SHAHRISTANI ON THE HYDROCARBON LAW - THE WAY AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003653 SIPDIS /////C O R R E C T E D C O P Y. ALL PARAGRAPHS CHANGED FROM (S) TO (C).///// SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016 TAGS: ECON EPET IZ KJUS KCOR PGOV EINV PBTS SUBJECT: SHAHRISTANI ON THE HYDROCARBON LAW - THE WAY AHEAD BAGHDAD 00003653 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met September 28 with Oil Minister Shahristani to discuss the status of the Hydrocarbon Law. Shahristani confirmed that broad agreement has been reached on most elements, and felt that especially with U.S. help, the Kurds could be convinced to reach agreement on the remaining issue ) contracting. He clarified, however, that there is no document laying out these areas of agreement at this point, but that the Prime Minister's (PM's) oil adviser, Thamir Ghadban, could produce one quickly. In fact, Shahristani offered to provide a draft summary of the agreed principles within a week. Other issues discussed included the International Compact for Iraq, LPG and kerosene supplies and the impact of anti-corruption activities on his sector, including plans to combat corruption at the Bayji refinery. Shahristani described his infrastructure and hydrocarbon development plans for Iraq, and argued that with the hydrocarbon law in place, oil and gas would be the glue that would hold Iraq together. End Summary. -------------- The Compact and Regional Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by describing the UN meeting on the Iraq Compact, noting the high level participation, especially from the Gulf States. He noted that in his bilateral meeting, Kuwait offered to host the next Compact event, likely to be the one on October 30. The Ambassador added that the Kuwaitis also complained in that meeting of their difficulties working with Basrah because of the corruption problem there. He added that the Qatari Crown Prince had complained that Qatar was not being kept informed by the Iraqis. Shahristani noted that the Qataris had not come to the Abu Dhabi Prep Group Compact meeting despite being invited. The Ambassador also described his conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Gul and queried Shahristani on the status of the debt owed Turkish operators for fuel supplies. Shahristani explained that the head of the State Oil Marketing Organization was in Turkey negotiating a debt repayment deal, and that Shahristani expected this would ease the impasse on kerosene and other product supplies to the Kurdish region. He said, however, that the Iraqis would not renew their operating arrangement with the Turks next year, since Turkish conditions dictating the suppliers and their prices was unacceptable. The Minister said that no government could agree to the conditions Turkey was trying to impose, but that the outstanding debt issue would be resolved. -------------- Hydrocarbon Law -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked Shahristani where things stood on the hydrocarbon law and if U.S. help was needed. He explained that our understanding was that there was broad agreement on a hydrocarbon deal, except in the area of contracting. He noted that the Kurdish position that they needed to retain the right to conclude contracts raised suspicions about their motives, which could well include corruption. Moreover, the Ambassador thought the Kurdish position would be de-stabilizing even within the KRG with sub-regions competing with each other for the right to negotiate and sign contracts. Shahristani agreed, and added that U.S. help was not only welcome, but likely necessary to convince the Kurds that, having accepted the principle of revenue-sharing, it only made sense for there to be central control of contracts to ensure revenue maximization that would benefit everyone. Shahristani said that basic agreement had been reached, and that the key element had been to get acceptance of the principle that all the Iraqi people should benefit from oil resources on the basis of national development. He added that the idea that some regions should be compensated for past deprivation had been dropped, since arguably all the regions had suffered, either during the Saddam years or in the period since, so it was just simpler to drop that clause. He added that it was agreed that revenue distribution would be based on per capita shares resulting from the 2007 census. ¶4. (C) He elaborated that the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) would be reconstituted as a holding company with a "large" number of regional operating companies ) some would operate exploration and production companies, some facilities such as the oil terminal. INOC would own the oil produced, but the regional companies would be the operators, with the Oil Ministry's role reduced to that of a regulator. Shahristani stressed that he himself had insisted the Ministry's role would be limited given sensitivities about who might control the Ministry in the future. Shahristani said that a federal or national oil committee could take BAGHDAD 00003653 002.3 OF 003 several forms. It could either be based on the current Energy Committee (11 members),or could be a special experts' body or could just be the Cabinet itself. In any event, in his model the committee would be the body to propose oil policy. This policy should be based on a technical assessment of what the priorities should be, but it should also take into consideration fair geographic balance. The committee would also determine various types or models of contracts. Depending on the choice of the field a different type of contract might be used. ¶5. (C) The only remaining question was who would carry out the negotiations. The Kurds want the regional companies to negotiate the contracts, but the national position is different. Shahristani felt the Kurdish position could lead to civil war, at least in the south, pitting regions like Nasiriyah against current producing areas. Given Kurdish acquiescence to the principle of national distribution of revenues moreover, their position made no sense. Shahristani solicited the Ambassador's aid in convincing the Kurds that logic was not on their side. The Ambassador suggested that if a decision by the board or committee also required the approval of the representative of the region affected, then the regional representative would effectively have a veto. Shahristani agreed that such a mechanism would meet the Kurds' concern about veto by the center. The Ambassador asked whether a draft summary of the agreed-upon principles already existed, or, if not, when one might be available. Shahristani said that while there was no draft summary yet, Ghadban could easily commit the understandings to paper in a few days and offered to provide a copy within the week. ¶6. (C) Shahristani said that he had briefed major oil companies on the workings of the proposed hydrocarbon