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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
06BAGHDAD211 2006-01-26 03:25:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

60-DAY ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCIAL

Tags:   MARR PINS ODIP OFDP PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2409
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0211/01 0260325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260325Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2281
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
					  UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000211 

SIPDIS

INFO MNFIM
MNCI//00//

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR PINS ODIP OFDP PREL IZ
SUBJECT: 60-DAY ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

REF: 05 BAGHDAD 4045



1. (U) THIS IS A COORDINATED EMBASSY BAGHDAD AND MNF-I
CABLE.



2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The National Coordination Team (NCT)
provided AMB Khalilzad and GEN Casey the 60-Day
Assessment of the three operational Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) on January 19. From this
assessment, it remains clear the PRT concept is a
crucial component of both our integrated counter-
insurgency strategy and our national capacity building
in the provinces; the PRTs add value across the
political, economic, and governance lines of operation
in Iraq. Mission and MNF-I are prepared to roll out
additional PRTs pending resourcing and security
manning decisions by the Principals Committee. END
SUMMARY.



--------------------------


60-DAY ASSESSMENT


--------------------------





3. (SBU) As directed by Ambassador and MNF-I
Commanding General (CG) Casey, the NCT developed a 60-
day joint assessment of the three proof-of-concept
PRTs (Babil, Tamin, Ninawa) and of the PRT initiative
overall. (NOTE: Briefing slides sent separately to
NEA/I. END NOTE.) The results of this assessment
were briefed to Ambassador and CG on January 19.
Overall, the initiative is assessed as on-track, with
all PRTs functional and engaging provincial
authorities.



4. (SBU) Operational highlights of the PRT after 60-
days include:

-- All PRTs are functional and, with few exceptions,
fully-staffed.

-- Comprehensive work plans have been developed.
These plans integrate efforts of USAID, IRMO, DOS,
Civil Affairs, and the Local Governance Program, and
focus on integration of MNF-I and Mission initiatives
in the provinces.

-- The PRTs have provided Mission with enhanced weekly
reporting and situational awareness of political,
economic, rule of law, and infrastructure
developments.

-- Local offices previously established under Local
Governance Program-II have been integrated into PRTs.



5. (U) Functional accomplishments of the PRTs after
60-days include:

-- In Babil, the PRT developed a joint Iraqi-US 90-day
action plan that includes a prioritized list of small,
high-impact projects to address constituents'
immediate needs.

-- In Kirkuk, the PRT assisted the Provincial Council
(PC) in developing a solid waste management master
plan to resolve critical public and environmental
concerns. The PRT also assisted in drafting a local
law to transfer authority for weapons permits from
Coalition to the PC and for establishing a Missing
Persons/Detainees Working Group.

-- In Ninawa, the PRT facilitated a human rights
assessment of local prisons by the PC. It also
assisted the Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committee (PRDC) Chairman in developing a
comprehensive reconstruction plan for Tal Afar that
resulted in an allocation of $37 million from the
central government.



--------------------------


ACTIONS


--------------------------




BAGHDAD 00000211 002 OF 003




6. (SBU) As a result of the review, Ambassador and CG
agreed on a number of steps to enhance the
effectiveness of the existing PRTs:

-- To address an immediate need to support engagement
by the first three PRTs until a permanent PRT
arrangement is decided, additional movement security
teams will be provided by MNF-I so that each existing
PRT will have two military movement security teams to
augment the DOS-contracted personal security detail
(PSD) teams currently supporting PRTs.

-- Ambassador and CG agreed to cost-sharing provisions
by which Mission would take responsibility for
logistical support for PRTs located on DOS facilities,
and MNF-I would assume responsibility for logistical
support of PRTs located on MNC-I facilities.



--------------------------


OUTSTANDING ISSUES


--------------------------





7. (SBU) Acceptance and recognition are still needed
from all USG elements that PRTs are central to
capacity building at the provincial level and in the
counterinsurgency effort. To that end, capable local
governments that have the support of their populations
significantly diminish anti-GOI activities while
supporting the federalist structure defined by the
Iraqi constitution.



6. (SBU) Adequate movement security remains the
largest area of concern for existing and future PRTs.
Although the proof-of-concept PRTs have initiated
their engagement successfully with the provincial
governments and have met with notable success, DOS
security restrictions have limited the ability of
existing PRTs to interact fully with provincial
governments. Mission requires Washington to make a
decision on whether dedicated movement security assets
will be provided by Coalition forces, contracted
private security companies, or a combination of the
two. Additionally, Post has asked for clarification
on whether specific Washington authorization is needed
(vice existing COM authority) to allow COM personnel
to travel with non-COM PSD assets (e.g., Corp of
Engineers or military contracted civilian PSDs) in
order to increase flexibility of integrated PRT staff
and to use resources efficiently.



7. (SBU) USAID funding for the Local Governance
Program (LGP) is the critical component for capacity
development. USAID has front-loaded existing LGP
funds to stand up the PRTs. If additional funds are
not obtained, it is likely that the program will shut
down during the third quarter of FY06.



8. (SBU) The PRTs need supplemental funding or
reallocation of IRRF funds dedicated to each team for
reconstruction and development projects developed
through the PCs.



--------------------------


COALITION ENGAGEMENT


--------------------------





9. (SBU) Mission has engaged with Coalition partners
regarding the PRT initiative and has met with varying
degrees of interest from the British, Danes,
Salvadorans, Poles, Italians, Koreans, Japanese, and
Australians. Mission continues to work closely with
the UK regarding their lead on southern PRTs and
anticipates a formal proposal from them within the
next two weeks. We believe that the Italians and
Koreans will step up and assume a major role in PRTs,
and we anticipate that others will commit further
following a formal USG decision to move forward.



--------------------------


WAY AHEAD


--------------------------




BAGHDAD 00000211 003 OF 003




10. (SBU) The 60-Day Assessment has highlighted the
value of PRTs to achieving success in our mission in
Iraq. The magnitude of the contribution that the PRT
program can make depends upon the continued commitment
of resources. The issue of movement security and
future funding for the LGP are the critical drivers.
Continued staffing of PRTs with quality personnel with
requisite skill-sets and dwell-time also is paramount.
While these issues are being addressed, we have
challenged our team to continue to examine PRT
priority and location options that reflect the diverse
regional security, Coalition, and battlespace
dynamics.

KHALILZAD