TALABANI ACCUSES TURKISH MILITARY OF UNDERMINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003255

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI ACCUSES TURKISH MILITARY OF UNDERMINING
PEACE TALKS WITH OCALAN

REF: ANKARA 4999

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) In separate meetings on August 30 and September 2,
President Talabani updated the Charge d'Affaires on steps
taken by the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) to push the PKK toward a ceasefire.
Charge began the meeting on August 30 by raising the spate
of attacks in Turkey the previous week, all attributed to the
PKK or its front offices, and questioning how this reconciled
with the supposed interest in a cease-fire. (NOTE: Charge
was referring to the spate of attacks and bombings from
August 21-28. See Ankara 4999. END NOTE) Talabani noted
that the PKK denied responsibility for those attacks, but
eventually conceded that they may have been involved.
Talabani accused the new chief of the Turkish General Staff
(TGS),General Yasar Buyukanit, of trying to cause more
conflict between the PKK and the Government of Turkey (GOT).
Talabani darkly referred to a linkage between Buyakanit and
complicity in a car bombing in southern Turkey directed
against the Turkish Kurds several years ago, and complained
that the Turkish military leadership is actively undermining
efforts to resolve the PKK conflict. When asked, Talabani
claimed that the Turkish General Staff needed a threat to
justify their budgets and significance to Turkish security.


2. (C) Despite the Charge's urging, Talabani demurred on
taking more steps to cut off supply routes to the PKK or to
encircle PKK camps with peshmerga forces. Likewise, he
delayed making more public statements condemning the PKK as a
terrorist organization, citing the need to give a few more
days to seeing if his efforts to encompass them to "lay down
their arms" would produce results. Talabani accused the
Turks of trying to undermine the process by pushing for too
much too quickly, and stated that Ankara does not understand
the art of convincing others, only the use of power.
Talabani then passed to the Charge a letter he had recently
received from the PKK leadership, explaining that the reason
they had not called for a ceasefire yet was twofold: first,
it was difficult to mobilize such a broad-based organization
so quickly and second, the PKK had no confidence that the
Turks would not continue to use force against them even if
they observed a cease-fire. (NOTE: See full text of letter
below, paragraph 4. END NOTE)


3. (C) Talabani asked the Charge to press for the immediate
arrival to the region of the new U.S. Envoy for Countering
the PKK, and to put pressure on Ankara to allow Turkish Kurd
political leader Dr. Ahmad Turk or one of his lawyers to see
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Talabani complained
that the GOT was divided internally on this issue: while
Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Gul, and the Turkish
military intelligence organization agreed on the need for
Ocalan to meet with either Turk or his civil defense
attorneys, the TGS was blocking access to Ocalan. In a
subsequent meeting on 2 September, however, Talabani informed
the Charge that the GOT will permit a visit with Ocalan in
prison. Talabani expressed hope that this meeting would
result in Ocalan publicly declaring a ceasefire, which the
"people in the mountain" would hopefully accept. Talabani
promised to confirm the information for the Charge.


4. (U) Begin Text:

Mr. President,

We have received your letter dated August 2, 2006 and
realized that it is our duty to express our sincere thanks
for the interest you have expressed. I met with Mr. Mohammad
Ameen Benjewini who conveyed your valuable opinion. We
discussed the issues which you tried to draw our attention
to. But I felt that it is better to express, our positions
and views in regard to finding a peaceful solution to the
Kurdish issue in northern Kurdistan, in this letter.

We hereby assert that the opinions you have outlined in this
letter, and what Mr. Benjewini conveyed, are valuable
opinions which we take seriously and with due respect. We
would like to inform you that this matter was included in our
agenda from the time Mr. Mustafa Sayyid Qadir communicated
your proposals when we met with him few months ago, and when
our representative met with him at a later date. These
opinions and ideas had the greatest influence on our decision
to introduce this latest initiative.

In general and through what we have announced, we would have

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thus entered a peaceful stage in our struggle which includes
the possibility of reaching a ceasefire if the elements of
confidence and positive steps were exhibited by the other
side. Although your opinions on this subject matter are
accepted by us, nonetheless we haven't announced an immediate
ceasefire for reasons I will attempt to sum up in two key
points:

First: Our movement is broad based and includes many
institutions, parties, and organizations; each having its
special organizational identity. Consequently we face many
difficulties in persuading the components of the movement and
its popular base of the necessity to unilaterally introduce
an initiative in this respect, particularly when there are no
positive signs from the other party. And if we attempt to
proceed with such a step regardless of this fact, our
organizational structure will face considerable problems.

Second: In previous stages of our struggle, we experimented
with this a number of times. Our experiments in this respect
confirm that if the initiative lacks the agreement of the two
parties, it will fail. For example; what would a unilateral
ceasefire mean if units of the Turkish Army continue in their
military operations which today cover all areas of northern
Kurdistan?

The continuation of the Turkish Army military operations will
certainly lead to the outbreak of fighting and losses on both
sides. Therefore, I believe that halting Turkish Army
military operations is needed, as one of the most important
prerequisites for the success of the peaceful process.

We are confident that through our declared initiative, we
have achieved the larger segment of your proposals and
opinions and have carried out the important part of our
responsibilities within the framework of our special
circumstances. And through the historic role that you are
playing and your position which we cherish, I once again
express my confidence and hope that you will play the role
which we expect you to play in completing what remains.

We appreciate the achievements of our people in southern
Kurdistan and we are ready to exert all sacrifices required
to defend them. But we also realize that Kurdistan has been
transformed into a divided reality, against the will of the
Kurds. Therefore, a solution that is limited to one part of
the homeland will continue to face problems and challenges
with the various powers, when solution in absent in the other
parts. Consequently, we believe that a solution that deals
with the issue in all parts of Kurdistan will be the sole
assurance for the protection of southern Kurdistan from
facing problems. Thus we must play roles that will impose on
the powers that govern the other parts of Kurdistan to
recognize the existence of the Kurds and to solve their issue
peacefully. With that, the potentials and achievements of
our people in the south will be used to find a solution to
the issues of the Kurds in other parts.

As for us, we are discussing the initiative which we launched
and the declaration which we issued, meaning our entry in the
ceasefire phase. Our main goal is to reach a process of true
silencing of weapons as soon as possible. The issue here is
in dire need of positive echoes from the Turkish side and
speed in carrying out the anticipated steps and for the
United States of America to fulfill its responsibilities and
demonstrate them on the ground. On this basis we will be
ready to do our share of tasks and on the basis of our belief
that you will exert more efforts to find a formula that the
various parties, the USA, Turkey, and the PKK, agree to, and
on the basis of our confidence in your feeling of
responsibility concerning the issues of the Kurds in the
other parts, we present to you our greetings and best wishes
for good health.

//signed//, Chairman of the Executive Council, Democratic
Confederation of Kurdistan
Murad Qraielan
August 25, 2006
END TEXT
SPECKHARD