FADHILA PARLIAMENTARY HEAD OFFERS TO COOPERATE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002373 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT PREL PTER KDEM KISL IZ SUBJECT: FADHILA PARLIAMENTARY HEAD OFFERS TO COOPERATE ON BASRAH SECURITY Classified By: Charge d,Affaires David Satterfield for reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 29 meeting, Nadeem al-Jabiri, the head of the Fadhila Party parliamentary bloc, offered to help find a solution to Basrah's security problem. The Ambassador encouraged him to work with PM Maliki. Al-Jabiri attributed many of Basrah's problems to struggles between the UK and Iran and between Fadhila and SCIRI. SCIRI, al-Jabiri said, is pushing for federalism so that SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim can rule over the Shia heartland. In other comments, al-Jabiri gave Maliki credit for a good start, citing detainee releases as important. Al-Jabiri predicted that PM Maliki's attempts to disband militias and enforce a weapons ban would fail. END SUMMARY. -------------- Security in Basrah -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador received Nadeem al-Jabiri at the latter's request on June 29 and asked for al-Jabiri's views on developments since government formation. Al-Jabiri said the Fadhila Party wants the security situation in Basrah to improve and admitted that Governor Mohammad Mossibh al-Wahili is part of the problem. Al-Jabiri claimed that he spoke to many people, including PM Maliki and the Iranian Ambassador, about the security situation in Basrah but that still no solution had been found. Al-Jabiri said that he now wants the Ambassador's views on how to move forward. The Ambassador urged al-Jabiri to work with PM Maliki to solve Basrah's problems and offered to phone the PM to let him know al-Jabiri would soon contact him. ¶3. (C) Al-Jabiri placed some of the blame for poor security in Basrah on an ongoing rivalry between the UK and Iran. According to al-Jabiri, Iran currently has the upper hand in this rivalry. Iranian influence is a destabilizing force in Basrah, and activities such as smuggling oil across the Iranian border undermine the rule of law. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that people with ties to the GOI commit crimes. The GOI has been unable to stymie corruption. "It is even possible for criminals to rent out police cars," the Ambassador said. In Basrah, Ambassador added, there are officially 15,000 police officers, but only 3,000 actually show up for work; the other 12,000 exist only on paper. Al-Jabiri agreed, likening the police in some areas to a mafia. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked al-Jabiri's opinion on possible military options to resolve the problems in Basrah. Although not advocating it, al-Jabiri said that the threat of increased Coalition Forces in Basrah could put pressure on Governor al-Wahili to restore the rule of law. ¶6. (C) Al-Jabiri told the Ambassador that many of the problems in Basrah are a result of a struggle between Fadhila and SCIRI. SCIRI, al-Jabiri claimed, is pushing for federalism in Iraq so that SCIRI head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim can rule over the Shia heartland. Iran, al-Jabiri said, favors this. Fadhila is not pushing for federalism, al-Jabiri said, because it would cause unnecessary friction with the Sunni Arabs and possibly ignite a civil war. He argued that the UIC either should delay debate on federalism or divide the nine Shia provinces into three separate regions. -------------- Disbanding Militias -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Jabiri said that he thinks the PM is doing okay, but he predicted that Maliki likely would fail in his attempts to disband militias and to enforce a weapons ban. Dawa, al-Jabiri said, has no militia and therefore must work with the Sadrist-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi. Pointing out that SCIRI will want to exploit this, al-Jabiri emphasized the need to work politically to solve the militia problem and not focus simply on the violence. This is one of the failings of the Baghdad security plan, al-Jabiri said. -------------- National Reconciliation -------------- ¶8. (C) Pointing out that de-Ba'athification is an important part of the national reconciliation process, the Ambassador told al-Jabiri he agrees with PM Maliki's view that between 90-95 percent of former Ba'athists can be reintegrated into BAGHDAD 00002373 002 OF 002 Iraqi society. The Ambassador commented that al-Jabiri agreed with this idea once, too. Al-Jabiri acknowledged this, but he lamented that the de-Ba'athification process too often is used as a weapon against political opponents. The Ambassador agreed, noting that even al-Jabiri has been accused of being a Ba'athist. The Ambassador added that, if the former Ba'athists who currently oppose Iraq truly lay down their arms, the UIC perhaps should be more generous in supporting amnesty for them. -------------- Prisoner Releases -------------- ¶9. (C) Nadeem al-Jabiri praised the recent release of 2,700 MNF-I-held detainees. The Ambassador said that if more detainees renounced violence, more could be released. The Ambassador estimated that, of the approximately 12,000 detainees still held by MNF-I, about 8,000 could be released. SATTERFIELD