discussion with
Interior Minister Bolani. According to Chalabi, Bolani is
hampered by his inability to fire deputies, a move that would
cause problems in Iraq's unity government. In addition, he
said the MOI is severely under strength.
--------------
Intelligence Reform
--------------
13. (C) Chalabi said that reform of the intelligence sector
would help solve many of Iraq's problems. He suggested as a
first step adding an intelligence-related line item in Iraq's
annual budget.
--------------
Iran Visit
--------------
14. (C) Chalabi said that his visit to Iran went well. He
provided few details, other than that he had met with top
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani for two hours.
KHALILZAD