CABINET FORMATION ATMOSPHERICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001689 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PNAT PTER IZ SUBJECT: CABINET FORMATION ATMOSPHERICS Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Atmospherics at the May 20 inauguration of the new Iraqi Cabinet, reflected a blend of mirth, frustrated ambition, chaos -- but also satisfaction that a hurdle had been passed. Kurdish attendees joked over Speaker Mashadani's occasional malaproprisms and the fluid denouement to the government formation negotiations. Prior to commencement of the session, in which he would rise in protest, Hewar leader Saleh Mutlak told PolOff that he had in fact agreed to participate in the government. Up to the moment of cabinet announcement, some Iraqiyya members seemed under the mistaken impression that they would be ministerial nominees. The new Industry Minister (Kurdish Alliance) told PolOff that he did not know which ministry he would head until the ceremony began. According to the new Minister of Human Rights (Iraqiyya),the May 21 Cabinet meeting suggests that the discussion was mostly about administrative matters. The confusion stemmed largely from the closed-door, secretive negotiations about names. Iraqi politics in this sense are not so different from other developing democracies (including, at one time, ours) that are not very transparent. This could change over time - many of those mulling around waiting for the final cabinet announcements privately acknowledged the system should be more open. The Iraqi political deal making was also marked by the Iraqi predilection to putting off hard decisions until the last possible moment - or even a little later. End Summary. -------------- KURDISH STAFFER AMUSED -------------- ¶2. (C) The May 20 Council of Representatives vote on the cabinet was set to begin at 1100 but in fact was delayed until nearly 1330 as last-minute wrangling over names continued. In the meantime, most parliamentarians and a few political aspirants like Ahmed Chalabi wandered through the Convention Center trading stories, gossip and cigarettes. By 1300 President Talabani declined to negotiate any further with Tawafuq dissident Khalaf Alayan, noting Alayan deserved no further favors. Instead, he decided to sit down with a table of Kurdish Alliance and Iraqiyya members to reminisce about his youth. He chided his chief of staff, Kamran Karadaghi for failing to make an appointment for one of the Council of Representatives members at the table, saying "of all the people in the world, he should get an appointment whenever he wants!" He told an enthralled audience - including Ayad Allawi's aunt Aida Ussayran and Nasir Chaderchi's son Kamal - how he was once broke and alone in China, with two suitcases and no money. The Council of Representatives member, who was in China as well at the time, took him to lunch and loaned him money. Later, Karadaghi told PolOff wryly that Talabani had ordered him last week to postpone the meeting. ¶3. (C) PolOff heard Karadaghi and Presidency Council Media Advisor Hiwa Othman joking throughout the whole May 20 program. When Sunni Arabs loudly protested the lack of a complete government and the allocation of ministries, Karadaghi leaned over and mocked, "You call this leadership?" Later, when Speaker Mashadani called out the names of new ministerial nominees, the Kurds started laughing because he accidentally called for the Minister of "Maliya" (Financial) Resources, rather than "Ma'iya" (Water) Resources. "It can be both," Karadaghi assured PolOff. Later, Ja'afari gave a moving speech calling for all sides to renounce their sectarian prejudices and sternly reminded the COR that, "None of us are here today by coincidence!" Karadaghi, not a fan of the Shia Islamists, again leaned over to whisper, "Actually, I think three-quarters of the members wandered here by accident." Newly-appointed Ministry of Industry and Minerals Fawzi Hariri, who had said wearily before the ceremony that he still did not know for which Ministry he was being nominated, caught PolOff's eye from the podium after he was called up to take a seat with other ministers and mouthed, "Can you believe this?". -------------- Mutlak - a Day Late -------------- ¶4. (C) Hewar's Saleh Mutlak told Poloff immediately before the Assembly session that he had accepted PM Maliki's proposal for his inclusion in government. He denied reports that Hewar was excluded from the government after he refused to sign a written pledge to support the government program. "After all, I was in the group that BAGHDAD 00001689 002 OF 003 developed the program," he said. He said he was asked to sign a statement that he would change his public pronouncements - which he refused to do. Mutlak said that PM Maliki had called him May 20 morning and asked if Mutlak wanted to be in the government on terms agreed to and Mutlak agreed. (Note: The reported agreement would have given Mutlak the Ministry of State of National Dialogue and the Ministries of Environment and Women's Affairs. End note.) Mutlak later learned during the morning of May 20 that he had been excluded from the cabinet deal. During the CoR seQon Mutlak