PRIME MINISTER ON SECURITY ISSUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002907

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: ASEC IZ MARR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ON SECURITY ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: On July 29, MNF-I CG Casey briefed Prime
Minister Maliki on security-related developments that had
occured during his absence from Iraq. The Prime Minister's
National Security Adviser, Dr. Mowaffaq Al-Rubaie was also
present. General Casey stressed to the Prime Minister that
the majority of high civilian casualties continue to be the
result of sectarian-based reactions to car bombings or other
similar provocative actions. He suggested to the Prime
Minister that recent incidents of indirect fire (IDF) in the
International Zone are originating in Sadr City and New
Baghdad. General Casey reviewed in general terms plans for
Phase II of the Baghdad Security Plan and noted that
Ministers of Defense and Interior would brief the PM in
detail at the next MCNS. Maliki reiterated his belief that
his reconciliation project is taking off with opposition
groups approaching him. He proposed using the next month to
"quiet things down" in an effort to promote the
reconciliation process and build his security forces.
Military operations could resume if the reconciliation effort
did not produce results.

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Update
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2. (S) MNF-I CG Casey called on Prime Minister Maliki July
29 to brief him on security related developments that had
occured during his absence from Iraq. The Prime Minister
asked whether or not reports of six rockets used against
civilian targets in the Karadah area of Baghdad were true.
General Casey acknowledged that initial reports suggested
this, but investigation made clear that the explosions came
from four car bombs and two satchel IEDs. Overall, civilian
casualties continued to be high and attributable to revenge
attacks that had been provoked by, perhaps, an AQIZ car bomb.
The Prime Minister concluded that the proper security
response is to increase measures against AQIZ targets in
Baghdad. Dr. Al-Rubaie, believing the PM had not fully
understood General Casey's point, repeated to him that
majority of civilian casualties were not coming from the car
bombs directly, but as a result from sectarian violence
undertaken in reaction to the car bombs. General Casey
showed the Prime Minister a photo of Baghdad that showed the
incoming indirect fire (IDF) into the International Zone was
coming from Sadr City and New Baghdad. He suggested to the
Prime Minister that the IDF was in reaction to recent CF/ISF
efforts to neutralize death squads. Shooting mortars at
civilian targets was a worrisome trend. The Prime Minister
countered that the death squads were not necessarily from
JAM. Casey agreed that Omar Brigade of the AQIZ also ran
Sunni death squads.

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Phase II Baghdad Security Plan
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3. (S) General Casey explained that he had taken advantage
of an opportunity to bring his most capable counterinsurgency
forces to Baghdad for 90-120 days, by extending a brigade due
to rotate home from Mosul. Showing him a photograph of a
Stryker vehicle, General Casey said there would be
approximately 300 such vehicles on the streets of Baghdad by
mid-August; this would extend protection to more
neighborhoods. The Prime Minister asked that they be put in
the most challenging areas, such as Abu Gharaib, Doura,
Amariya, and the canal area. He very much wanted the citizens
of Baghdad to see the presence of security forces. General
Casey said that he expected that the Iraqi Armed Forces
would, in the end, emerge as the dominant security force in
Baghdad. They discussed the political complications of
bringing two predominantly Kurdish IAF brigades from
Kurdistan to reinforce Baghdad, without introducing Kurd-Arab
tensions, which currently did not exist, into the city. Dr.
Al-Rubaie suggested the Kurdish brigades be "mixed" with Arab
brigades to lessen the problem.


4. (S) Maliki said he believed his reconciliation project
was taking off. He said that during his short stop in Jordan
on the way back from the U.S. opposition groups and ex-Iraqi
Army officers had contacted him. Likewise, Anbar tribal
leaders asked that he decrease military operations to
facilitate their efforts at reconciliation and their fight
against Al-Qaeda. He needed this momentum to grow. Maliki
said he could use breathing space to test whether or not he
could reduce violence politically and use the time as well to
build up his forces. If political efforts failed, one could
always resume the tempo of military operations. General Casey
acknowledged that military operations needed to support
political goals, but losing the military momentum could work

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against those goals as well. He said that a careful balance
was needed over the coming months. He promised to provide
military options to the Prime Minister but understood that
the PM would make the political call. The Prime Minister
responded positively to General Casey's idea that, if
progress could be made in security for Bagdhad over the next
month, then the month of Ramadan would be a perfect
oppportunity to reinforce the Prime Minister's calls for
peace and reconciliation.


5. (S) General Casey told Maliki that the ISF need to be
empowered by the political leadership and recommended that
the Council of Representatives issue a statement of support
for them. The PM had seen a draft communique on this and
promised to talk to the CoR leaders, although their last day
in session was the 30th. He said that possibly another
political grouping could issue, such as the Political
Committee for National Security. He referred briefly to the
situation in Basrah, noting that Shaykh Yacoubi of the
Fadhila Party had threatened that the "people" will take
control if the government fails to do so. He also pointed
out that the Ministry of Oil itself is under threat from
forces of the previous (Fadhila) minister.

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IAF Modernization
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6. (S) Maliki said he spoke to the President about plans to
modernize the Iraqi Army--the President had expressed his
full faith in Generals Casey and Dempsey, if they were on
board, he would be too. General Casey said that General
Dempsey would be working with the Minister of Defense on a
modernization plan; it would reflect the Prime Minister's
requirements. In the end, it would be the Prime Minister's
program. In response to the Prime Minister's desire to
shorten the timeline needed to increase Iraqi forces--"I
can't wait until the end of 2007"--General Casey promised to
work on it, noting that it was all about priorities and
resources.
KHALILZAD