Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD300
2006-02-02 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

(U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH

Tags:  PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM 
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VZCZCXRO9935
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0300/01 0331219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021219Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2442
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AMMAN FOR REFCOORD CLAIRE KANESHIRO
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD GERRY CHEYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM
SUBJECT: (U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH
RELOCATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 277

B. 05 STATE 180059

C. 05 BAGHDAD 3918

D. 05 KIRKUK 188

E. 05 AMMAN 6270

F. 05 AMMAN 297

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300 SIPDIS SIPDIS AMMAN FOR REFCOORD CLAIRE KANESHIRO CAIRO FOR REFCOORD GERRY CHEYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 TAGS: PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM SUBJECT: (U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH RELOCATION REF: A. BAGHDAD 277 ¶B. 05 STATE 180059 ¶C. 05 BAGHDAD 3918 ¶D. 05 KIRKUK 188 ¶E. 05 AMMAN 6270 ¶F. 05 AMMAN 297 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 25, RefCoord accompanied UNHCR to Kawa to monitor and evaluate the PRM-funded, UNHCR-implemented relocation of Iranian Kurds formerly resident in the Al Tash refugee camp near Ramadi in Al Anbar governorate. Ref A covered assistance work at the camp. En route to the site, RefCoord and UNHCR called on the Mayor of Qushtepe and the Qushtepe Chief of Police, whose mandates extend to Kawa, to explore the local government perspective on the Kawa project. Although the local government officials made vague allegations about links between former Al Tash residents and insurgents, they indicated that Erbil remained committed to accepting up to 2,000 Al Tash Kurds and would take in the remaining Al Tash populations barring specific information that could be linked to individuals. END SUMMARY. -------------- (SBU) BACKGROUND ON AL TASH RELOCATION -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Al Tash Refugee Camp for Iranian Kurds in Al Anbar is no longer viable. Security concerns have undermined provision of adequate humanitarian assistance and protection. The Government of Jordan has been anxious to see the camp moved out of Al Anbar to northern Iraq. Hundreds of refugees from Al Tash have already flooded into Jordan; the GOJ is concerned about future flows (refs E and F). Ninety-seven percent of the Al Tash Kurds wanted to go to Sulaymaniyah, to join several thousand former Al Tash residents who had previously been relocated. The Department and UNHCR sought and won agreement from KRG-Erbil (KRG-E) to relocate 2000 Al Tash Kurds to Erbil. The KRG-E offered an acceptable site above the green line at Kawa (refs C and D). ¶3. (SBU) As of January 25, almost all of the Al Tash Kurds have relocated. 1273 have traveled to Kawa with UNCHR assistance; the remainder has spontaneously migrated to Sulaymaniyah without objection from KRG-S. UNHCR does not have a firm figure for Iranian Kurds left in Al Tash camp proper, b
ut estimates approximately 150. Another 189 Al Tash Kurds remain on the Jordanian border hoping that they will be admitted to Jordan and referred for third country resettlement. UNHCR is seeking better information about how many individuals remain at each location, who they are, whether they are UNHCR recognized refugees, and why they have not yet accepted relocation to Kawa. -------------- -------------- (SBU) VIEWS OF QUSHTEPE MAYOR AND CHIEF OF POLICE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Before visiting the Kawa relocation site to monitor assistance levels (SEPTEL),RefCoord and UNHCR met with the Qushtepe Mayor and Chief of Police (COP) to explore the local government's view of the project. Both indicated they had security concerns about the Kurds remaining in Al Tash. The COP asserted that all people who live two or three years in Ramadi have some involvement with terrorist groups. He said the 50 families remaining in Al Tash don't want to move North because they are involved in terrorist activities. The COP claimed to have information that terrorist attacks had been planned in the camp. (Note: MNF-I is following- up.) ¶5. (C) The Mayor was uneasy about travel back and forth between Ramadi and the Kawa site. He noted that a number of the refugees at the Kawa site had legitimate business to settle in Ramadi. However, he expressed concern that traveling to and from Ramadi might "create an opportunity that the terrorists can exploit." The refugees at the Kawa site are allowed to travel to Ramadi, conditional on a police investigation including interviews with the police before and after the trip. Visitors to the Kawa site from Ramadi and Iran are required to register with BAGHDAD 00000300 002 OF 002 the Qushtepe authorities. ¶6. (C) UNHCR asked whether the refugees at the Kawa site posed a security problem. The Mayor said that in dealing with security issues, it is prudent to always suspect and investigate. However, he noted that the refugees at the Kawa site were allowed into Erbil without an investigation. The COP confirmed that in principle the local government has no problem with the remainder of the Al Tash Kurds coming North. He said that if he had any solid evidence of anything, they would not be allowed, but he did not have any such evidence. The COP said that they had specific information implicating one refugee leader in an alleged bomb preparation incident in December, and they would arrest him if he came north. UNHCR asked if the Mayor and COP knew of Iranian government activity in Kawa; they said no. ¶7. (SBU) The Mayor said that ID cards from Ramadi are being accepted in Erbil. Students are attending local schools and universities. One refugee is working as a shuttle bus driver. Some refugees have shops in neighboring villages. The Mayor indicated he wanted the refugee population at the Kawa site to be locally integrated. He said 205 families would be given ID cards indicating they were refugees in Qushtepe. Per the COP, these ID cards would serve as residence permits, and would be valid for six months "so if they are resettled in third countries we will know who has left." As to the time frame, the Mayor said "we are working on it" and expressed a desire for the IDs to be issued as quickly as possible. ¶8. (SBU) According to the Mayor, the refugees are free to work anywhere. The COP said a contractor regularly hires day laborers from the Kawa site. Per the COP, the refugees can get driver's licenses through the same process as the local people. ¶9. (SBU) According to the Mayor, all of the refugees at the Kawa site will get new Ministry of Trade ration cards in 2006, but the cards will be issued in Ramadi. Transferring the cards from Al Anbar to Erbil will take some time. The Mayor remarked that ration cards are a general problem throughout Iraq. ¶10. (SBU) UNHCR informed the Mayor about its hopes to persuade the 189 Al Tash Kurds on the Jordanian border to move to Kawa. UNHCR is trying to organize a delegation of local officials and refugee representatives to tell the 189 at the border about the Kawa site. The Mayor indicated he would be willing to join the delegation, if the Ministry of the Interior and the Erbil Governor agree. The Mayor reiterated that the KRG-E is committed to accepting 2,000 Al Tash refugees. So far only 1273 have moved to Kawa; KRG-E remains willing to take an additional 727. -------------- (U) Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) UNHCR's relocation of the Al Tash refugees to northern Iraq is thus far a success. The refugees, now out of harm's way, are beginning the process of locally integrating; the reported access to education and work are positive signs. The reports of bad apples remaining at Al Tash and a limited number of refugees traveling between Al Tash and Kawa are bear monitoring. The local authorities' security concerns about Al Tash Kurds (paras 4 and 5) seem to conflict with continued KRG-E willingness to accept relocation of more of them to Kawa. The Mayor and COP's motives to espouse these contradictory positions were not clear, but may be laying the groundwork to justify limiting the refugees' freedom of movement. Although the officials claimed there were no such limits per se, and promised to help resolve existing problems, they could use security concerns as an excuse later for not following through. KHALILZAD

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