NINEQA: TURKISH CG BOTSALI VISIT TO MOSUL 19-20

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID MARR PREF TU IZ
SUBJECT: NINEQA: TURKISH CG BOTSALI VISIT TO MOSUL 19-20
SEP 2006

Classified By: NINEWA PRT Leader James Knight: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
This is a Ninewa Provincial Team (PRT) message.

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Turkish Consul General for Mosul Huseyn
Avni Botsali visited Mosul 19-20 Sep. While this
visit was scheduled primarily to initiate contractor
work to harden and rehabilitate the Consulate's
facilities in Mosul, he held productive discussions
on future GOT-Coalition economic and governance
cooperation and GOT perspectives on northern Iraq
with Ninewa PRT Leader Knight, MDN-N Deputy
Commanding General Wiercinski (25th Infantry
Division) and PRT USAID Representative Senykoff.
Botsali promised to follow up on these cooperation
opportunities and fuel issues upon his return to
Ankara. End summary.


2. (C) Botsali and most of his party traveled
overland from Turkey, entering Iraq at Harbur Gate;
the balance of his party and an additional armored
vehicle arrived in Mosul aboard a GOT C-130. PRT
Team Leader Knight met Botsali at 1230 19 Sep at
Mosul Airfield (MAF) on FOB Marez East, and there
held a wide-ranging discussion with Botsali (joined
by his two vice-consuls) while waiting arrival of
the Turkish aircraft. After Botsali's 20 Sep
courtesy call on BG Wiercinski, Team Leader Knight
held an additional meeting at PRT offices which
USAID Representative Senykoff joined. Botsali and
his party departed Mosul at 1410 20 Sep to return
overland to Turkey via Harbur Gate.

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Setting up in Mosul
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3. (S) Botsali detailed that his trip was primarily
to facilitate a site visit for Turkish contractors
who will prepare the new Turkish Consulate facility
in Mosul (formerly the residence of an Iraqi Army
division commander). He expects work to begin in 15
days or less, after which the facility will be in
condition for occupancy within 6-8 weeks. All work
should be completed within 12 weeks. Botsali added
that when fully staffed, the Consulate will include
five diplomats -- himself, two vice-consuls, and two
administrative attaches, as well as 30 Turkish
security personnel who are police officers of the
GOT Ministry of Interior. He expects to take up
residence permanently in Mosul in late November or
early December 2006, when renovation of their new
Consulate has reached an appropriate point.


4. (C) Botsali related that the former GOT
consulate in Mosul had been closed by Saddam in
1996, when the GOI had also closed its consulate in
Istanbul in protest against GOT support for the no-
fly zone and related matters. The GOT had
maintained a consulate in Mosul since before WWII
primarily to support commerce, but the new
Consulate will have a political as well as
commercial role. In discussion with BG Wiercinski,
Botsali emphasized the commercial importance of
Mosul for Turkey, and the consequent importance of
providing visa services and commercial facilitation
at their Consulate. He added that their Mosul
consular district will include Ninewa and the three
provinces of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG),and thus entail overseeing the welfare of the
5,000 or so Turkish nationals working in that area.

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Ready to support economic recovery
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5. (C) Botsali pointed out that the GOT is already
pursuing several capacity-enhancement, economic
development, and governance initiatives for Mosul
and Ninewa Province, including:

-- a visit to Istanbul and Ankara by a 20-member
commercial delegation in the near future but after
Ramadan;
-- a two-week training visit to Ankara by about 35

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Provincial physicians, again after Ramadan; and
-- a two-week orientation and contact visit to
Ankara for 20 faculty members of Mosul University.


6. (C) Botsali emphasized that the GOT is favorably
disposed to provide training in Turkey for municipal
services employees and other capacity-enhancement
projects for Ninewa, including projects that could
be implemented by the Turkish International
Cooperation Agency (TICA). He asked that the PRT
and USAID develop concrete proposals for such
assistance, promising to pursue them in Ankara.
Botsali added that Turcomans living in Ninewa and
the KRG would be best suited as escorts and
facilitators for Turkish initiatives of this kind,
since they speak Arabic and Turkish, and often
Kurdish as well.


7. (C) Botsali noted that the GOT has already
proposed a joint engineering team to rehabilitate
water systems in Tal'Afar, and could widen such
efforts. Botsali pointed out that he had worked
five years in Afghanistan, and that Turkey had taken
responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team
there; that experience could be usefully applied to
Ninewa Province. As security conditions permit, the
GOT may be willing to post assistance program staff
to Mosul.


8. (C) USAID Representative Senykoff responded that
'composite training' and resulting linkages of the
kind proposed by Botsali would fit very well into
USAID's evolving approaches for capacity enhancement
and knowledge-sharing essential for economic
recovery in northern Iraq. Senykoff pointed out
that the USAID PRT office has been working with
UNAMI for some time and has provided office space
for UNAMI; similar courtesies could extended to GOT
development workers as USAID seeks to
internationalize support for Iraq's recovery.
Botsali responded by noting that he has personal
connections to UN offices in Baghdad that might be
useful to support coordinated efforts as they
evolve.

