GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE: ALLAWI SAYS SCIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000294

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE: ALLAWI SAYS SCIRI
FEARS FADHILA/SADRIST FLIGHT

REF: BAGHDAD 0195

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASON 1.4 (b).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Allawi told the Ambassador on February 1 that
the Shia Coalition is confused, with SCIRI fearing a Sadrist
and Fadhila pullout. Allawi claimed that Mohammed Ridha
SISTANI is exerting efforts to hold the coalition together,
but has limited influence over the Fadhila Party. Referring
to sharp public criticism Tariq al-Hashimi (IIP) had directed
at the MOI February 1, Allawi said that he would try to
restrain Tawafuq's leadership from making inflammatory
comments. He also claimed that Talabani is under growing
pressure from Tehran to support SCIRI's Adil Abd' al-Mahdi
for the premiership. Allawi and Barzani both said that a
government led by al-Mahdi would tilt too far toward Iran.
In a separate conversation, Fadhila party insider al-Shamiri
told PolCouns that he doubted Fadhila could risk pulling out
of the Shia Coalition in the end, although it could threaten
to do so. Ultimately, Fadhila could not risk the wrath of
the Najaf clerical establishment which probably would work to
hold the Shia Coalition together. Al-Shamiri predicted that
if the Shia Alliance could not reach a compromise on PM
selection, the matter would be brought to a membership vote.
END SUMMARY.

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ALLAWI'S READ: SHIA COALITION WOBBLY
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2. (C) At a February 1 lunch with the Ambassador, Dr. Ayad
Allawi described the situation within the Shia Coalition as
"very confused." He said Coalition members are still
fighting and are scared about what the Fadhila Party might
do. He claimed that SCIRI is afraid that the Coalition might
fall apart, with the Sadrists ready to leave the Coalition if
Fadhila departs first. He added that SCIRI is sending him
messages to support Adil Abd' al-Mahdi for PM because, if
Fadhila left, Abd' al-Mahdi's candidacy would be doomed. Dr.
Allawi also told the Ambassador that Ayatollah SISTANI's son
(Muhammad Rida) is exerting efforts to hold the Coalition
together and that SISTANI is aware of the nature of these
discussions. However, Dr. Allawi said SISTANI has limited
influence on Fadhila because Ayatollah Yaqubi (whom Fadhila
looks upon as its spiritual leader) is continuing to support
party chief Nadeem al-Jabiri. The Ambassador stressed the
importance of getting a clear understanding from al-Jabiri;
Dr. Allawi said al-Jabiri will consult with them when he
returns to Iraq.

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ALLAWI CAUTIONS ON TALABANI
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3. (C) Dr. Allawi agreed with the assessment that Tariq
al-Hashimi's February 1 public statement criticizing MOI was
too powerful and not helpful to the formation of a national
unity government. Dr. Allawi said he will try to restrain
Tawafuq. Dr. Allawi stated that President Talabani is trying
to please both the United States and Iran, and agreed that
Talabani has made too many commitments. He added that
Talabani is under growing pressure from Iran (NOTE: to
support Adil Abd al-Mahdi for PM. END NOTE.) Dr. Allawi
said neighboring Arab countries have bought into the Erbil
Agreement and are willing to help with its implementation.
Dr. Allawi said they could help pressure President Talabani
to distance himself from Iran.

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BARZANI: KURDS INSIST ON ALLAWI BEING IN
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4. (C) At a February 1 dinner with the Ambassador, Dr. Ayad
Allawi and KRG President Massoud Barzani said that Abdul Aziz
Al-Hakim hosted a lunch February 1 with all of the major
political parties. Barzani stated that no agreement has been
reached within the Shia Coalition on a Prime Minister
candidate. He added that he told the Shia Coalition that the
Kurdish Alliance will not participate in a new government
without the Iraqi National List. Dr. Allawi confirmed a
written agreement between Tawaffuq, the Iraqi National List,
and the National Dialogue Front to form one bloc. He denied
statements from Jalal Talabani to Barzani that Tawaffuq had
withdrawn from this bloc.

