S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003345

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SALAH AD DIN PROVINCIAL OFFICIAL DISCUSSES BAATH
PARTY AND COMING PARTY CONVENTION

Classified by Charles O. Blaha, Deputy Political Counselor,
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Salah ad Din Province Vice Governor Abdullah

H. M. Ejbarah claims the Baath Party is planning to hold a
national convention in Salah ad Din province before the end
of the year to begin the party's reintegration into Iraq's
political process. The party will expel Saddam to
demonstrate that the party is ready to participate
democratically. Ejbarah expects that many of the party's
senior leaders in Iraq and in exile will attend, representing
what he claimed are the party's four million supporters. PRT
Salah ad Din assesses Ejbarah as a central figure to the
political process in the Sunni and former Baathist heartland
of Salah ad Din Province. His proposed Baath Party
reunification is at odds with the current strong national
consensus that some form of de-baathification should go
forward, but continuing to exclude Baathists who support
democracy from the politics may cause them to subvert the
process or resort to violence. END SUMMARY.

Bringing Back the Baath Party
--------------


2. (S) In a carefully constructed argument, Salah ad Din
(SaD) Vice Governor Abdullah H. M. Ejbarah described both the
desire and the need to re-integrate the Baath Party into the
political process in a meeting with poloffs in Baghdad on
September 8. Ejbarah said the Baath Party is still very
active in all parts of the country, including the south, and
that among the party's 4 million supporters are many Shia.
He said he is in daily contact with all of the party's
regional leaders.

National Convention
--------------


3. (S) Ejbarah said the party is planning to have a national,
all-inclusive convention before the end of the year in Salah
ad Din, to include party leaders and members from all three
regions and in exile. In discussing the way forward, Ejbarah
has told the party members that there are three essential
elements that they must embrace: publicly condemn/reject
Saddam Hussein and Izzat Al Douri, isolating remaining

supporters and stating clearly there will be no return to
supporting that regime's policies; condemn/forbid insurgent
activity, against both Iraqis and CF, recognizing any such
activity as a terrorist act against Iraq; and embrace the
new, democratic political process. He seemed confident that
the party leaders and rank-and-file would agree to these
pre-conditions.

On Saddam
--------------


4. (S) Additionally, he said the party must officially expel
Saddam. Ejbarah said that when Saddam hid from the CF, he
went "from a dictator to a mouse," losing favor in the eyes
of the people. Recently, however, Saddam has been becoming
more popular through his impassioned speeches in the court
room. In Ejbarah,s thinking, if the party officially expels
Saddam, it will demonstrate in a tangible way to Iraqis and
to CF that the party has changed and is ready to participate
in the democratic political process. In separate
conversations with the SaD PRT Leader, Ejbarah has said that
Izzat al Douri must also be expelled; he stated that much of
the financing of insurgent activity is linked to al Douri.

Re-Thinking De-Baathification
--------------


5. (S) Ejbarah said the CF had been ill-advised to pursue
de-baathification in what he claims was a rigid way, because
it has cut an important part of the population out of the
political process. He predicted that Iraq's new political
authorities will keep these reformed Baathists out of
government but that allowing this to happen would not be
representative of "the whole political spectrum." He
characterized the recent reconciliation meeting of tribal
leaders as calling for the Baath Party to remain in
existence. (NOTE: The conference's final declaration merely
called for re-evaluation of the de-baathification process.
END NOTE.)


6. (S) According to Ejbarah, the only way to prevent civil
war, division of Iraq, and increased Iranian influence is to

BAGHDAD 00003345 002 OF 002


bring the Baath Party back into the political fold.

Comment
--------------


7. (S) PRT Salah ad Din assesses Ejbarah as politically
savvy, straight-talking, and central to the political process
in the Sunni and former Baathist heartland of Salah ad Din
Province. His views are representative of other Sunni
leaders who are keen to re-engage in the political process.
However, his idea to reintegrate using the Baath Party as his
vehicle is at odds with the current strong national consensus
that some form of de-baathification should go forward. At
present, it does not appear that GOI leaders intend to change
many of the de-baathification policies in place, leaving
little maneuver room for Ejbarah and his colleagues.


8. (S) This will be problematic. Those who support democracy
but continue to see themselves excluded from their country's
formal political process will be hard-pressed to rein in the
disaffected who may eventually believe that alternative
means, including subverting the process or resorting to
violence, are the only ones left to them. END COMMENT.
SPECKHARD