PRT BAGHDAD: IRAQI POLICE PERCEPTION OF

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 003505 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PINR PTER PINS IZ SUBJECT: PRT BAGHDAD: IRAQI POLICE PERCEPTION OF CAPABILITIES ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In furtherance of Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) operations, PRT officers visited seven police stations in BSP focus areas in September. Our conversations with senior police officials revealed that police officers believe or want us to believe that BSP focus area residents lack confidence in local Iraqi Police (IP) units and that area IP leaders think violence will return to pre-BSP levels when the Coalition Forces (CF) disengage. Local IP leaders have also apparently concluded that their officers lack training and experience, especially with weapons. Bureaucratic blockages between the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and local police stations have reportedly resulted in inadequate equipment, operations and maintenance, and detainee tracking. In addition, militia infiltration of local police stations is believed to be widespread. Such a situation, if true, would be cause for concern. END SUMMARY. IPs: Residents' Lack of Confidence, Violence to Return without CF-IA Presence -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) IP officials from most BSP focus areas disclosed to us during our September visits that area residents have little confidence in the abilities of local IP forces. Investigative police, for example, complained that residents will not speak to them about security incidents and will not let them enter their homes without CF present. A police station commander in Al Rasheed District confirmed that residents "refuse" to speak with his officers because the police "are not trusted by the residents." ¶3. (SBU) While pleased with the recent decline in violence due to BSP security operations, many senior IP officials asserted that the improved security will be impossible to sustain without the continued presence of the CF. These officials said they expect violence to rise after the CF disengage. A police station commander in Al Mansour District said the calm will only "last as long as the CF and Iraqi Army are present." IP Leaders: Officers Lack Training -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Police leaders also complained that most of their officers, particularly the recent recruits, lack training and experience, especially with weapons. Some of our sources complained that they themselves had received little formal and on-the-job training. A police station commander in Al Rasheed District surmised that "approximately seventy percent of his officers" were inadequately trained, especially for work in such a difficult security environment. Bureaucratic Blockages Between MoI and Local IPs -------------- --- ¶5. (SBU) IP officials also stated that lack of MoI support for equipment, operations and maintenance, and detainee tracking prevent them from patrolling areas and conducting proper investigations. Most of the facilities we saw need general maintenance and additional supplies, and their equipment and vehicles require repair. Few have adequate facilities for detainees. IPs on Militia Infiltration -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to several recent police station monthly reports from the stations visited, many IP officials consider their ranks to be infiltrated by sectarian militias in spite of CF presence at the stations. Investigative IPs from Al Rasheed claimed that militia members among the police ranks are responsible for many of the killings in the area. The officials feel powerless to investigate because of lack of internal police and national MoI support. Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The observations above are not official IP assessments. We will try to obtain information confirming or refuting the claims that the IP local station officials in BSP focus areas have been inadequately trained and are without sufficient resources to perform regular area patrols and to conduct proper investigations. Such a situation would be cause for concern. END COMMENT. SPECKHARD