AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002928 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MALIKI Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey met on August 11 with Prime Minister Maliki to review the Baghdad Security Plan. Maliki gave his consent to a revised plan for a more flexible checkpoint system and appeared markedly more forward leaning on operational security cooperation than in recent conversations. He again asked that coalition security operations be planned to avoid giving Sadr City residents the perception that they are targeted. Maliki said that he had peeled Sadr off from the Shiite extremists attacking the International Zone and disclosed that Sadr is now providing information on the extremists. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Maliki was pleased with the progress of the latest phase of the Baghdad security operation. The Doura district was secured with little use of Iraqi or Coalition firepower and efforts to clean up the neighborhood are already taking place. Maliki once again hoped that as the operation continues and additional neighborhoods are cleared, residents will return and Iraqi trust in the government will grow. Casey stressed that Iraqi police must maintain control over cleared areas. Maliki agreed and said that he would prefer to boost security in the recently-cleared Karada district with additional police rather than the Iraqi Army. ¶3. (S) General Casey said that the Doura operation had not benefited from the element of surprise. Maliki acknowledged the poor Iraqi operational security. &We are infiltrated8 he admitted. In response, General Casey explained, the operation,s timing and focus areas had been amended. Maliki seemed pleased with General Casey,s plans for next steps, which include simultaneous operations in multiple Baghdad neighborhoods. He was clearly impressed to learn that, in response to the PM,s concern about the impact of checkpoints on cross-town traffic, General Casey had driven across Baghdad to assess traffic conditions and view checkpoint sites. He quickly approved our new plan for a more flexible checkpoint system, but asked that we strive to &keep discomfort to an acceptable level.8 The Ambassador assured him that we will be as flexible as possible. SECTARIAN BALANCE ¶4. (C) The Prime Minister again asked that plans for security operations in and around Baghdad consider sectarian balance. He called for additional checkpoints to be placed in Sunni areas. Noting that the plan now calls for only one additional checkpoint in Abu Ghraib, he suggested that checkpoints be established on additional roads between Abu Ghraib and Baghdad. This would keep Sunni terrorists out of Baghdad and Shia death squads out of Abu Ghraib. The Ambassador assured him that we understand the need for balance and General Casey undertook to study options. COUNTERING ROCKET ATTACKS ¶5. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad raised the recent spike of indirect fire attacks on the International Zone emanating from Sadr City. General Casey showed him a graphic that showed the firing points in Sadr City. Maliki said that these increased attacks are extremely harmful to his government. He said Iraqi intelligence is gathering information on those in Sadr City responsible for the attacks and will soon have enough information to start operational planning. Maliki asked General Casey to devote more assets to aerial surveillance. He suggested that Iraqi Special Forces could infiltrate the areas being used as launch sites to be guided by air to intercept those launching attacks. AL-SADR,S ROLE ¶6. (S) Maliki claimed that he has &separated8 Moqtada al-Sadr from the Shiite extremists responsible for these attacks and that Sadr was now providing information on those responsible. Although these extremists promised not to launch further attacks, disclosed Maliki, he expected that they would continue to rocket the International Zone. Reminded that the insurgents were launching the rockets near schools, hospitals and other civilian sites, Maliki said that the Iraqi people have been alienated by these extremists. Not only is there is public outrage, said Maliki, but Moqtada al-Sadr has distanced himself from them. The Iraqi public could, therefore, accept some collateral damage arising from airstrikes. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY BAGHDAD 00002928 002 OF 002 ¶7. (S) Maliki said the perpetrators were linked to "Iran and Lebanon.8 The Prime Minister said that Shiite groups had received not only sophisticated rocket weapons systems, but advanced anti-aircraft weapons. Maliki said that he had instructed Iraq,s ambassador to Lebanon to ask Hezbollah to stop providing assistance to Iraqi Shia extremists. He added that he had also dispatched an envoy to Tehran with the same message. The Iranians had acknowledged had providing assistance in the past, but claimed they were no longer engaged in such activity. ¶8. (S) Ambassador Khalilzad asked about the tactics to be used if Maliki,s present approach -- based upon intelligence, diplomacy and special operations -- fails to halt indirect fire attacks on the International Zone. Maliki replied that the problem has the potential to bring down his government and must therefore be eliminated. If the methods now being implemented are unsuccessful, a &huge combing operation8 in Sadr City will be needed. Maliki was confident, however, as he was receiving cooperation in Sadr City and from partisans of Moqtada al-Sadr. He underlined his determination, but urged that no action be taken until the intelligence dossier is completed. THE THREAT ¶9. (S) Maliki made it clear that he views the politically motivated resistance to be far more dangerous than religious extremists. Asked by the Ambassador who he defined as the resistance, Maliki responded, &the Baathists.8 Maliki opined that "even civil war is easier than dealing with the Baath.8 He claimed that &all8 Arab countries were assisting the resistance, as they fear the spread of democracy in the region. ¶10. (S) Maliki said that Baathists sought to retake the country, and were unwilling to compromise, while some religious extremists had more limited objectives and were open to compromise. He felt that the recent sectarian violence has taught many religious extremists of the dangers of their course of action. Unlike the Baath, he continued, the religious extremists did not seek to take over the country. The Ambassador inquired whether Maliki felt the Baath could ever regain power. Yes, Maliki replied, ask any Iraqi and they,ll give you the same answer, he said, recalling that 150 Baath had been sufficient to take over Iraq. MALIKI SEEK U.S. HELP WITH FUEL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY ¶11. (C) Maliki also indicated that he was concerned that many armed individuals with questionable loyalties were entering the International Zone as members of protective details. He asked for assistance installing security cameras, metal detectors and other security equipment in his offices and other key Iraqi government building in the International Zone. ¶12. (S) Prime Minister Maliki voiced his concern to Ambassador Khalilzad that continuing fuel shortages might lead to domestic unrest. He said he had recently received calls from religious leaders such as Sistani and Abdul Aziz Hakim asking him to take urgent measures to ameliorate the situation. Over the long-term Iraq would increase pipeline security and refining capability, but immediate assistance was required. He asked that the United State facilitate short-term assistance from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. KHALILZAD