law when he attended the recent OPEC meeting in Vienna, and the companies expressed their support for the approach. He felt the companies could be helpful also in expressing confidence in the plan once agreement has been reached on it. The Ambassador noted that it was important for the policy board or committee to be as independent as possible, and noted that in the Aramco model, the Minister served as the head of the board, but it was run on a strictly business basis. Shahristani concurred that his goal was to have the work of the committee be as business-like as possible. The Ambassador said he could see the infrastructure architecture of Iraq pulling the country together. Shahristani strongly agreed and added that he wanted to start as soon as possible to develop Iraq's resources for the benefit of all the people and the various regions. ¶7. (C) Shahristani gave a tour d'horizon of the various regional projects that he felt would exert a centripetal effect on Iraq. Starting in the west, he said the Akkas gas field could quickly be developed. While it might make more economic sense not to process the gas in Iraq, but simply send it to Syria, Shahristani said he wanted to invest in gas compressor facilities anyway to signal his commitment to develop the local infrastructure. He said he also wanted to rehabilitate the pipeline from Haditha to Kuwait and to build a spur to Jordan for eventual refining or shipment to Aqaba. These projects depended on the security situation in the west of the country, so investing in Akkas also made sense as a way to show the center was committed to the region. ¶8. (C) Shahristani said that he had encountered problems with the Kurds over gas from wells in the Kormor field, which the Kurds wanted to be piped to Erbil for use in the power plant there, but this project would require construction of a gas separation plant, which could be avoided if the gas were processed in Kirkuk where there is excess capacity. On the other hand, Shahristani noted, the Kurds were happy with the investments MinOil has carried out at the Kuysanjak field. He also noted that his plans to build a pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish border should reassure Kurds about their ability to get their oil to market. Moving south and east, Shahristani said that there was considerable interest on the part of the Japanese to develop the heavy oil field in East Baghdad. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador queried Shahristani about his view on moving army units south to protect the Bayji-Kirkuk pipeline. Shahristani was very supportive of this plan. He went on to say that he was supportive of efforts to reduce corruption at the Bayji refinery, though he wryly noted that Coalition plans to do so with the help of product markers was too sophisticated. All that is needed at Bayji is more checkpoints. He noted however, that orders issued by the Prime Minister to arrest individuals known to be involved in diversion of product at Bayji were being ignored by the army. Shahristani also said that he had stopped going to the Infrastructure Protection Committee meetings because they BAGHDAD 00003653 003.3 OF 003 were just discussions of the problems, with no solutions. ¶10. (C) Shahristani was proud of the investments MinOil and the Government had made in the governorates, claiming that the construction boom in Najaf meant full employment there. He acknowledged however that the situation in Basra was seriously deteriorating with Fadhila elements threatening oil supplies and forcing Oil Ministry workers to strike. Corruption there was preventing exports of product by truck, with charges as high as $1000 per truck being charged by lawless elements. Shahristani expressed frustration over ongoing attacks on transmission lines and pipelines. While the repair teams had cut the time needed to fix lines down to only 48 hours on average, the number of attacks was up to three per week, basically offsetting the progress the repair teams were making. -------------- Supply Shortages -------------- ¶11. (C) Shahristani joked that PM Maliki had told him that supplies promised by Tehran would be slow in coming and in fact they had been. Nevertheless, Shahristani expressed general calm about shortages of LPG and kerosene. On LPG, production would rise to 2000 MT/day on October 1 and this, with supplies from Iran should meet short term needs. Regarding kerosene, he said the problem for Baghdad and the center of the country had been resolved and that a team from SOMO was negotiating a resolution with the Turks that should re-open supplies from the north. Shahristani complained again about the conditions the Turks had imposed on the Iraqi side in terms of which suppliers and what prices were used in the north, but he said he the problems of outstanding debt with the Turks would be resolved and shipments should resume in time for winter demand. -------------- China -------------- ¶12. (C) In parting, Shahristani said he would be going to China on October 16-17 for discussions. He said he would deliver the message to the Chinese that their contracts dating from the Saddam era would have to be re-visited. He added these were, in any event, small fields. -------------- Corruption Case Procedures -------------- ¶13. (C) Shahristani at one point in the conversation mentioned that a distant relative of his had been involved in matters possibly linked to corruption from overcharging for gas, and that Shahristani had taken his relative to task for this involvement. In response to a question, Shaharistani outlined the procedure under which corruption charges were dealt with by the ministries. When corruption allegations were made, a committee had to be convened to review any accusations, and the committee included the ministry's Inspector General (IG). If the IG felt there was reason to investigate further, the case was referred to the Commission for Public Integrity (CPI). If the CPI felt there was substance to any accusations, it referred the case to an investigative judge in a criminal court. The court could then summon an accused official in a ministry for a hearing ) as had happened to one of Shahristani,s own Deputy Ministers, a Kurd. At that point the Minister could intervene and hold up the charges. The problem was that if the investigative judge felt there was a flight risk on the part of the accused, the judge could order preventive detention, so that in effect an official could be incarcerated before a Minister could exercise the prerogative to hold up a warrant. (Comment: Shahristani's explanation of his understanding of the procedures governing corruption investigations is of interest since charges of politically motivated corruption cases are commonly directed at his Ministry. Shahristani was in effect arguing that he has no ability to intervene to protect his officials from preventive detention. End comment.) KHALILZAD