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Ninewa fuel shortages
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9. (C) Botsali insisted the main issue complicating
fuel imports from Turkey is arrears still owed by
the GOI to Turkish companies for deliveries already
made -- about USD 1 mn, he believes. He also
pointed out that the GOI plans to invite the GOI
Minister of Economy to Ankara for a working visit,
which will be an appropriate occasion to address
this issue (Note: Presumably Botsali meant Iraq's
Minister of Oil; there is no Minister of Economy per
se. End note.)


10. (C) When queried by the Team Leader whether
these arrears are implicated in the enormous backlog
of fuel trucks now at Harbur Gate, he replied that
he did not believe so, and that he was uncertain why
congestion there is so severe. He asked for details
on the magnitude of the problem, and promised to
seek clarification and resolution when he returns to
Ankara. Botsali noted in his comments to BG
Wiercinski that LPG deliveries from Turkey have
already resumed.


11. (C) Note: the backlog of fuel trucks at Harbur
was reported to exceed 3,500 vehicles at one point
in August. The PRT is verifying current numbers of
fuel trucks waiting to clear the border there and
will pass that number to Botsali by e-mail. End
note.

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The KRG, disputed territories, and Turcomans
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12. (C) Botsali insisted that there are no
particular urgent GOT issues for the KRG at this
time, but then somewhat defensively described in
detail GOT protection for Iraqi Kurds during
Saddam's anti-Kurd campaigns. He clarified that
'protection' included refuge in Turkey and some

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humanitarian aid for Kurds so displaced.


13. (C) When asked about GOT views on disputed
territories within Ninewa that might eventually be
incorporated into the KRG, he noted that the Makhmur
refugee camp 'must be closed', then added that
current Makhmur camp residents without terrorist
connections are welcome to return to Turkey. (Note:
the 'disputed territories' in question include
Makhmur, Sinjar, Zumar, which were moved out of
traditionally Kurd-dominated provinces now part of
the KRG during Saddam's regime. End note.) Botsali
took the opportunity to insist that the U.S. risks
the fate of the Soviets in Afghanistan if Iraq falls
victim to ethnic cleansing and then fragments into
separate political units.


14. (S) When queried by the Team Leader on current
GOT concerns for Iraq's Turcomans, Botsali noted in
the first instance GOT policy for Iraq is not
'ethnically driven'. He observed that Iraq's
Turcomans are 'politically disorganized' and not
proportionally represented in Iraqi legislative and
executive bodies. Botsali further observed that
Iraqi Turcomans are more driven by sectarian (Shi'a
or Sunni) than ethnic (Turcoman) loyalties.

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Worried about security in Mosul
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15. (S) At his MAF meeting with Team Leader Knight,
Botsali stated that he believed the security
situation in Mosul has significantly deteriorated
recently. In a discussion of Mosul security the
following day at the PRT meeting with Team Leader
Knight and Deputy Team Leader LTC Brackney, he
seemed somewhat more relaxed about those conditions
but emphasized that he 'does not trust' the
capabilities and motivation of Iraqi police in the
city. He again recalled his experience in
Afghanistan, which taught him that training and new
equipment are not enough to make an effective
security force. We pointed out that the situation
in Mosul remains serious, but that both the Iraqi
Police and Army forces deployed in Mosul are
regularly demonstrating great initiative and
effectiveness.


16. (S) Botsali was especially impressed by DTL
Brackney's point that Iraqi police in Mosul are
planning and executing effective security missions
without direct Coalition inducement or close direct
oversight, as well as our observation that insurgent
improvised explosive device (ICED) operations have
become progressively less expert and thus
significantly less effective in recent months. We
again emphasized that security in the city has not
deteriorated since Botsali's last visit in July
2006, although there are spikes and lulls in
insurgent activity.

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COMMENT
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17. (C) Botsali was unexpectedly forthcoming in his
offers to support and pursue GOT development and
governance programs in coordination with USAID and
international development organizations. We note
that USAID Representative Senykoff is within days of
his permanent departure from Iraq and still without
an identified successor: it will be difficult to
mobilize this opportunity if an equally seasoned and
effective USAID Representative is not posted to the
PRT in a timely fashion.


18. (S) Comment continued: Although Botsali
continued to seek logistical, intelligence, and
security support for him and his Consulate from
Coalition forces during this visit, his efforts were
relatively muted. He appears somewhat reluctantly
resigned to reliance on Iraqi authorities for his
Consulate's security, although his GOT security
arrangements in Mosul will also be robust. During
this visit he was hosted by Mosul Governor
Kashmoula, and security and logistical arrangements
for his party were made through GOI channels.

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Botsali appears to have been somewhat reassured that
his Consulate can begin effective operations once
the new Consulate facilities can be occupied. End
comment.


19. (C) Bio note: When asked about his anticipated
tenure as CG in Mosul, Botsali observed that that he
was appointed CG on 7 Dec 2005, and that his normal
tour would be for two years despite conditions which
have so far prevented his residence in Mosul. He
expects onward assignment as an Ambassador by
December 2007, although he is uncertain where he
will be posted.
SPECKHARD