SUNNI COR MEMBER DEFENDS MASHHADANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003029

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI COR MEMBER DEFENDS MASHHADANI


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a late meeting on August 17 with the
Ambassador, Sunni National Dialogue Front (INCD) Council of
Representatives (CoR) member Sheikh Abd al-Nasir al-Jenabi
stubbornly defended CoR Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani's
performance and demanded that he retain his position in the
CoR. While admitting that Mashhadani's statements may not
always appear proper, al-Jenabi claimed that Mashhadani is
genuinely committed to Iraq. The Ambassador responded with
two main points: Mashhadani needed to pay more careful
attention to his public statements, and he should consult
with others in the government before making significant
decisions like state visits and signing international
agreements. In addition, the Ambassador noted that Sunni
Arab participation in the political process and the national
unity government had not resulted in any appreciable decline
in the level of violence in Iraq, particularly against
Coalition Forces in Sunni Arab areas. He called on the Sunni
Arab political parties, Tawafuq in particular, to develop a
unified policy position that would improve the stability and
prosperity of Iraq. END SUMMARY.

Mashhadani on Thin Ice
--------------


2. (C) In a late meeting on August 17 with the Ambassador,
Sunni National Dialogue Front (INCD) Council of
Representatives (CoR) member Sheikh Abd al-Nasir al-Jenabi
stubbornly defended CoR Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani's
performance and demanded that he retain his position in the
CoR. Al-Jenabi claimed that Mashhadani should be given
credit for creating Tawafuq, which in turn led to the forming
of the current parliament. Mashhadani continues to have the
most influence in the CoR, and will probably have the most
impact in resolving the problems facing Iraq today, he said.
Therefore, removing Mashhadani as Speaker would be viewed as
a "negative escalation" to the Sunni Arabs, destroying the
political process and exacerbating the already significant
security problems in Iraq. If such a move were to be made,
however, it would be Tawafuq - specifically the INCD - who
would decide on the replacement. In addition, since the
selection of Mashhadani was done as part of a larger
negotiation for a national unity government, if the
government chose to replace Mashhadani the INCD would demand
that the rest of the government also be replaced.


3. (C) Although al-Jenabi admitted that some of Mashhadani's
statements may not be viewed as "proper", Mashhadani was
simply voicing what the public felt. The "street" respected
this very much, al-Jenabi said, and noted that in times of
upheaval one needed a "man of the people." For example,
Mashhadani's statements on Lebanon appeased the public's need
to express solidarity and outrage at the suffering of the
Lebanese people and averted a potentially more destabilizing
mass protest, al-Jenabi claimed. Similarly, with respect to
Mashhadani's statements on the US "occupation" and "invasion"
of Iraq, Mashhadani was merely reflecting the popular
sentiments of his constituency base in areas that have
traditionally rejected the American presence in Iraq.


4. (C) The Ambassador responded with two main points:
Mashhadani needed to pay more careful attention to his public
statements, and that he should consult with others in the
government before making significant decisions like state
visits and signing international agreements. First, the
Ambassador noted that as the Speaker of the CoR, Mashhadani
was no longer representing a single constituency, but the
whole of Iraq. As such, Mashhadani needed to be careful not
to destroy his credibility - both at home and abroad - with
ill-considered statements, such as referring to Iraq as
"Americastan." For example, the Ambassador remarked,
Mashhadani had complained recently about Iranian interference
in his public statements, only to travel to Iran and hold
private meetings with senior Iranian officials like the head
of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This
kind of contradictory behavior gave rise to rumors that
Mashhadani had been bribed by the Iranians, the Ambassador
warned.


5. (C) Second, the Ambassador stressed the importance of
teamwork and communication within the government. The
Ambassador noted that Mashhadani did not bring other members
of the government with him in his recent trips to Iran and
Syria, let alone receive permission to go on official visits
from the Prime Minister's office or any other executive body.
Even within his own party, Tawafuq, officials were surprised
by Mashhadani's actions. Both CoR member Khalaf Ulayan and
Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi told the Ambassador in
separate meetings that they had been surprised by
Mashhadani's trip to Syria. Tawafuq will need to consult and
develop a consistent political policy in order to counter the
impression that it is hopelessly fractured. Direct

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communication between political blocs is also necessary for
the national unity government to function effectively, the
Ambassador stated. He reminded al-Jenabi that the Prime
Minister had consulted the cabinet and leaders of the various
political blocs (within the structure of the Policy Committee
for National Security) for advice and guidance before making
the decision to go the US. True leadership involved winning
consensus from the various blocs, the Ambassador warned, not
presenting the government with a fait accompli.

Sunni Arab Politicians Need to Deliver
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador stated that Sunni Arab participation in
the political process and the national unity government had
not resulted in any appreciable decline in the level of
violence in Iraq, particularly against Coalition Forces in
Sunni Arab areas. Both the Shia and the Kurds had also been
expecting that greater Sunni Arab participation in the
political process would result in better security for Baghdad
and a decrease in violent attacks. The Ambassador noted that
much work remained to be done, including working on broad
agreements across the political spectrum on key issues such
as the Constitutional review, federalism, natural resources,
de-Baathification, militias, and the insurgency. On
de-Baathification, for example, the Sunni Arab parties could
work with other groups within the CoR to annul or modify the
de-Baathification Commission; yet Tawafuq has done nothing.


7. (C) Al-Jenabi declared that the general security situation
in Iraq was due to two main factors: the disbanding of the
Iraqi Army by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),and
the de-Baathification law. If the Ambassador would only
cancel the de-Baathification law himself, then 50 percent of
the problems in Iraq would evaporate, according to al-Jenabi.
He asked the Ambassador to cooperate with the Sunni Arabs to
retain "balance" in the government, make clear that the US is
not in favor of dividing Iraq into three parts, and to
maintain strong central authority "as in the past." The
Ambassador reminded al-Jenabi that, while U.S. policy
remained committed to a unified Iraq that can stand on its
own feet.
KHALILZAD