KURD TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003684

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: IZ KDEM PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: KURD TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ninewas Provincial PRT Leader James Knight: 1.4 (B) and
(D).

This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) message.

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Summary
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1. (C) Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurd
political leadership in Ninewa are focused on
reintegrating districts in Ninewa formerly part of
Kurd-dominated provinces into the KRG, through
referenda per Article 140 of the current GOI
Constitution. This process as Kurds envision it
would postpone new provincial elections -- now
expected no later than March 2007 -- to late 2007 or

2008. Both accelerated district referenda and
postponed elections risk confidence in the electoral
process and exacerbation of widespread fear of
Kurdish encroachment among Sunnis and Ninewa's many
minorities. End summary.

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Back to the old borders of Kurdistan . . .
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2. (C) As recent Ninewa reporting has consistently
documented, Ninewa's Sunnis and minorities are
sharply fearful of Kurd intentions to integrate
parts of Ninewa into the KRG. Although local
Kurdish political parties denied such ambitions in
July and early August meetings with PRT Team Leader
Knight, recent discussions with ranking KRG
authorities and the Ninewa Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP) Chair (and Provincial Vice-Governor) have
tilted toward resolution of 'disputed territories'
before further provincial elections.

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. . . in three steps . . .
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3. (C) In a 7 Sep Team Leader discussion with KRG
Minister for Extra-Regional Relations Ihsan and a
similar discussion with KRG Minister of State for
the Interior Sinjari 9 Sep, both insisted that
resolution of disputed territories should be
completed before provincial elections. In Ninewa
those territories include Makhmur, Sinjar, Shikhan,
and Zumar districts. In discussion with Ninewa
Vice-Governor (and Provincial KDP Chair) Goran 13
and 21 Sep, he echoed these views with precision.
When queried further, all three indicated that the
process should include three steps --
'normalization', a census, and referenda in each
district -- which must be completed before
provincial elections take place.


4. (C) All three defined 'normalization' as the
return of Kurds displaced or resettled during
Saddam's Arabization and anti-Kurd campaigns to
their home towns and villages. Sinjari was the most
poignant, describing in detail the eviction of his
family from Sinjar in the 1970s after they refused
to register as Arabs. Despite repeated queries
during these discussions, none consider this process
problematic; Goran insists that in Ninewa the
process is already nearly complete.


5. (C) The three anticipate the necessary census in
2007, in view of the decennial national Iraq census
already expected next year. Referenda on
incorporation of the disputed areas into the
provinces now constituting the Kurdistan Regional
Government would follow late in 2007. In his
conversation with PRT Leader Knight on 21 Sep, Goran
displayed a map of Iraqi Kurdistan that, in his
view, would generally match the boundaries of the
post-referenda KRG. That map (clipped from a
Kurdish newspaper article reporting on Article 140
negotiations) shows most of northern and eastern
Ninewa, all of Tamim, and parts of Diyala added to
the KRG.

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. . . despite Arab and minority alarm
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6. (C) Ninewa Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Chair Dr.
Mohammad Shaker and two senior IIP staff met PRT
Leader Knight 25 Sep at PRT offices on IIP's urgent
request. The meeting was scheduled by the IIP
specifically to convey alarm at the increasing pace
of Kurdish encroachment in Ninewa and the prospect
of delayed Provincial elections. Dr. Mohammad
emphasized that KRG expansionism continues to feed
fear and may lead to violence from Ninewa's Sunni
and minorities -- especially if the districts that
are the focus of KRG efforts to extend its hegemony
are 'annexed' and if the resolution process
significantly delays elections.


7. (C) Dr. Mohammad attributes much recent violence
in Ninewa -- notably in Tal'Afar -- to Kurd pressure
for incorporation into the KRG. He underscored that
referenda and provincial realignment of heavily
Kurdish districts part of Ninewa are acceptable, but
only after new Provincial elections and entry into
force of national federalism legislation now before
the Council of Representatives. To maintain
confidence and reduce tension in Ninewa, he asked
that the USG issue a statement affirming its
commitment to the CPA decree of 9 Apr 2003 declaring
that provincial boundaries in effect that date would
be maintained.

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Comment
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8. (C) This KRG effort already has had significant
implications for Ninewa. As IIP concerns underline,
this effort already feeds rampant Sunni and minority
fears of Kurdish encroachment. Dr. Mohammad is an
authoritative spokesman for most of Ninewa's Sunnis,
and in this regard echoes minority fears as well.
PRT staff are regularly reminded that Kurd ambitions
to carve off parts of Ninewa are likely to inflame
violence. In particular, some Sunnis originally
resettled in Ninewa under Saddam's Arabization
programs are now approaching two generations of
residence in Ninewa, and would likely become
internally-displaced persons (IDPs) elsewhere in
Iraq if forced out -- despite Kurds' blithe
indifference to the practical consequences of
'normalization'.


9. (C) Comment continued. This effort will also
dilute the currently general commitment to
democratic processes now evident across Ninewa's
political spectrum as it progresses, especially
since it will significantly delay new provincial
elections that will overturn current Kurdish party
control of Ninewa's Provincial government. Ninewa's
Sunnis have consistently pressed for early
provincial elections to redress their error in
boycotting the January 2005 vote. Similarly,
opinion leaders of Ninewa's minorities (including
Christians of several varieties, Yezidis, Shabaks,
and Turcomans) have equally consistently called for
early elections to overcome their currently limited
Provincial representation, which they attribute to
vote-rigging by Kurds in 2005. This eagerness to
vote demonstrates Sunni commitment to the electoral
process at the provincial level despite their 2005
boycott -- a critical PRT accomplishment. Delaying
provincial elections for what may be another full
year poses grave risks to that commitment. End
comment.
KHALILZAD