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ALLAWI, BARZANI CAUTION ON IRAN ANGLE
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5. (C) Both confirmed their preference for Nadeem al-Jabiri
as Prime Minister. Both said they would prefer Jafari if a
choice had to be made between Jafari and 'Abd al-Mahdi. 'Abd
al-Mahdi is personally a better choice, but it would be a

strategic mistake for Iraq because the new government would
be too close to Iran. Dr. Allawi specifically cited 'Abd
al-Mahdi's lack of an Islamist constituency and his
subsequent dependence on Abdul Aziz al-Hakim for direction
and guidance. He also pointed to 'Abd al-Mahdi's strong
personal relationship with Jalal Talabani, who is also close
to Iran. Barzani said SCIRI, Jalal Talabani, and Iran have
had a long-time close relationship. Barzani declined to
speculate on what he would do if 'Abd al-Mahdi became the PM
candidate and Fadhila did not leave the Shia Coalition. He
stated that "in all circumstances," the government program
must be clear, although he added that such a situation could
split the Kurdish Alliance. Dr. Allawi and KRG President
Barzani agreed to meet separately with Nadeem al-Jabiri
within the next two days.

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MORE CAUTIOUS READ FROM FADHILA INSIDER
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6. (C) Fadhila Party Political Bureau Chief and Jabiri
confidante Shaikh Hassan al-Shamiri told PolOffs that that
the Shia Islamist Coalition is edging closer to deciding to
decide about the premiership. Ideally, he said, the
Coalition would make its decision on the basis of consensus.
Shamiri asserted that Jafari and Abd al-Mahdi would cancel
each other out, leaving Jabiri as the compromise choice. (He
stated that, on the basis of his meeting January 31 evening
with Sadrists, Jafari's support among Sadrists appears still
strong.) If no consensus within the Coalition is possible,
ultimately the prime minister decision will come to a vote
among the Coalition parliamentarians. He opined that the
vote would take place initially with all four candidates in
play; the lowest vote-getter would be eliminated in the first
round. Voting rounds would continue until one candidate
remained with a majority. He thought such a vote would occur
by the middle of next week.


7. (C) Al-Shamiri told PolCouns that the Fadhila Party is
unlikely to quit the Shia Islamist Coalition if Jabiri is not
chosen as the Coalition's prime minister candidate. He noted
that quitting the Coalition carried big risks, especially
from Najaf. Recalling that the Najaf clerical establishment
had strongly backed unity of Shia Islamist Coalition in the
transition government, Shamiri anticipated that Najaf could
launch a withering verbal blast at Fadhila that would be very
harmful to the party. Shia voters, he commented, are
"simple" and do not understand politics. They only
understand what the Najaf establishment tells them. Risking
Najaf's wrath, he concluded, would be an "adventure" that
Fadhila could not risk. Shamiri then added that Jabiri
could, of course, threaten to leave the Coalition without
actually doing so.


8. (C) Shamiri was upbeat about Jabiri's chances inside the
Coalition on the basis of the broader support it could claim
outside the Coalition. He stated that Jabiri would work to
reunite all Iraqis and therefore has support from the Sunni
Arab Tawafuq Front. Later, however, Shamiri brushed aside
reports of Tawaffuq complaints about excesses committed by
the Interior Ministry as mere political gamesmanship.
(Shamiri later displayed a similar lack of acuity when
discussing fuel price reforms. He rejected market reforms in
general because, he claimed, Iraqis cannot absorb more price
shocks. Instead, the government should promote
industrialization to create jobs.)

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NEXT STEPS
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9. (C) Ambassador will join the lunch hosted by President
Talabani for Iraqi political leaders. Around February 3 the
Ambassador will meet with Dr. Allawi and Barzani to assess
issues in light of the political party meetings scheduled in
the next few days. The goal is to reach agreement in the
next 2-3 days on the inclusion of the four groups and the
formation of working groups to discuss the specifics of the
government program.
KHALILZAD