IRAQI VILLAGERS AND SECURITY FORCES FOIL JAYSH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001683 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2026 TAGS: PGOV MOPS PHUM IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI VILLAGERS AND SECURITY FORCES FOIL JAYSH AL-MAHDI RAID ON SUNNI VILLAGE BUT QUESTIONS STILL REMAIN Classified By: Political Counseelor Robert Ford, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is a PRT Diyala cable. A May 11 raid by Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements on a Sunni village east of Khan Bani Sa'd was foiled by the response of villagers and the coordinated response of local Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) units. Twenty-eight detained members of the group conducting the raid were turned over to Coalition Forces (CF) and admitted to JAM involvement. The local Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units operated in a coordinated and even-handed manner. Some of the circumstances of this incident suggest, however, elements of collusion between JAM and the ISF. Local response to the incident and political pressure to release the detainees are reported septel. END SUMMARY. -------------- FOILED RAID ON SUNNI VILLAGE -------------- ¶2. (C) At approximately 0515 on May 11, 70-80 gunmen wearing Iraqi army uniforms entered a predominantly Sunni village east of the mixed Sunni-Shi'a city of Khan Bani Sa'd, in southwestern Diyala. (Note: This village, generally referred to by our contacts as Arab Jabbar, has a history of support for insurgents. The Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party frequently complains to us about anti-Sunni incidents in and around Arab Jabbar. End Note.) The gunmen entered several houses in the village, took ten military-aged males from a list of targets, and then apparently came under fire from villagers. They retreated from the village, taking with them the ten hostages. ¶3. (C) When the gunmen had first entered the village and began to enter houses, the mukhtar of the village contacted the Khan Bani Sa'd Joint Coordination Center (JCC) to inquire if the men entering the village were legitimate members of the Iraqi Army. The JCC, after determining from the local IA battalion that no operations were taking place in the area, dispatched a patrol of local Iraqi police to the village. The local Iraqi Army battalion also dispatched a patrol in the direction of the village. ¶4. (C) As the gunmen retreated along the only road leading from the village in the direction of Baghdad, they encountered the approaching IA and IP units. After some initial confusion due to the dress and equipment of the gunmen, the ISF detained many of them without a fight. Meanwhile, another group of retreating gunmen attacked the Khan Bani Sa'd JCC. There were no casualties on either side in this exchange. In total, the ISF detained 28 gunmen. They also freed seven of the hostages taken earlier in the morning. Three of the hostages remain unaccounted for. The ISF escorted the detainees to the Khan Bani Sa'd police station and then turned them over to CF two hours later. -------------- JAM PREPARATIONS FOR RAID -------------- ¶5. (S) Under interrogation, the detained gunmen revealed some of the preparations that they had made for the attacks. Most of the detainees, who hailed almost exclusively from the Sadr City and al-Husseiniyah areas of Baghdad, claimed that they had been approached on the day before the raid by recruiters which some detainees identified as JAM members. (Some detainees claimed that that they had believed the recruiters were legitimate Iraqi Army members. The "recruits" said they were offered 200 USD to participate in the raid and were told to pick up their uniforms at a local mosque the night before the raid. They said some had received JAM badges to ease their passage through ISF checkpoints on the way to the raid. ¶6. (C) Reports indicate the gunmen traveled in vehicles covered in mud to match the coloring of Iraqi Army vehicles. ISF captured three of these trucks when they detained the gunmen, two of which were older-model Toyota pickup trucks and one of which was a new Toyota Land Cruiser. Sunni contacts aver that some of the other vehicles used were also new Land Cruisers of a type they claim is used by the Ministry of Interior. How they ended up in the hands of gunmen working for JAM is still unknown. (Comment: there are other unverified reports that the JAM and Badr militias are in possession of new police vehicles. End Comment.) -------------- COMMENT BAGHDAD 00001683 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶7. (C) The performance of the ISF in this engagement was very good. The local JCC effectively coordinated the movements of Iraqi Police and Army units, which confronted a large number of armed men without sustaining casualties. Just as encouraging was the willingness of the mixed- sectarian units in both the IA and IP to confront a sectarian militia mounting an attack against a village that has shown itself in the past as no great friend of the ISF. ¶8. (S) The wider story of the Khan Bani Sa'd raid leaves questions open, however. Beyond the leakage of Iraqi Army uniforms to the Jaysh al-Mahdi, the attackers' using Jaysh al-Mahdi badges to ease the attackers' path through ISF checkpoints implies that ISF manning checkpoints in eastern Baghdad tolerated the movement of large numbers of armed militiamen as long as those men are JAM members. (This is a pattern seen in Baghdad too.) The pressure applied on provincial ISF from Baghdad to release the detained militiamen (septel) also suggests a degree of ISF involvement. Septel will report on efforts by officials in the ISF to secure the release of the detained JAM members and the local political reactions to this JAM raid in troubled Diyala province. KHALILZAD