CORRECTED COPY - IRAQ: STAYING CLEAR OF THE MESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002744 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 TAGS: PREL EAID ECON EINV KPRV IZ SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - IRAQ: STAYING CLEAR OF THE MESS AT STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES REF: A. BAGHDAD 2716 (NOTAL) ¶B. BAGHDAD 2375 (NOTAL) ¶1. (C) Summary: Econoff on July 17 accompanied a U.S. military team on visits to two Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to assess the condition of the companies and determine how best to assist them to improve overall security conditions. The visits illustrated difficulties in dealing with state bureaucracy and the risks inherent in assisting the GOI to revitalize its SOEs. The visit also delineated the difficult challenges we face in Iraq trying to ensure that a security objective -- providing gainful employment -- does not undercut a primary economic objective -- assisting the transition of this state economy to market-based principles. End summary. -------------- -------------- Subsidy Addictions, Bloated Payrolls, Outdated Facilities -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The State Company for Electrical Industries (SCEI), which our team visited, tells a typical story of Iraq's entrenched state-controlled economy and the risks inherent in assisting the GOI to revitalize its SOEs. SCEI, owned entirely by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), produces a range of electrical products, including generators, air conditioners, and light fixtures. According to company management, SCEI sells 75% of its output to the Iraqi government, and the remainder on the open market at lower prices. Besides government support on the output side, SCEI benefits from subsidized power and raw materials. Management told us SCEI employs 4,500 workers, 30% of whom actually work. The remainder of SCEI's workforce stays home, and they are compensated at 65% of their normal salary to do so. Salaries of full-time employees are paid out of company earnings; those of stay-at-home employees are covered by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). SCEI's facilities and processes, though well-maintained, are outdated and noncompetitive. As one engineer said after requesting help modernizing SCEI's technology: "We're stuck in the 80's!" ¶3. (SBU) SCEI management told us SCEI is operating at no more than 20% of its capacity, running one seven-hour shift five days per week, mainly because government-provided power supplies are inadequate. Indeed, management believes the government's failure to adequately support SCEI is the main �00A;cause of all the SOE's problems, particularly its inability to provide a secure environment for SCEI's workforce as it goes to and from work. (A firefight between unidentified combatants broke out directly across the street from SCEI during our visit and lasted approximately 40 minutes.) ¶4. (SBU) A close second to security failures, says management, is the GOI's failure to finance adequate salaries for SCEI's employees. Management said the average SCEI worker makes approximately $300 per month (when working), which they argued is inadequate to support a typical Iraqi family. (Note: According to USAID's Economic Governance II Project, the average Iraqi family needs approximately $180 per month, or $1 per day per individual, to survive at a "poverty" level. About 20% of Iraqi households fall under this category and are currently eligible to receive benefits under the Social Safety Net administered by the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) SCEI management also told our team that the GOI should erect protective barriers against unfair Chinese competition, including tariffs and "buy-Iraq" laws. "Our quality is better," said one manager, "but their prices are lower." -------------- Not Getting It -------------- ¶6. (SBU) SCEI management also laid out what they hoped the USG could do for them: "What kind of technology can you provide?" "What kind of access to money do you have?" "Can you link us up with foreign investors?" SCEI management believes that if only they could revitalize their operations, upgrading equipment and hiring back non-working employees, then they could operate at full capacity. They made no mention of the need to understand changing market conditions and adopt flexible, innovative business practices to compete. Despite our efforts to the contrary, free-market principles have yet to take root in Iraq's SOEs. ¶7. (C) Deputy Minister Sami of the Ministry of Industry & Minerals (MIM),which owns the largest share of Iraq's SOEs at 31%, told Embassy officials July 24 that the public sector is currently the best source for employing Iraqis because the private sector is "too weak" (ref A). This tracks with the BAGHDAD 00002744 002 OF 003 2006 year-to-date increase in SOE employment from approximately 500,000 to 600,000 employees (most of whom appear to be not working). DM Sami said he strongly favors private sector development, but that the GOI needs to "rehabilitate" its SOEs. His long-term vision (five years out),he told us, includes retained government ownership in "privatized" SOEs. His vision also seems to include a larger MIM profiting from "rehabilitated" SOEs. The main problem, as DM Sami pointed out to us, is that the GOI does not have the money necessary to perform successful "rehabilitation." -------------- A Typical Scenario -------------- ¶8. (SBU) SCEI is typical of Iraq's approximately 192 SOEs. Even the GOI's most profitable SOEs are highly