RUBAIE TELLS EDELMAN OF SECURITY DEFICIENCIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002040 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 TAGS: MOPS PREL PINS IZ SUBJECT: RUBAIE TELLS EDELMAN OF SECURITY DEFICIENCIES Classified By: Political-Military Counselor David C. Litt for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On June 8, National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak Rubaie told Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, SIPDIS Eric Edelman that establishing a stable Iraq requires improved intelligence coordination, a comprehensive vetting and national ID program, competent leaders, and USG long-term commitment. Rubaie also took this opportunity to vent his frustration with USG's opposition to Ibrahim al Ja'afari remaining as Prime Minister. According to him, the political capital and time spent to ensure his departure was not worth it, especially since the government that was finally formed is weak. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT. Edelman concurred with Rubaie's needs assessment and assured him that President Bush has stressed to the American people that Iraq requires our long term support. Edelman also conveyed the importance of the new Iraqi government taking ownership in such as areas as security detention operations and strategic planning for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) Rubaie spent a considerable amount of time in the beginning of the visit, expressing his frustration with the USG's insistence on removing former Prime Minister Ja'afari from the new government. He told USDP Edelman the USG wasted too much political capital and caused months of delay because of this prohibition. He went on to say, the USG gained nothing from the effort as the new government is weak and does not include the "right people." ¶4. (C) Rubaie told Edelman that poor intelligence collection and coordination is among the greatest obstacles to defeating the insurgency in Iraq. He lamented that the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and the National Security Council are neither working together nor sharing information. Without a formal intelligence framework and clear legislation in place, Iraq is doomed to remain a playground for the enemy. ¶5. (C) Rubaie also stressed that Multi National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) was not helping the situation by taking control of all intelligence operations leaving the MoI, in particular, without a role. Rubaie requested MND-B relinquish power so MoI can gain competency and not remain so dependent on the Coalition. (NOTE: MND-B reports it is not partnered with MOI or MOD for Intelligence coordination. MND-B,s fight is at the tactical level. Rubaie may be confused at the level of capability and ability of MND-B to influence intelligence sharing at the strategic level. MND-B only works with its partner units 9th IA DIV, 6th IA DIV and 8th IA DIV to share intelligence and coordinate operations. (END NOTE). Rubaie also believes the Coalition should allow the Iraqis to lead and control the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). ¶6. (C) Rubaie said he would like to have a more comprehensive security vetting process for senior government officials and singled out Director Generals and Deputy Prime Ministers as key candidates for such extensive background checks. He believes vetting would assist in weeding corruption and guard against appointing people with ties to militias and insurgents. In addition to the vetting system, Rubaie told Edelman that Iraq desperately needs an National Identity Card system. ¶7. (C) Edelman attempted to allay Rubaie's concern about the possible waning of USG support by stressing that President Bush understands and has conveyed to the American people that Iraq is a long-term commitment. (NOTE: The President's visit to Iraq was after this meeting, END NOTE). Edelman went on to emphasize that while the USG is committed to Iraq, we expect the new Iraqi government to increasingly take responsibility for security, meeting Iraqi basic needs, and building unity among the people. ¶8. (C) Edelman pointed to the transfer of detention operations to the Iraqi government as an example of one of key responsibilities the Iraqis must take on as soon as feasible. Edelman stated "we need to get out of the detention business" as this is in both our interests. Edelman also told Rubaie it was important for Iraqi and USG leadership to develop a more traditional bilateral security relationship to include a security assistance office and implementation of standard security agreements. Edelman stressed that with this development, the USG expects the Iraqis to tell us what it expects out of such a relationship, outlining its vision for security assistance and cooperation. This will be critical for continued Congressional support. ¶9. (U) USDP Edelman did not clear this cable. SPECKHARD