MCNS APPROVES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN, DISCUSSES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001920 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016 TAGS: PINS PGOV MOPS IZ SUBJECT: MCNS APPROVES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN, DISCUSSES BASRAH AND DIYALA REF: BAGHDAD 1844 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),(B),(D ). ¶1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: On June 5, the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) met and approved a new plan for Baghdad security. The group decided that Prime Minister Maliki would be in overall charge of the plan's execution, with Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commanders carrying out day-to-day military operations in close consultation with Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) army and police commanders. British Ambassador urged that a Basrah security plan be formulated and implemented as soon as possible. Security in Diyala was also briefly dicussed. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS) PM Nuri al-Maliki convened the MCNS at his office the morning of June 5. Present for the Iraqis were DPM and Acting MinDef Salam al-Zawbai, DPM Barham Salih, Minister of Finance (and former Minister of Interior) Bayan Jabr, and National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie. Also present were Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Babikir Shawkt and Prime Ministerial assistant Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Tamimi. The Coalition was represented by Ambassador, MNF-I Commanding General Casey, and British Ambassador Patey. -------------- QUESTIONS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL -------------- ¶3. (S//REL GBR AUS) The main purpose of the meeting was to continue discussions of a proposed Baghdad Security Plan, debated in a previous meeting (reftel). NSA Rubaie reported that the "red team" had met to address unresolved issues with the plan. The key remaining issue for the MCNS to decide was who would command the troops deployed to execute the plan's operation. It was agreed that, as Commander in Chief, the Prime Minister would be in overall charge of the operation. The importance of close cooperation between Coalition Forces and MOD and MOI forces was emphasized, but Maliki agreed that there must be one commander with final authority when questions regarding the use of military force arise. Accordingly, the MNF-I commander responsible for the plan (U.S. Fourth Infantry Division Commanding General J.D. Thurman) will be in command. He is to closely coordinate with the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police commanders at all times, with the goal of a joint command be established as soon as possible. �0A; ¶4. (S//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey pointed out the four different elements involved in bringing security to Baghdad: Coalition Forces (CF),the IA, the Iraqi National Police, and the local Iraqi Police Service. Of these, GEN Casey argued, the local Iraqi Police Service is the largest and most important. Therefore, he added, it is critical that local police exert control over their neighborhoods and that they be seen and trusted by local residents. GEN Casey reinforced a point made earlier by Rubaie that all available forces must be deployed. Currently, between 40-50 percent of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are used at any one time; the goal is 80 percent. Casey endorsed the idea of a joint command structure but highlighted the need to get started now. In addition, GEN Casey, supported by Ambassador, strongly urged the PM to appoint someone to oversee the operation. GEN Casey agreed that it should eb someone other than the PM. The PM's other responsibilities will require much of the time and attention necessary ensure the success of the plan. The PM decided to oversee the operation for the time being. British Ambassador Patey added that this is another reason why Maliki must immediately name his new Ministers of Defense and Interior. -------------- PROBLEMS IN BASRAH -------------- ¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS) Ambassador Patey also urged Maliki to take stronger action to define command and control relationships in Basrah. Maliki agreed that a Basrah security plan needs to be developed. Patey concurred but pressed that, in the meantime, the Maliki needs to make it clear now who is in charge. Patey reported that the Basrah Governor believes that he is in overall command of the security forces in Basrah, when in fact he does not control CF, the IA, or the National Police forces. The Governor only controls the police force, which is a major part of the problem, Patey explained. Because Maliki has declared a BAGHDAD 00001920 002 OF 002 state of emergency in Basrah, Patey added, either he or the Minister of Interior (yet to be appointed) must exert control, since the Governor cannot be permitted to ignore the central government. Rubaie pointed out that since the PM visited Basrah and declared an emergency, the criminal gangs, terrorists, and militias have become even more active, hoping to discredit the government. Rubaie agreed that someone must be appointed to oversee the security situation in Basrah. It was agreed that steps would be taken to expedite implementation of a security plan for Basrah. -------------- DIYALA -------------- ¶6. (S//REL GBR AUS) The MCNS briefly discussed the security situation in Diyala, acknowledging that security is unstable and facts are indiscernible. For example, the Mayor of Muqtadiya was recently assassinated by an improvised explosive device placed in the window of his office. However, Zawbai said he had heard that the mayor supported terrorists and had been killed by a bomb that he was hiding in his office. Zawbai said he is planning to meet with sheiks and religious leaders in Diyala province later this week to get them to sign an honor agreement to halt the violence. Zawbai also urged the creation of a new armed force in Diyala composed of local residents. Maliki agreed to look into the circumstances of the mayor's death and directed General Babikir to proceed with a plan to address the security situation in Diyala. KHALILZAD