dependent on subsidized inputs and outputs, probably incapable of operating profitably without them (ref B). From a facilities perspective, SCEI is probably better off than most of Iraq's SOEs. The Modern Sewing Company, which we visited the same day, is even less competitive: its equipment is older and not as well-maintained; its buildings are in poor condition; and it has a constant stream of sewage running onto the grounds, which the management is attempting to dilute by mixing regular water with the sewage. -------------- Injecting Ourselves into the Mess -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The U.S. goal is to help Iraq reform its dysfunctional economy by moving away from government control of industry to a competitive free-market economy. The GOI has been reluctant to pursue privatization for a number of reasons, chiefly a fear that those presently on the payroll, including employees who do not work, will be unable to find other employment. ¶10. (C) Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC) shares the Mission goal of eventual privatization, but has its own overriding objective of improving the security environment by improving economic conditions. MNC's central, but untested, assumption is that improved economic conditions, measured both by job creation and psychological effects (i.e. increased confidence of area residents),will lead to fewer attacks against Coalition Forces and innocent Iraqis. (Note: Not all elements of the Mission agree with this assumption, as the correlation between high unemployment and frequency of anti-coalition attacks is not robust. Moreover, the advantages provided to SOEs can be seen as inhibiting to private-sector activity that might potentially have a greater economic impact. End note.) As a means to achieving this greater security, MNC is spending CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) money to assist Iraqi SOEs in strategic areas. -------------- Confusing Signals? -------------- ¶11. (C) MNC's efforts are currently limited to human capital capacity building (providing training and assistance in creating business and marketing plans) and assistance in obtaining contracts. At Hateen Industrial Complex in Iskandaria, for example, MNC is using CERP money to train Hateen management on basic business principles. MNC has also contracted Hateen to paint humvees, and has persuaded the Ministry of Interior to contract with Hateen on various projects, such as constructing living containers and buses. (Prior to the war, Hateen was primarily a bus, truck, and military vehicle factory.) ¶12. (C) Considering MNC's limited budget for SOE assistance and the immense effort expended just to set up business training for Hateen management, it is unlikely that MNC's efforts can extend to significant "rehabilitation," such as procuring new equipment lines or refurbishing obsolescent facilities. Nonetheless, MNC runs the risk of creating false expectations through its assistance efforts. During our meeting with SCEI management, it was apparent they hoped for a savior to inject much-needed funding into their largely moribund operations. Civil Affairs teams have visited SCEI in the past, prior to MNC's new mandate to assess SOEs and determine best ways to assist in order to improve security conditions. As a result, SCEI is currently a bit skeptical about possible outcomes of this newest lookover: "We've been down this road with you before, and nothing happened." ¶13. (C) Also, in the absence of an effective privatization law, MNC is injecting the USG into a SOE rejuvenation process that may or may not end up in privatization. The danger is BAGHDAD 00002744 003 OF 003 that in pursuit of important short-term objectives, USG actions may keep an effectively bankrupt system of government-controlled enterprises on temporary life support. Worse yet, we may be unwittingly aiding corrupt GOI officials who intend to use rehabilitated SOEs as revenue generators for political or personal purposes. -------------- Maintain the Middle Ground -------------- ¶14. (C) Embassy wishes to avoid moving in contradictory directions on the issue of SOE assistance. Given the security interests involved, we will continue careful coordination between Embassy, MNC, and the GOI to maintain the current middle ground: As MNC provides very limited, carefully considered assistance, based on realistic assessments of conditions in Iraq's SOEs, Embassy will aggressively press the GOI to pass a privatization law. We believe this law will be necessary to create a transparent and independent oversight agency, come to grips with the economic realities of the SOEs, and develop a plan to protect and assist workers who will eventually be displaced by privatization. -------------- Continuing to Work Together -------------- ¶15. (C) At the same time, Embassy will continue traveling with MNC as they visit and assess SOEs around Iraq. The combined trip of July 17 was beneficial in that it enabled EconOff to observe firsthand SOE operations and develop relationships with SOE management. It was also an opportunity for Embassy to explain our policies to the troops in the field, who more often deal with mid-level Iraqis and are in a better position to influence them. ¶16. (C) Post appreciated the cordial welcome extended to Econoff by the MND-B G9 Public Administration Team, MNC-I C9, 4th Brigade Combat Team/101 Airborne, and A Company/414 Civil Affairs Battalion, and the excellent spirit of cooperation in including him in their assessment operations. Their professionalism throughout the mission was impressive. SCOBEY