TURKISH AMBASSADOR TELLS CHARGE: IRAQ MUST DO MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003543

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR TELLS CHARGE: IRAQ MUST DO MORE
ON PKK


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 20 meeting with the Turkish
Ambassador to Iraq Unal Cevikoz, Charge gave Cevikoz a
readout of U.S. Special Envoy for Countering the PKK General
(Ret.) Joseph Ralston's September 14-15 meetings in Iraq to
prepare for the upcoming visit to Washington by Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan. Cevikoz noted that Ankara was not
satisfied with the results of Ralston's recent visits,
stating that Iraq has "fallen short of adequately
demonstrating the political will" to resolve the PKK issue.
They then discussed the confusion between the Iraqi Prime
Minister's office and the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara over who
had been selected as the Iraqi interlocutor for the
Trilateral Talks, Amir Ahmad Hassan (a Sunni general) or
Talib al-Kanani (Prime Minister's advisor on military
affairs). While agreeing that the situation was frustrating,
the Charge counseled patience, stressing that it was more
important to take the time to appoint the right candidate.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a September 20 meeting with the Turkish Ambassador
to Iraq Unal Cevikoz, Charge gave Cevikoz a readout of U.S.
Special Envoy for Countering the PKK General (Ret.) Joseph
Ralston's September 14-15 meetings in Iraq to prepare for the
upcoming visit to Washington by Turkish Prime Minister
Erdogan. Cevikoz told Charge he had met with Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri Al Maliki a few days ago, and reemphasized
Ankara's desire to see an appropriate Iraqi interlocutor
named on the PKK issue and a public statement released by
Maliki condemning the PKK as a terrorist organization.
According to Cevikoz, Maliki's response was that he
considered the PKK a terrorist organization and recognized
several other nations had already designated it as such.
Iraq did not need to make a separate designation of PKK as a
terrorist organization but could rely on the fact that this
had already been done by others. For the kind of definitive
statement Ankara is seeking, Maliki reportedly stated, the
Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) would have to be
involved, lengthening the process significantly.


3. (C) Cevikoz then noted that Ankara was not satisfied with
the results. Iraq has "fallen short of adequately
demonstrating the political will" to make the tough decisions
on countering the PKK threat, Cevikoz stated, and Ankara was
not impressed with the statement from the Prime Minister's
office, which Turkish Government officials had noted came
from the "Prime Minister's Press Office," not from Maliki
himself. Cevikoz stated that it was his personal belief that
Ralston himself would not be pleased with the Iraqi
statement, and that if Barzani had been more supportive of
the statement it not might have been so weak. Cevikoz opined
that the solution might be to put more pressure on Barzani,
as this was the likely standing block and not the CoR.

Confusion Over the Iraqi Envoy to the Trilateral Talks
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Cevikoz reported that the status of the Iraqi Envoy
to the Trilateral Talks was unclear. He stated that the
Iraqi Embassy in Ankara had sent a formal note to the Turkish
Government informing them that a Sunni general,
Amir Ahmad Hassan, had been nominated by the Prime Minister
to be the Iraqi envoy. However, in a separate phone
conversation with GOI spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, Cevikoz had
been informed that Maliki had appointed his military advisor
Talib al-Kanani to be the envoy. For clarity on the
situation, Cevikoz contacted the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which informed him that they had never notified the
Iraqi Embassy in Ankara about such an appointment, and
suggested that the information may have come from a Ministry
of Defense through the Defense Attache. Cevikoz strongly
pushed for an Envoy with the authority to speak for the
entire GOI.


5. (C) The Charge replied that the Embassy is also hearing
the same rumors, and informed Cevikoz that we would follow-up
with the PM to get more clarity. In the meantime, the Charge
stressed, it was more important to get the right person
rather than to appoint any interlocutor in a hurry. It
should be done right the first time to ensure that the person
selected would be able to make decisions with authority, be
trusted by both Maliki and Barzani, and have the appropriate
background to deal with the issues.

Turkish Steps to Move Forward with this Process?
-------------- --------------

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6. (C) The Charge asked if the Turks had made any progress
in naming a Turkish liaison officer to accompany Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces in confirming the
closures of the PKK front offices. Cevikoz replied that the
difficulty lay in Turkish troops not being allowed to move
from Camp Victory, and suggested a Turkish Embassy official
accompany the mission. Charge replied that it might be more
suitable to have all Coalition military personnel. Cevikoz
agreed to cable back to Ankara for instructions.


7. (C) When asked whether Ankara planned to do anything to
move this process forward while Baghdad was selecting an
interlocutor for the Trilateral Talks, Cevikoz replied that
he was only aware of the October 2 meeting between Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan and President Bush in Washington. In
addition, Turkish Foreign Minister Gul would be meeting with
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari on 21 September on the
margins of the Iraqi Compact Meeting, and Cevikoz expected
that the PKK issue would be discussed.
SPECKHARD