AL ANBAR GOVERNOR QUESTIONS GOVERNMENT'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AL ANBAR GOVERNOR QUESTIONS GOVERNMENT'S
COMMITMENT TO PROVINCE, FEDERALISM PROSPECTS

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Al Anbar cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Al Anbar Governor Ma'moun Sami Rasheed Al-
Awani told MNF-W Deputy Commanding General and Al Anbar
PolOff August 21 that central government officials appeared
to want to sideline the province. The lack of sustained
financial resources proved especially worrisome to him.
Governor Ma'moun said flatly that PM Maliki's government
makes us feel as if we are the enemy. He noted that most
residents in the province opposed efforts toward
federalism, equating it with division of Iraq. The
governor himself did not see federalism as a problem, but
added that a changed Sunni-Arab mindset on the matter would
take several more years. He flagged that he wanted to
reintroduce collection of local taxes within the province.
END SUMMARY.

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COMMITMENT TO ANBAR QUESTIONED; GOVERNMENT WANTS ANARCHY HERE
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3. (C) In a meeting held August 21 at the Government Center
in central Ramadi, Governor Ma'moun Sami Rasheed Al-Awani
told MNF-W Deputy Commanding General and PolOff that PM Al-
Maliki's government needed to do more to demonstrate a
genuine commitment to Al Anbar province. He listed several
complaints, including a request letter that he had
previously submitted to the Prime Minister's office that
had yet to elicit a formal response - including reasons for
arresting Al Anbar's provincial police chief. The governor
also questioned the lack of financial resources committed
to the province's rebuilding, beyond funds already
allocated for Fallujah. COMMENT: Following extensive CF
engagement, Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr recently agreed
to release a portion (40 percent or USD 39M in dinar) of
GOI-budgeted reconstruction money for Al Anbar projects,
provided that the dinar be transported and safeguarded by
Marines. This money has not yet been transported to Al
Anbar; the province must first send a treasury
representative to Baghdad, pick-up and cash the MoF check,
and then coordinate transport of the bulk dinar. END
COMMENT.


4. (C) Governor Ma'moun criticized the GOI's failure to
reach out to Al Anbar more proactively and consistently.
He said that the perception of Anbaris as the enemy seemed
to prevail inside the current government, adding we need to
fix this concept. The governor said that he believed GOI
officials were trying to marginalize the province, and keep
anarchy and the struggle here - and suggested that the
Shia-led government favored prolonging CF in the fight
against Sunni extremists. PolOff stressed the U.S.'s
continued support for PM Maliki's unity government, which
included proportionate Sunni-Arab representation.

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FEDERALISM EQUALS DIVISION
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5. (C) The populace in Anbar still rejected talk of
federalism and equated it with the division of Iraq,
according to Governor Ma'moun. He said that some GOI
leaders would likely press the issue when the council of
representatives reconvened. The concept was strange to
most Anbaris, who believed it would lead to the destruction
of the country. Personally, he did not see a problem with
Iraq's eventual transition to a more federal structure, but
a similar mindset among Sunni-Arabs would take several more
years. The governor noted that we are still using weapons
as dialogue; there is no free speech.


6. (C) Governor Ma'moun said that he wanted to re-establish
a system of local taxes. This step would help the province
address rebuilding needs internally, without total
dependence on central government-controlled resources.


7. (C) COMMENT: Most in Al Anbar Province remain critical
of the new government. Governor Ma'moun's frank criticisms
point to underlying frustrations about the lack of tangible
results post-election, particularly in lagging
infrastructure investment and bureaucratically stymied
rebuilding funds. Anbaris' automatic rejection of
federalism might be lessened, over time, should they see a
functional provincial government as an effective governing
body and advocate in Baghdad. National-level Sunni-Arab
political leaders have an opportunity to demonstrate

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success in winning basic constituent services for Al Anbar
Province. So far, however, their failure - on top of
perceived GOI policies to exclude the province - has only
solidified Anbaris' pessimism and innate paranoia about the
Shia-led government. END COMMENT.
SPECKHARD