WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000215 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PHUM IZ SUBJECT: WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE TIME TO ASSEMBLE SAYS TAWAFFUQ LEADER REF: BAGHDAD 195 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: One of Iraq's top Sunni Arab political leaders, Tariq al-Hashemi, told us January 25 that while his constitutents are not happy with the election process, he will move forward on unity government talks. He anticipated difficulties finding common ground with the Kurds and the Shia Islamists on a government program. He underlined that security is the top issue for the Tawaffuq leadership. He hoped constitutional issues like federalism could be put off (since he knows he'll lose any vote in the parliament). A senior member of the Shia Islamist Coalition, meanwhile, told us that the Coalition will work for a unity government even though a deal with the Kurds is "legally sufficient" to stand up a government. He brushed off Sunni Arab worries about militia-driven killings and said the Shia Coalition will bring its own security concerns -- Sunni Arab religious extremists and ex- Baathists -- to the negotiating table. Discussions between the political blocs are still in their early stages, but already the future of the Interior Ministry is shaping up as one of the contentious issues. For the Sunni Arab political bloc, it might be the make-or-break issue. End Summary. -------------- SUNNI ARABS STILL GRUMPING ABOUT ELECTION -------------- ¶2. (C) Tariq al-Hashemi of the Tawaffuq Front told us January 25 that the Sunni Arab community is still unhappy with the election results. The fraud, especially in the South, was well documented and the IECI did not investigate the complaints properly, he claimed. He sought compensation - either extra seats awarded from the 45 compensatory seats or extra ministries in the government. PolCouns told Hashimi that the IMIE report provided recommendations on how to improve the complaints process and better ensure IECI staff obeyed the boundries of propriety. The U.S. would support IECI and UN effort to implement those recommendations. PolCouns cautioned, however, that the U.S. had no plan to intervene to boost up Tawaffuq's seat total, whatever it turns out to be. -------------- SECURITY, NOT THE CONSTITUTION, IS VITAL -------------- ¶3. (C) Pol Counselor said the best way to address Sunni concerns would be for the Tawaffuq to negotiate to obtain real power in the new government. Hashimi said that he understood this and Tawaffuq will be seeking key ministries rather than symbolic political posts like the Presidency. While conceding that the discussions on government formation and ministry allocation among the political groups may take some time, Hashimi continued to point to security as the number one concern for the Sunnis. Something must be done about MOI Bayan Jabr, said Hashimi. People are being killed every day, he fulminated. He claimed that 16 Sunnis were killed by people wearing police uniforms and driving police vehicles in Baghdad's al-Salam district on January 24. The Coalition is doing nothing to stop the killings, pleaded an angry Hashimi. PolCouns advised that a good police force and army are needed to protect the Sunnis. Making sure that the Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense are non-sectarian professionals is essential. Hashimi readily agreed and underlined that security issues top the agenda of the Tawaffuq Front. ¶4. (C) Hashemi said the Tawaffuq Front would not push the constitutional issue of federalism when the new parliament sits. He readily admitted that the Sunni Arabs would lose a vote about moving forward on federalism badly in the next parliament as alignments stand now. He suggested that it would be easier to form a national unity government with Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Shia Islamists if the debate on Constitutional changes (including the setting up of any new regions) could be put off for several years. -------------- SUNNI ARABS AND KURDS - NOT NATURAL PARTNERS -------------- ¶5. (C) Hashimi told PolCouns on January 25 that it will be difficult to reach agreement on a unity government deal with the Kurds. The Sunnis and Kurds have incompatible BAGHDAD 00000215 002 OF 003 views on the key Constitutional issues of federalism and the status of Kirkuk. Hashimi doubted that the Kurds will be flexible on these issues. A government coalition must have a common program on security, the Constitution and the economy, said Hashimi. Discussions with Ayad Allawi are proceeding well and the prospects of a Sunni/Allawi block representing 83 seats appear good, Hashemi observed. He asserted that convincing the Kurds to join the coalition would depend largely on the extent of American pressure. Hashimi readily agreed with ideas agreed upon by Allawi and the Kurds on issues such as a four-way unity government, dividing ministries into functional groups each headed by a deputy prime minister and ensuring each unity government bloc had representation in each functional group. He liked the idea of a top-level national security council as well. (Comment: his discussions with Allawi may be progressing, but Allawi apparently didn't brief Hashimi in detail on the discussions in the Irbil. