DAWA ADVISORS TALK ABOUT PM OFFICE, NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002099 SIPDIS SIPDIS REL TO UK E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: DAWA ADVISORS TALK ABOUT PM OFFICE, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PLAN, MILITIAS AND COMSG REF: BAGHDAD 508 Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. To compensate for a weak cabinet, the Prime Minister has plans to divide his Office into four separate divisions, creating small groups of specialized, expert advisors, organized around key ministries that would provide policy guidance and oversight. The PM has yet to appoint the General Secretary of the Council of Ministers but has agreed to settle on a consensus candidate. According to one of his advisors, the PM would like to push for legislation that restricts weapons to the hands of official law enforcement. The delay in implementing the National Reconciliation plan is to allow enough time for the Presidency Council to review the plan and Shia Coalition concerns about meeting with insurgents. End Summary. -------------- Prime Minister's Office -------------- ¶2. (C/REL UK) PM Senior advisor Hassan al-Seneid told Pol/C that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wanted to divide the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) into four separate divisions (Policy, Finance, Administration and Services) each managed by a Chief of Staff. Al-Seneid said that the Prime Minister has been convinced also to appoint a senior Assistant to whom all four Chief of Staffs would answer. Al- Seneid asserted that the PM considers his cabinet extremely weak and will need a strong group of advisors to "watch dog" the ministers. He did not speculate what degree of authority these advisors would have over the ministers or how this group would relate to the proposed National Policy Council and its possible authority. Al-Seneid reported that when the PM met the cabinet for the first time he made clear that retaining a cabinet post would depend entirely on competency. ¶3. (C/REL UK) Another senior Dawa advisor to the PM, Falah Fiad, on June 17 gave PolOffs a similar account of the Prime Minister's efforts to compensate for the weakness of his cabinet. Fiad stated that the advice received from U.S. advisors - to find a small number of competent but totally loyal aides was problematic. Maliki, he said, simply did not have that type of brain trust to call upon. Fiad said that the PM wanted to create small groups of specialized, expert advisers, organized around key ministries that would provide policy guidance and oversight of the ministries. These advisors would be chosen on the basis of their competence not political party affiliation. (Shia politician Mohammad Ali Hakim told PolOffs the same day that the some senior positions on the PM's staff may require approval from the Council of Representatives.) Fiad was working on lists of names to propose to the PM and said he would welcome U.S. ideas. He did not offer a clear response to questions as to how, or whether, the PM would empower these advisors or other subordinates to be effective overseers of the ministries. 4 (C/REL UK) On June 19, PM Advisor and the media face of Dawa, CoR member Haider Jawad Khadir al-Abadi told PolOffs that it is unclear if PM media relations will fit in one of the four divisions of the PMO. He added that current Media Advisor Yaseen Majid has experience drafting speeches and press releases, however, he has no experience running an office. Al-Abadi said he prefers the PM to summon former PM Spokesperson Laith Kubba back from London to head media relations. ¶5. (C/REL UK) Having worked over 25 years with al-Maliki, al-Seneid described Maliki's management style as "hands off" as long as one remembers to check-in on a regular basis. Al-Seneid believes that many 'advisors' trying to establish permanence in the PM's inner circle may not survive. ¶6. (C/REL UK) On a personal note, al-Seneid said that he is being considered for General Secretary of the Council of Ministers (CoMSG) admitted that there are several candidates being considered (Kurd Farhad Hussen, SCIRI Zuhair al-Humadi, Sadrist-aligned Sami al-Askari),and that the candidate will be selected by consensus of the political blocs. Al-Seneid said he would only leave the Council of Representatives if selected for CoMSG. Otherwise, he would remain in CoR and advise the PM as a BAGHDAD 00002099 002 OF 002 close friend and Dawa party colleague. -------------- Militias -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Seneid claimed that the security situation in Iraq would be much worse if the Shia did not believe in the political process. He emphasized how the Shia continue to demonstrate self-restraint in the face of sectarian violence. Al-Seneid said that PM al-Maliki wants to push legislation that prohibits the average citizen the right to bear arms and that weapons only be in the hands of the official law enforcement. He added that there is much talk about dissolving the militias, but he expressed dismay about absorption of these factions into the military. He warned that this "quick fix" method is problematic because it does not dissolve but legitimize militias. Al-Seneid preferred that all militia members be placed in civilian employment. He reasoned that once a militia man is employed, he will lose interest in participating in militias. -------------- Fighting Terrorism -------------- ¶8. (C) On the topic of combating terrorism, al-Seneid stated, in a heated anti-Sunni diatribe, that Sunni religious rules give their people the justification to murder non-Muslims. He added that these ideas were formulated long before al-Qaeda was a concept and claimed that this school of thought has become imbedded in the Sunni mindset for many generations. Al-Seneid said he believes we are witnessing the transfer of this mindset to the Shia and predicts that there will be Shia-based terrorism in 50 years time if it goes unchecked. Al-Seneid suggested the need to establish learning centers to root out terrorism. He also suggested that the CoR needs to pass stronger terrorism legislation that fights terrorism on a cultural level as well as authorizes enforcement according to rule of law. ¶9. (C) As the PM's advisor on security issues, al-Seneid reiterated that security is the first order of business for the new administration and a top priority is to secure Iraq's border with its neighboring countries (reftel). He reported that he is daily discussions with the PM on defense policy. He believes that the GOI and the Parliament must exert 50% of its total capacity on security issues for this administration to be successful. -------------- National Reconciliation Plan -------------- ¶10. (C) Haider al-Abadi told PolOffs that PM al-Maliki delayed implementation of the National Reconciliation Plan (NPR) for a number of reasons. First, both President Talabani and Deputy President Tarik al-Hashimi did not have enough time to review the plan. Secondly, the plan calls for meetings with insurgents but several Shia Coalition members (including al-Abadi) have no assurances that their Iraqi interlocutors really do speak for the insurgents they are seeking to disarm. Third, al-Abadi said Dawa party members objected to the clause where recommendations would be made without restrictions. Al-Abadi elaborated that there must be red lines when negotiating with insurgents. ¶11. (C) Al-Abadi said that security drives national reconciliation. He said he is confident that the Shia leadership has the will and can deliver the Shia street. However, he hopes that the Sunnis have the will, but questions if they can deliver their side of the street. SPECKHARD