PRIME MINISTER ON SECURITY ISSUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002907 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016 TAGS: ASEC IZ MARR PREL PTER SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ON SECURITY ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: On July 29, MNF-I CG Casey briefed Prime Minister Maliki on security-related developments that had occured during his absence from Iraq. The Prime Minister's National Security Adviser, Dr. Mowaffaq Al-Rubaie was also present. General Casey stressed to the Prime Minister that the majority of high civilian casualties continue to be the result of sectarian-based reactions to car bombings or other similar provocative actions. He suggested to the Prime Minister that recent incidents of indirect fire (IDF) in the International Zone are originating in Sadr City and New Baghdad. General Casey reviewed in general terms plans for Phase II of the Baghdad Security Plan and noted that Ministers of Defense and Interior would brief the PM in detail at the next MCNS. Maliki reiterated his belief that his reconciliation project is taking off with opposition groups approaching him. He proposed using the next month to "quiet things down" in an effort to promote the reconciliation process and build his security forces. Military operations could resume if the reconciliation effort did not produce results. -------------- Update -------------- ¶2. (S) MNF-I CG Casey called on Prime Minister Maliki July 29 to brief him on security related developments that had occured during his absence from Iraq. The Prime Minister asked whether or not reports of six rockets used against civilian targets in the Karadah area of Baghdad were true. General Casey acknowledged that initial reports suggested this, but investigation made clear that the explosions came from four car bombs and two satchel IEDs. Overall, civilian casualties continued to be high and attributable to revenge attacks that had been provoked by, perhaps, an AQIZ car bomb. The Prime Minister concluded that the proper security response is to increase measures against AQIZ targets in Baghdad. Dr. Al-Rubaie, believing the PM had not fully understood General Casey's point, repeated to him that majority of civilian casualties were not coming from the car bombs directly, but as a result from sectarian violence undertaken in reaction to the car bombs. General Casey showed the Prime Minister a photo of Baghdad that showed the incoming indirect fire (IDF) into the International Zone was coming from Sadr City and New Baghdad. He suggested to the Prime Minister that the IDF was in reaction to recent CF/ISF efforts to neutralize death squads. Shooting mortars at civilian targets was a worrisome trend. The Prime Minister countered that the death squads were not necessarily from JAM. Casey agreed that Omar Brigade of the AQIZ also ran Sunni death squads. -------------- Phase II Baghdad Security Plan -------------- ¶3. (S) General Casey explained that he had taken advantage of an opportunity to bring his most capable counterinsurgency forces to Baghdad for 90-120 days, by extending a brigade due to rotate home from Mosul. Showing him a photograph of a Stryker vehicle, General Casey said there would be approximately 300 such vehicles on the streets of Baghdad by mid-August; this would extend protection to more neighborhoods. The Prime Minister asked that they be put in the most challenging areas, such as Abu Gharaib, Doura, Amariya, and the canal area. He very much wanted the citizens of Baghdad to see the presence of security forces. General Casey said that he expected that the Iraqi Armed Forces would, in the end, emerge as the dominant security force in Baghdad. They discussed the political complications of bringing two predominantly Kurdish IAF brigades from Kurdistan to reinforce Baghdad, without introducing Kurd-Arab tensions, which currently did not exist, into the city. Dr. Al-Rubaie suggested the Kurdish brigades be "mixed" with Arab brigades to lessen the problem. ¶4. (S) Maliki said he believed his reconciliation project was taking off. He said that during his short stop in Jordan on the way back from the U.S. opposition groups and ex-Iraqi Army officers had contacted him. Likewise, Anbar tribal leaders asked that he decrease military operations to facilitate their efforts at reconciliation and their fight against Al-Qaeda. He needed this momentum to grow. Maliki said he could use breathing space to test whether or not he could reduce violence politically and use the time as well to build up his forces. If political efforts failed, one could always resume the tempo of military operations. General Casey acknowledged that military operations needed to support political goals, but losing the military momentum could work BAGHDAD 00002907 002 OF 002 against those goals as well. He said that a careful balance was needed over the coming months. He promised to provide military options to the Prime Minister but understood that the PM would make the political call. The Prime Minister responded positively to General Casey's idea that, if progress could be made in security for Bagdhad over the next month, then the month of Ramadan would be a perfect oppportunity to reinforce the Prime Minister's calls for peace and reconciliation. ¶5. (S) General Casey told Maliki that the ISF need to be empowered by the political leadership and recommended that the Council of Representatives issue a statement of support for them. The PM had seen a draft communique on this and promised to talk to the CoR leaders, although their last day in session was the 30th. He said that possibly another political grouping could issue, such as the Political Committee for National Security. He referred briefly to the situation in Basrah, noting that Shaykh Yacoubi of the Fadhila Party had threatened that the "people" will take control if the government fails to do so. He also pointed out that the Ministry of Oil itself is under threat from forces of the previous (Fadhila) minister. -------------- IAF Modernization -------------- ¶6. (S) Maliki said he spoke to the President about plans to modernize the Iraqi Army--the President had expressed his full faith in Generals Casey and Dempsey, if they were on board, he would be too. General Casey said that General Dempsey would be working with the Minister of Defense on a modernization plan; it would reflect the Prime Minister's requirements. In the end, it would be the Prime Minister's program. In response to the Prime Minister's desire to shorten the timeline needed to increase Iraqi forces--"I can't wait until the end of 2007"--General Casey promised to work on it, noting that it was all about priorities and resources. KHALILZAD