AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002928

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
MALIKI

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey met on
August 11 with Prime Minister Maliki to review the Baghdad
Security Plan. Maliki gave his consent to a revised plan for
a more flexible checkpoint system and appeared markedly more
forward leaning on operational security cooperation than in
recent conversations. He again asked that coalition security
operations be planned to avoid giving Sadr City residents the
perception that they are targeted. Maliki said that he had
peeled Sadr off from the Shiite extremists attacking the
International Zone and disclosed that Sadr is now providing
information on the extremists. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) Maliki was pleased with the progress of the latest
phase of the Baghdad security operation. The Doura district
was secured with little use of Iraqi or Coalition firepower
and efforts to clean up the neighborhood are already taking
place. Maliki once again hoped that as the operation
continues and additional neighborhoods are cleared, residents
will return and Iraqi trust in the government will grow.
Casey stressed that Iraqi police must maintain control over
cleared areas. Maliki agreed and said that he would prefer
to boost security in the recently-cleared Karada district
with additional police rather than the Iraqi Army.


3. (S) General Casey said that the Doura operation had not
benefited from the element of surprise. Maliki acknowledged
the poor Iraqi operational security. &We are infiltrated8
he admitted. In response, General Casey explained, the
operation,s timing and focus areas had been amended. Maliki
seemed pleased with General Casey,s plans for next steps,
which include simultaneous operations in multiple Baghdad
neighborhoods. He was clearly impressed to learn that, in
response to the PM,s concern about the impact of checkpoints
on cross-town traffic, General Casey had driven across
Baghdad to assess traffic conditions and view checkpoint
sites. He quickly approved our new plan for a more flexible
checkpoint system, but asked that we strive to &keep
discomfort to an acceptable level.8 The Ambassador assured
him that we will be as flexible as possible.

SECTARIAN BALANCE


4. (C) The Prime Minister again asked that plans for security
operations in and around Baghdad consider sectarian balance.
He called for additional checkpoints to be placed in Sunni
areas. Noting that the plan now calls for only one
additional checkpoint in Abu Ghraib, he suggested that
checkpoints be established on additional roads between Abu
Ghraib and Baghdad. This would keep Sunni terrorists out of
Baghdad and Shia death squads out of Abu Ghraib. The
Ambassador assured him that we understand the need for
balance and General Casey undertook to study options.

COUNTERING ROCKET ATTACKS


5. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad raised the recent spike of
indirect fire attacks on the International Zone emanating
from Sadr City. General Casey showed him a graphic that
showed the firing points in Sadr City. Maliki said that
these increased attacks are extremely harmful to his
government. He said Iraqi intelligence is gathering
information on those in Sadr City responsible for the attacks
and will soon have enough information to start operational
planning. Maliki asked General Casey to devote more assets
to aerial surveillance. He suggested that Iraqi Special
Forces could infiltrate the areas being used as launch sites
to be guided by air to intercept those launching attacks.

AL-SADR,S ROLE


6. (S) Maliki claimed that he has &separated8 Moqtada
al-Sadr from the Shiite extremists responsible for these
attacks and that Sadr was now providing information on those
responsible. Although these extremists promised not to launch
further attacks, disclosed Maliki, he expected that they
would continue to rocket the International Zone. Reminded
that the insurgents were launching the rockets near schools,
hospitals and other civilian sites, Maliki said that the
Iraqi people have been alienated by these extremists. Not
only is there is public outrage, said Maliki, but Moqtada
al-Sadr has distanced himself from them. The Iraqi public
could, therefore, accept some collateral damage arising from
airstrikes.

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY


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7. (S) Maliki said the perpetrators were linked to "Iran and
Lebanon.8 The Prime Minister said that Shiite groups had
received not only sophisticated rocket weapons systems, but
advanced anti-aircraft weapons. Maliki said that he had
instructed Iraq,s ambassador to Lebanon to ask Hezbollah to
stop providing assistance to Iraqi Shia extremists. He added
that he had also dispatched an envoy to Tehran with the same
message. The Iranians had acknowledged had providing
assistance in the past, but claimed they were no longer
engaged in such activity.


8. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad asked about the tactics to be
used if Maliki,s present approach -- based upon
intelligence, diplomacy and special operations -- fails to
halt indirect fire attacks on the International Zone. Maliki
replied that the problem has the potential to bring down his
government and must therefore be eliminated. If the methods
now being implemented are unsuccessful, a &huge combing
operation8 in Sadr City will be needed. Maliki was
confident, however, as he was receiving cooperation in Sadr
City and from partisans of Moqtada al-Sadr. He underlined
his determination, but urged that no action be taken until
the intelligence dossier is completed.

THE THREAT


9. (S) Maliki made it clear that he views the politically
motivated resistance to be far more dangerous than religious
extremists. Asked by the Ambassador who he defined as the
resistance, Maliki responded, &the Baathists.8 Maliki
opined that "even civil war is easier than dealing with the
Baath.8 He claimed that &all8 Arab countries were
assisting the resistance, as they fear the spread of
democracy in the region.


10. (S) Maliki said that Baathists sought to retake the
country, and were unwilling to compromise, while some
religious extremists had more limited objectives and were
open to compromise. He felt that the recent sectarian
violence has taught many religious extremists of the dangers
of their course of action. Unlike the Baath, he continued,
the religious extremists did not seek to take over the
country. The Ambassador inquired whether Maliki felt the
Baath could ever regain power. Yes, Maliki replied, ask any
Iraqi and they,ll give you the same answer, he said,
recalling that 150 Baath had been sufficient to take over
Iraq.

MALIKI SEEK U.S. HELP WITH FUEL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY


11. (C) Maliki also indicated that he was concerned that many
armed individuals with questionable loyalties were entering
the International Zone as members of protective details. He
asked for assistance installing security cameras, metal
detectors and other security equipment in his offices and
other key Iraqi government building in the International
Zone.


12. (S) Prime Minister Maliki voiced his concern to
Ambassador Khalilzad that continuing fuel shortages might
lead to domestic unrest. He said he had recently received
calls from religious leaders such as SISTANI and Abdul Aziz
Hakim asking him to take urgent measures to ameliorate the
situation. Over the long-term Iraq would increase pipeline
security and refining capability, but immediate assistance
was required. He asked that the United State facilitate
short-term assistance from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
KHALILZAD