Q attemptedQ make an appeal to the parliamentarians to vote their conscience and not their party but pointedly did not threaten to go into opposition. He left the CoR with Tawafuq's National Dialogue only after the cabinet names were read out. Mutlak later told the media that he refused to be part of the government because he was asked to renounce his principles which he would never do. (Comment: In the end, Mutlak, who played hard to get to the very end, made it easy for Maliki and the IIP leadership to exclude him and divide up the spoils. End comment.) -------------- -------------- Uncertainty Within Iraqiyya -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Iraqiyya insider Saad Janabi called Poloff on the morning of May 20 and said that Iraqiyya sent a letter to PM Maliki with a new slate of candidates for ministerial posts listing him as their number one choice for the Ministry of Communication. Iraqiyya CoR member Safia Suhail told Poloff later that morning that the Iraqiyya letter also demanded that an Assistant Prime Minister position for Safia be created with the same powers as those afforded DPM Barham Salah or she would not accept the position. The letter was reportedly the subject of a last minute negotiating meeting with PM Maliki that delayed the 11 A.M. planned start of the CoR session. (Comment: The letter may have been a ploy by Ayad Allawi to placate inconvenient demands from Saad and Safia. E.g., Saad was one of the Iraqiyya CoR candidates barred from running by the De-Ba'thification Committee, which might also have precluded him from holding a ministerial position. Knowing that the demands would be rejected, Allawi could claim that he had tried. End comment.) ¶6. (C) After the cabinet names were read and Suhail saw that she was not named as an Assistant Prime Minister she began to loudly protest the lack of women in cabinet leadership roles and demand a vote count for each minister. Though ignored by Speaker Mashadani, she repeatedly demanded a vote count and when FM minister Zebari's name was read, asked to be able to pose questions about the nomination. She later told Poloff that she was happy that she embarrassed FM Zebari on international TV - "I got my revenge" she added. (Note: Safia Suhail has publicQand pQtely aQcked FM Zebari on two issues. First that he withdrew her nomination to be Iraq's Ambassador to Egypt in 2005 after she received agrement. Moreover, she is angry that Zebari kept on in the Foreign Ministry and promoted a Ba'thist official who she thinks was implicated in the murder of her father in Lebanon in 1994. End note.) -------------- A SURPRISED NOMINEE -------------- ¶7. (C) New Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Mikhail Salim told PolOff May 20 that she was unaware that she had been chosen to be the new minister. She received a call notifying her right after the Council of Representatives meeting started. Surprised, she rushed over to the session arriving almost an hour late; she slipped into the back row of ministers on the podium. ¶8. (C) Deputy Minister of Human Rights and Council of Representative member Aida Ossairan told PolOff in a subsequent May 20 phone conversation that she had assumed that she was being nominated as the Minister of Human Rights. Ossairan, a relative of Ayad Allawi's, said that she was told the night of May 19 that she would be the Human Rights Minister. Ossairan complained that she only found out during Maliki's announcement on the podium that it was not to be. "Even President Talibani congratulated me today before the session" she said. -------------- FIRST CABINET MEETING -------------- ¶9. (C). In a phone conversation May 21 with PolOff, BAGHDAD 00001689 003 OF 003 Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim said that the Council of Ministers meeting was uneventful and focused on introductions and general house business items. Salim said that during the ninety minute meeting, introductions were made of both former and new Ministers followed by general remarks from Jaafari and Maliki which included a message that the new Ministers should "work for Iraq" and not for their respective parties. The rest of the meeting according to Salim was focused on IZ badge issues, housing and other logistical matters. According to Salim, several new ministers were no shows, including the new ministers for Women's Affairs and Housing and Construction. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C). It should not be a surprise that Iraqi political figures finalize their deals in closed meetings while aides and allies mull around waiting for decisions. Many developing democracies, including our own, have operated in such a fashion. Over time, the system here could evolve into one which is more transparent; many political figures already are demanding this. Many also argue that it would be better here if the political bloc leaders had a smaller role choosing ministers and the prime minister had a bigger role. The Iraqi process in 2006, as it was in 2005, was also notable for the Iraqi political leaders' preference to postpone final decisions until the last possible moment, and then perhaps even a little after that. KHALILZAD