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) Hashimi underlined that opposition to the Shia plurality in the COR is not a sufficient bond for coalition government partners. A coalition that excluded key Shia Islamist parties would only trigger a sharply negative reaction from the Shia and the Iranians. Moreover, the option of breaking the Shia coalition seemed unlikely to Hashimi. Fadhila's leader Nadeem al-Jabiri is also seeking Tawaffuq backing for his prime ministerial bid, but Hashimi dismissed the likelihood of Tawaffuq supporting him. (Comment: Hashimi did not discount Jabiri on ideological grounds but rather in a rapid-fire manner in line with Hashimi's perception of the weight of political forces. End Comment.) -------------- SHIA ISLAMIST VIEW: DON'T LECTURE US -------------- ¶7. (C) (C) Later January 25 Saad Qandil of the Shia Islamist party SCIRI told PolCouns that the Shia Islamist Coalition is willing to form a unity government that includes the Sunni Arabs, but people like Hashimi must stop claiming the Sunni Arabs have a "right" to participate in the next government. Qandil sniffed that that the Shia Coalition and the Kurdish Alliance can practically gain 2/3 of the next parliament alone; they don't need the Sunnis, he stated flatly. (He added that American insistance on the unity government theme grates some Shia because it ignores the legal reality.) PolCouns said the math may back Qandil's argument, but excluding the Sunni Arabs or presenting them with a marginal role at the end will narrow the chances of undercutting the insurgency. He cautioned that the U.S. wants the political process to dampen the insurgency, not aggravate it. ¶8. (C) PolCouns reviewed the types of complaints about the Interior Ministry raised by Tawaffuq in general, and the Hayy as-Salam incident January 24 allegations in particular. Qandil denied that there are militia members operating in the guise of the Interior Ministry. He suggested that those responsible for the killings were Sunni religious extremists (takfiris) in police garb. PolCouns rejoined that no other part of the political spectrum outside SCIRI believed that. It would be best to address the credibility problem at the Interior Ministry directly, he advised. PolCouns noted that the Sunni Arabs might be flexible about the next minister as long as it was a person with subject expertise and no sectarian agenda. Qandil insisted that the Shia Islamist Coalition would demand a Shia as Interior Minister. He pointed to the many terror attacks on Shia and stated that the Shia are the real victims of violence, not the Sunni Arabs. PolCouns urged Qandil to consider also how to use deputy minister positions in the negotiations to enhance the chances of a deal. -------------- THE PM CHOICE WILL BE - JAFARI ? -------------- ¶9. (C) Qandil told PolCouns that negotiations to choose the next Prime Minister would be more difficult than in the spring of 2005. Qandil said the Shia Coalition would not vote to settle the Jafari-Abd al-Mahdi competition because the tight margin of whatever result came out would be very divisive. Qandil commented that he thought PM Ja'fari is the frontrunner, but Abd al-Mahdi would make a better Prime Minister. Qandil discounted the possibility of a compromise candidate, such as Fadhila's Nadeem Jabiri or Deputy TNA Speaker Husayn Shahristani, getting the nod. BAGHDAD 00000215 003 OF 003 -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Both Hashimi and Qandil agreed on the importance of a unity government, but we doubt the Shia Islamists and Tawaffuq will agree on much after that. Notably, feelings run high among members of both the Shia Islamist Coalition the Sunni Arab Tawaffuq Front about the Interior Ministry and security problems. Even once we get past the prime minister choice and the Presidency Council, we can expect an sharp fight over the choice of the Interior Minister. Indeed, it is easy to imagine the Tawaffuq Front quickly threatening to walk out of the unity government talks unless they get satisfaction on the choice of the Interior Minister. We are quietly gathering names of possible choices should we need them later. KHALILZAD