PESHMERGA TRANSFORMATION TALKS

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003724 SIPDIS S/REL MNF-I SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ SUBJECT: PESHMERGA TRANSFORMATION TALKS Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),an d (d). ¶1. (S/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: On September 26, the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) held the second in a planned series of meetings to transform the Peshmerga into a unified regional force consistent with Iraq's constitution and federal law. Neither side presented a clear position on the proposed KRG regional force's name; organization; composition; size; or duties. Talks resume October 10, but negotiations are unlikely to progress unless both sides articulate their respective visions. If this transition is not properly structured and transparently executed, it could pose an unhelpful precedent with respect to local and regional militia forces formed along party and ethno-sectarian affiliation as Iraq's legislature works to structure federalism legislation. (NOTE: National Security Advisor Rubaie has since told us the GOI has developed a position on a few key issues. We assume these points will be used in the next round of discussions. END NOTE.) END SUMMARY. -------------- KRG effort to consolidate Peshmerga -------------- ¶2. (S/REL MNF-I) Service in the Peshmerga has been the path to power in PUK and KDP party structures, and the name carries strong nationalist and party connotations. In January 2006, President Barzani committed to merging the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's (PUK) Peshmerga with the Kurdish Democratic Party's (KDP) Peshmerga into one apolitical force. Coalition and Iraqi officials working together as the Joint Committee on the Transfer of Security Responsibility have assessed the three Kurdish provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah as "green" -- ready to transfer from MNF-I to domestic control since June 2006. Embassy stressed in June 2006 that, prior to transfer, the KRG and GoI should consolidate the Peshmerga as a regional security force in accordance with the constitution, Iraqi law, and Iraqi Armed Forces policy. ¶3. (S/REL MNF-I) On September 26, 2006, KRG and federal government officials discussed transformation of the Peshmerga into a regional force. Dilshad Miran, Head of the KRG Representation office in Baghdad, was the Kurdish spokesman. The GOI delegation, led by Minister of State for Council of Representative Affairs Dr. Safa al-Safi, included representatives from the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the offices of the National Security Advisor and Prime Minister. MNF-I, Polmiloff, and UK Pol-Mil Counselor also participated. -------------- Force Name -------------- ¶4. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG reported that the Peshmerga will be consolidated into a single force -- independent of party affiliation, under a unified Ministry and reporting to the KRG president -- by December 2006. The KRG representatives said the Kurdish regional force will maintain its current name, Peshmerga, arguing the name is integral to Kurdish identity and the Kurdish people's long struggle. The GOI rejected the name, arguing that the national constitution and law stipulate it should be named the "Regional Guard Force of Kurdistan." The matter was left unresolved. -------------- Structure, Roles and Responsibilities -------------- ¶5. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG did not propose a structure for the future regional force, but stated that the force would look as it does today. The GOI requested the KRG bring a copy of their organizational chart to the next discussion but made no proposals of their own. The KRG said the role of the regional force would remain as it is defined in the draft regional constitution. When pushed for specificity, the KRG stated their duties include "defending democracy fighting terrorism...supporting border control...(and) supporting the federal forces in times of natural disasters and against external threats..." (NOTE: The nature of 'external' threats was not elaborated. END NOTE.) ¶6. (S/REL MNF-I) The GOI argued the description is vague and overlaps Iraqi Security Forces' duties. For example, the GOI stated that border control is the exclusive role of Iraqi federal forces, not a function of regional forces. The KRG agreed but offered to provide 3000 regional guard troops to support border enforcement. The GOI asked the KRG to define the force responsibilities at the next meeting. -------------- Regional Versus National Constitutions -------------- ¶7. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG repeatedly cited KRG's regional laws and draft constitution as the basis for regional force authority. The GOI representatives were unfamiliar with KRG law and claimed the supremacy of the national constitution and federal laws on security matters. (NOTE: Article 110, subsection two of the Iraqi Constitution states that the federal government has exclusive authority on formulating and executing national security policy including establishing and managing armed forces. Article 121, subsection five states that regional governments are responsible for the establishment and organization of the internal security forces. END NOTE.) The KRG agreed to provide copies of relevant regional laws and the current draft KRG constitution. -------------- Force Size -------------- ¶8. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG said the regional force will total 120,000 with an additional 70,000 reservists - a total force of 190,000. The GOI questioned how the KRG derived this number without a clear organizational structure or defined roles and responsibilities. In private meetings with Emboffs and MNF-I, GOI representatives have proposed a much smaller Kurdish regional security force of 18,000. ¶9. (S/REL MNF-I) KRG representatives were unsure how many Pershmerga have retired since its 2003 official retirement of 32,000. Nor was the KRG able to define how many would be eligible for the planned Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (DDR). The Kurds asserted that the federal government should pay pensions to both the current and future retired force members. Salaries and pensions to Peshmerga constitute a major mechanism for the PUK and KDP to transfer funds to a large body of armed party supporters. ¶10. (S/REL MNF-I) We will continue to facilitate and monitor developments, as these negotiations will likely serve as a model for other regions aspiring to greater autonomy. This will have significant implications for both DDR and federalism. KHALILZAD