BADR CORPS SECGEN VIEWS ON MILITIA DEMOBILIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003399

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PNAT PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BADR CORPS SECGEN VIEWS ON MILITIA DEMOBILIZATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 02979

B. BAGHDAD 03282

Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Margaret Scobey, reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) SUMMARY: On September 5, Council of Representatives
(CoR) member and Shiite Badr Corps Secretary General Hadi
Al-Amiri met with Embassy and MNF-I officials to share views
on how to deal with militias in Iraq. Amiri reiterated
strong support for the implementation of CPA Order 91 but
believes pre-regime and post-regime militias should be dealt
with differently. He requested U.S. support in lobbying the
GOI for retirement of additional Badr Corps members. Amiri
cautioned that any plan to control or disband militias must
also address other legally sanctioned armed groups,
including ministry-controlled Facility Protection Service
(FPS) forces, private security companies and personal
security details (PSDs). END SUMMARY.

CPA ORDER 91
--------------


2. (C) Hadi Al-Amiri said he considered militias a serious
problem for Iraq and that the longer there was a delay in
dealing with them, the bigger the problem will become.
Repeating his position from a previous meeting with Embassy
and MNF-I officials, Amiri said that militias should be dealt
with according to CPA-91 as soon as possible (REF B).

3. (C) Amiri asked for support for the integration of several
thousand additional Badr Corps members into the ISF and to
retire or provide stipends to widows and orphans of over
6,000 additional members. (COMMENT: The original agreement to
integrate or retire Badr Corps members was reached by CPA in
2004 (REF A); MFN-I will address the issue in follow-up
discussions. END COMMENT).

DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS
--------------


4. (C) On Amiri said all armed groups could not be dealt with
in the same way. He described four categories of armed
groups which he believes must be dealt with separately from
the CPA 91 process: Takfiri ) ideologically motivated
terrorist groups; Saddamist ) former regime military,
security and government officials actively fighting against
the coalition and government; criminal enterprises; and
sectarian extremists ) groups organized along strictly
sectarian lines that are actively targeting other groups.


5. (C) Amiri held that the first two groups must be faced
head on and eliminated. They would not negotiate nor be open
to dialogue and this should not be attempted. Organized
criminal gangs or Mafia-style organizations must be dealt
with by law enforcement. Only sectarian groups, which
included militias, could be negotiated with. The Iraqi
government, and religious and tribal leaders should engage
these groups and attempt to convince them to stop their
activities. Amiri stated that if sectarian groups could not
be convinced to change their ways, they would have to be
taken on and dealt with similar to the other three groups.


6. (C) Amiri also said that a clear distinction must be made
between militias organized before the fall of the Saddam
regime (pre-collapse) and afterwards (post-collapse). Groups
formed pre-collapse must be appropriately honored for their
struggle against Saddam and dealt with more generously then
those organized post-Saddam. Regardless of when formal
militias were organized, job opportunities must be created
for their members and joining the army should be an option
for all former younger members and retirement for those who
are older who joined pre-collapse militias. Amiri said that
many members in the Mahdi Army (formed after Saddam,s fall)
were misguided youth who could be brought under control if
they had jobs. Militia members who would not join the
political process must be dealt with by force.

OTHER ARMED GROUPS
--------------


7. (C) Amiri stressed that any plan to deal with militias
must also address other armed groups operating in Iraq.
Amiri said he considered Facility Protective Service (FPS)
forces to be ministry-controlled militias. Amiri said that
these forces, which he estimated to number as many as
150,000, should be taken out of ministry control and placed
under either the MOD or MOI.


8. (C) Private security companies or contractors are another
serious problem. Amiri said that there are over 80 major
companies operating in Iraqi and that they must be

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registered, placed under some kind of control, and limited in
the types of weapons they can carry and areas of movement.


9. (C) Amiri said that personal security details (PSDs) need
to trained and brought under control. He claimed to have
received numerous complaints of abuses by PSD teams, to
include PSD teams posing as intelligence or MOI/MOD to
conduct kidnappings.


10. (C) COMMENT: Given his position as Chairman of the CoR,s
Security and Defense Committee and the Badr Corps Secretary
General, Amiri,s views are influential with CoR members and
moderate Shia factions. His insistence that pre-Saddam
militias must be distinguished from and dealt with more
gently then those formed afterward reflects that fact that
his Badr Corps falls into the pre-Saddam category. END
SUMMARY.
KHALILZAD