MCNS - UPDATE ON BAGHDAD SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002135 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 TAGS: MASS CIA IZ MASS MCAP MOPS NATO PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: MCNS - UPDATE ON BAGHDAD SECURITY Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),(B),(D). ¶1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: On June 20, the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) met to review progress on the Baghdad security plan. Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi National Police (INP) leadership, supported by Multi-National Division-Baghdad(MND-B) Commanding General (CG),highlighted logistical shortfalls and tactical setbacks of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It was reported that overall results thus far have been encouraging but incomplete. Murders and kidnappings are down, for example, but VBIED attacks spiked on June 17. There was frank discussion over the need to clarify a policy on militia engagement and follow-on actions. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS) Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki chaired the MCNS on the evening of June 20 to review progress on Baghdad security operations, better known as Operation Ma'an ila al-Amam (Together Forward). Present for the Iraqis were Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir, Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Wa'ili, National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, and Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Babikir Shawkt. The Coalition was represented by Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard, UK Ambassador William Patey, MNF-I Deputy Commanding General LTG Robert Fry, MNC-I CG Peter Chiarelli, MND-B CG James Thurman, and Pol-Mil Counselor. ¶3. (S//REL GBR AUS) Ministry of Defense (MOD) staff began by reviewing operational incidents and reporting that operations would be modified to focus more on specific hot spots in Baghdad. In addition, the 130 checkpoints currently in place would be shifted to counter newly-identified threats. The nightly curfews and Friday afternoon (prayer time) vehicle bans had been enforced, MOD staff reported, but there were some violations. Innovative booby traps in cigarette packs and cell phone chargers were being used. MG Thurman added that attacks are down overall: murders and kidnappings have decreased, but VBIED attacks spiked on June 17. Thurman urged strict discipline in enforcing curfews, checkpoint procedures, and Friday vehicle bans. ¶4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Despite progress with the operation, problems were identified. Some police were short of food, water, and fuel. As such, operations were difficult in the 100 degree summer heat, and vehicle patrols could not be conducted as patrol cars had no gas. Thurman noted that MND-B had to provide 145,000 liters of fuel to the Iraqi Police to overcome their shortages. ISF manning was at less than 75 percent of unit strength, weakening operational effectiveness. Militias, in particular Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM), were active on the streets and intimidating ISF units, causing them to back down (no major kinetic encounter with JAM has been reported so far). Certain discipline problems, such as ISF not wearing their protective gear and wearing face masks, also were reported. Iraqi intelligence officials claimed that a lack of useful intelligence was a hindrance to operations. ¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS) DCG Fry characterized the Baghdad security operation as satisfactory but that it could be done better. This is the largest ISF operation to date, Fry noted, and growing pains are expected. Coordination between MNF-I and ISF is an additional challenge, Fry added. ¶6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Fry then asserted that militias are the biggest threat to security in Baghdad. Their unhindered activity and contempt for the rule of law undermine the GOI's authority, he explained, and no real security progress can be made until the militia threat is faced head on. Actionable intelligence is available, Fry asserted, contrary to claims from Iraqi intelligence officials. Fry urged the targeting of senior JAM leadership -- on whom intelligence is available -- since they have been the most problematic. Fry strongly recommended that Maliki pursue these JAM leaders and that a carefully laid out public information plan accompany any anti-JAM operation in order to inform the populace of why these individuals were a threat. Likewise, Fry noted, logistical ISF problems must be resolved both to improve operations and to enhance ISF morale by demonstrating that the GOI is truly behind them. ¶7. (S//REL GBR AUS) Maliki stated strongly that those who oppose the Baghdad security operation are opposing Iraq. All who obstruct the operatopm must be dealt with equally and fiercely. There should be no distinction between the militias in this regard. Maliki directed the MinDef and BAGHDAD 00002135 002 OF 002 MinInterior to resolve the logistical issues, enforce the curfews, follow all rules to include wearing proper equipment, and punish those individuals who do not carry out their duties with seriousness and discipline. Maliki also called for ISF checkpoints not to back down when confronted. However, he did not openly commit to targeting the JAM leadership. SPECKHARD