SUNNI COR MEMBER DEFENDS MASHHADANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003029 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI COR MEMBER DEFENDS MASHHADANI Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a late meeting on August 17 with the Ambassador, Sunni National Dialogue Front (INCD) Council of Representatives (CoR) member Sheikh Abd al-Nasir al-Jenabi stubbornly defended CoR Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani's performance and demanded that he retain his position in the CoR. While admitting that Mashhadani's statements may not always appear proper, al-Jenabi claimed that Mashhadani is genuinely committed to Iraq. The Ambassador responded with two main points: Mashhadani needed to pay more careful attention to his public statements, and he should consult with others in the government before making significant decisions like state visits and signing international agreements. In addition, the Ambassador noted that Sunni Arab participation in the political process and the national unity government had not resulted in any appreciable decline in the level of violence in Iraq, particularly against Coalition Forces in Sunni Arab areas. He called on the Sunni Arab political parties, Tawafuq in particular, to develop a unified policy position that would improve the stability and prosperity of Iraq. END SUMMARY. Mashhadani on Thin Ice -------------- ¶2. (C) In a late meeting on August 17 with the Ambassador, Sunni National Dialogue Front (INCD) Council of Representatives (CoR) member Sheikh Abd al-Nasir al-Jenabi stubbornly defended CoR Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani's performance and demanded that he retain his position in the CoR. Al-Jenabi claimed that Mashhadani should be given credit for creating Tawafuq, which in turn led to the forming of the current parliament. Mashhadani continues to have the most influence in the CoR, and will probably have the most impact in resolving the problems facing Iraq today, he said. Therefore, removing Mashhadani as Speaker would be viewed as a "negative escalation" to the Sunni Arabs, destroying the political process and exacerbating the already significant security problems in Iraq. If such a move were to be made, however, it would be Tawafuq - specifically the INCD - who would decide on the replacement. In addition, since the selection of Mashhadani was done as part of a larger negotiation for a national unity government, if the government chose to replace Mashhadani the INCD would demand that the rest of the government also be replaced. ¶3. (C) Although al-Jenabi admitted that some of Mashhadani's statements may not be viewed as "proper", Mashhadani was simply voicing what the public felt. The "street" respected this very much, al-Jenabi said, and noted that in times of upheaval one needed a "man of the people." For example, Mashhadani's statements on Lebanon appeased the public's need to express solidarity and outrage at the suffering of the Lebanese people and averted a potentially more destabilizing mass protest, al-Jenabi claimed. Similarly, with respect to Mashhadani's statements on the US "occupation" and "invasion" of Iraq, Mashhadani was merely reflecting the popular sentiments of his constituency base in areas that have traditionally rejected the American presence in Iraq. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador responded with two main points: Mashhadani needed to pay more careful attention to his public statements, and that he should consult with others in the government before making significant decisions like state visits and signing international agreements. First, the Ambassador noted that as the Speaker of the CoR, Mashhadani was no longer representing a single constituency, but the whole of Iraq. As such, Mashhadani needed to be careful not to destroy his credibility - both at home and abroad - with ill-considered statements, such as referring to Iraq as "Americastan." For example, the Ambassador remarked, Mashhadani had complained recently about Iranian interference in his public statements, only to travel to Iran and hold private meetings with senior Iranian officials like the head of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This kind of contradictory behavior gave rise to rumors that Mashhadani had been bribed by the Iranians, the Ambassador warned. ¶5. (C) Second, the Ambassador stressed the importance of teamwork and communication within the government. The Ambassador noted that Mashhadani did not bring other members of the government with him in his recent trips to Iran and Syria, let alone receive permission to go on official visits from the Prime Minister's office or any other executive body. Even within his own party, Tawafuq, officials were surprised by Mashhadani's actions. Both CoR member Khalaf Ulayan and Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi told the Ambassador in separate meetings that they had been surprised by Mashhadani's trip to Syria. Tawafuq will need to consult and develop a consistent political policy in order to counter the impression that it is hopelessly fractured. Direct BAGHDAD 00003029 002 OF 002 communication between political blocs is also necessary for the national unity government to function effectively, the Ambassador stated. He reminded al-Jenabi that the Prime Minister had consulted the cabinet and leaders of the various political blocs (within the structure of the Policy Committee for National Security) for advice and guidance before making the decision to go the US. True leadership involved winning consensus from the various blocs, the Ambassador warned, not presenting the government with a fait accompli. Sunni Arab Politicians Need to Deliver -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador stated that Sunni Arab participation in the political process and the national unity government had not resulted in any appreciable decline in the level of violence in Iraq, particularly against Coalition Forces in Sunni Arab areas. Both the Shia and the Kurds had also been expecting that greater Sunni Arab participation in the political process would result in better security for Baghdad and a decrease in violent attacks. The Ambassador noted that much work remained to be done, including working on broad agreements across the political spectrum on key issues such as the Constitutional review, federalism, natural resources, de-Baathification, militias, and the insurgency. On de-Baathification, for example, the Sunni Arab parties could work with other groups within the CoR to annul or modify the de-Baathification Commission; yet Tawafuq has done nothing. ¶7. (C) Al-Jenabi declared that the general security situation in Iraq was due to two main factors: the disbanding of the Iraqi Army by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),and the de-Baathification law. If the Ambassador would only cancel the de-Baathification law himself, then 50 percent of the problems in Iraq would evaporate, according to al-Jenabi. He asked the Ambassador to cooperate with the Sunni Arabs to retain "balance" in the government, make clear that the US is not in favor of dividing Iraq into three parts, and to maintain strong central authority "as in the past." The Ambassador reminded al-Jenabi that, while U.S. policy remained committed to a unified Iraq that can stand on its own feet. KHALILZAD