AMBASSADOR,S AUGUST 6 AND 7 MEETINGS WITH PM MALIKI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002927

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR,S AUGUST 6 AND 7 MEETINGS WITH PM MALIKI


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey met on
both August 6 and 7 with Prime Minister Maliki to review
plans for the second phase of the Baghdad Security Plan.
Maliki -- focused on national reconciliation -- hoped that
residents forced out by sectarian intimidation would return
once security is restored. He was concerned, however, that
forceful tactics could further weaken his political footing.
Maliki accordingly: took issue with our plans for checkpoints
and called for a review of the checkpoint policy; asked that
we curtail night operations; and asserted that he had not
authorized the previous night,s operation in Sadr City.
General Casey clarified that National Security Advisor Rubaie
had merely communicated the PM,s "reservations," whereupon
it was agreed that clear instructions are needed. Maliki
said operations targeting terrorists and death squad leaders
may continue, but pressed for quieter, daylight operations.
General Casey stressed that the upcoming security operation
must quickly be followed by Iraqi government spending for
Baghdad reconstruction. END SUMMARY.

MALIKI HOPES BETTER SECURITY WILL INCREASE SUPPORT


2. (S) Maliki used the Ministerial Committee on National
Security on August 6 to press for upcoming military
operations in Baghdad to begin with an effort to
simultaneously stabilize several Baghdad neighborhoods. He
said that the central focus of the plan should be restoring
security in focus areas in order to allow Iraqis who had been
forced to move to return to their homes. He believes that,
if the government can maintain security, restore essential
services, and permit people to return to their homes,
citizens will gain confidence in his leadership and the Iraqi
security forces. Rubaie added that the return of displaced
citizens will have a greater impact on public consciousness
than a reduction in the number of killings.

TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS


3. (S) Maliki also pressed for an approach to the Baghdad
security plan that is minimally intrusive on the lives of
ordinary Iraqis. Maliki, joined by Rubaie as well as the
Ministers of Defense and Justice, was also concerned about
plans to set up numerous checkpoints along the canal. The
Iraqi leaders are hoping to avoid roadblocks, citing the
negative effect on the economy and memories of Saddam,s
practice of blocking cross-town traffic. They urge that an
alternative to the use of concrete barriers be considered, as
these create traffic problems. Maliki pushed for checkpoints
to stop traffic only at night during curfew hours, on an
as-needed basis.


4. (S) General Casey warned that the use of checkpoints is
essential to the success of the Baghdad security plan. As it
will not be possible to simultaneously implement the strategy
in all of Baghdad,s neighborhoods, checkpoints are necessary
to keep out car bombs and to prevent the return of terrorists
and death squads. The operation,s success would be
jeopardized without checkpoints. Intelligence Service
Director General Al-Shawani agreed that checkpoints were
critical to stopping death squads from crossing over from
Sadr City.


5. (S) The Ambassador reframed the issue by suggesting that
the key question was how to set up effective checkpoints with
the least possible inconvenience. The issue could be studied
and options developed for the Prime Minister. Maliki quickly
agreed and asked that the subject be tasked to the Deputies
Committee for National Security for further action.

CIVIC ACTION A KEY COMPONENT OF SECURITY PLAN


6. (S) The Ambassador joined General Casey in stressing that
the military operation must be complemented by political and
economic action from the Government of Iraq. They stressed
the need for the Government of Iraq to disburse funds for
reconstruction projects that could provide employment and a
sense of optimism in newly-stabilized areas. This was part
of successive post-operation steps that included a
substantial Iraqi police presence to enter and hold areas
cleared by the military.

SECTARIAN BALANCE


7. (C) The Prime Minister also opined that the Baghdad
Security Plan must consider the issue of sectarian balance.
He suggested that if Sadr City is blocked off, the route west
to Fallujah should also be blocked. The residents of Sadr

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City should not feel as if they are under siege, Maliki
cautioned, or they might pull back from reconciliation.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION


8. (S) Maliki is trying to reconcile two competing
objectives. Although he understands that his continued
political viability may depend on his ability to deliver
improved security, Maliki also hopes that he might be able to
bring Al-Sadr and some Sunni Sheikhs back into the tent.

MALIKI DISAVOWS NIGHT RAIDS


9. (S) Maliki summoned the Ambassador and General Casey to a
separate meeting on August 7 to discuss the previous night,s
operation in Sadr City. The PM believed he had vetoed the
operation. General Casey believed it had been approved.
Maliki undertook to provide General Casey and MNF-I with
clear judgments, i.e. a firm "yes" or "no," on future mission
proposals. The PM said that the previous night,s raid had
killed one person and injured twelve. He claimed the U.S.
had bombed three homes and destroyed a gas station. General
Casey responded that after gunmen attacked Iraqi & Coalition
forces conducting the operation, coalition aircraft fired
heavy machine guns, but no bombs were dropped. Maliki
claimed the operation had dealt a blow to the political
process. He urged the U.S. to end night operations and to
try to conduct lower-profile, daytime operations. General
Casey rejoined that military force is a "blunt instrument"
but assured Maliki that the U.S. would not conduct missions
without the PM,s approval.

COMMENT


10. (S) Maliki clearly feels politically vulnerable, and
seems hesitant to make any further public pronouncements
about the Baghdad Security Plan until the operation has been
proven a success. He claimed, however, that even religious
leaders will join him in publicly hailing a successful
operation. Maliki appears to be honestly optimistic about
the prospects for national reconciliation; however, he does
not yet seem to have fully considered how his reconciliation
efforts can best be synchronized with security operations.
KHALILZAD