IRAQI VILLAGERS AND SECURITY FORCES FOIL JAYSH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001683

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2026
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI VILLAGERS AND SECURITY FORCES FOIL JAYSH
AL-MAHDI RAID ON SUNNI VILLAGE BUT QUESTIONS STILL REMAIN


Classified By: Political Counseelor Robert Ford,
reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: This is a PRT Diyala cable. A May 11 raid
by Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements on a Sunni village east of
Khan Bani Sa'd was foiled by the response of villagers and
the coordinated response of local Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi
Police (IP) units. Twenty-eight detained members of the
group conducting the raid were turned over to Coalition
Forces (CF) and admitted to JAM involvement. The local
Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units operated in a coordinated
and even-handed manner. Some of the circumstances of this
incident suggest, however, elements of collusion between
JAM and the ISF. Local response to the incident and
political pressure to release the detainees are reported
septel. END SUMMARY.

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FOILED RAID ON SUNNI VILLAGE
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2. (C) At approximately 0515 on May 11, 70-80 gunmen
wearing Iraqi army uniforms entered a predominantly Sunni
village east of the mixed Sunni-Shi'a city of Khan Bani
Sa'd, in southwestern Diyala. (Note: This village,
generally referred to by our contacts as Arab Jabbar, has a
history of support for insurgents. The Sunni Arab Iraqi
Islamic Party frequently complains to us about anti-Sunni
incidents in and around Arab Jabbar. End Note.) The
gunmen entered several houses in the village, took ten
military-aged males from a list of targets, and then
apparently came under fire from villagers. They retreated
from the village, taking with them the ten hostages.


3. (C) When the gunmen had first entered the village and
began to enter houses, the mukhtar of the village contacted
the Khan Bani Sa'd Joint Coordination Center (JCC) to
inquire if the men entering the village were legitimate
members of the Iraqi Army. The JCC, after determining from
the local IA battalion that no operations were taking place
in the area, dispatched a patrol of local Iraqi police to
the village. The local Iraqi Army battalion also
dispatched a patrol in the direction of the village.


4. (C) As the gunmen retreated along the only road leading
from the village in the direction of Baghdad, they
encountered the approaching IA and IP units. After some
initial confusion due to the dress and equipment of the
gunmen, the ISF detained many of them without a fight.
Meanwhile, another group of retreating gunmen attacked the
Khan Bani Sa'd JCC. There were no casualties on either side
in this exchange. In total, the ISF detained 28 gunmen.
They also freed seven of the hostages taken earlier in the
morning. Three of the hostages remain unaccounted for.
The ISF escorted the detainees to the Khan Bani Sa'd police
station and then turned them over to CF two hours later.

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JAM PREPARATIONS FOR RAID
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5. (S) Under interrogation, the detained gunmen revealed
some of the preparations that they had made for the
attacks. Most of the detainees, who hailed almost
exclusively from the Sadr City and al-Husseiniyah areas of
Baghdad, claimed that they had been approached on the day
before the raid by recruiters which some detainees
identified as JAM members. (Some detainees claimed that
that they had believed the recruiters were legitimate Iraqi
Army members. The "recruits" said they were offered 200
USD to participate in the raid and were told to pick up
their uniforms at a local mosque the night before the raid.
They said some had received JAM badges to ease their
passage through ISF checkpoints on the way to the raid.


6. (C) Reports indicate the gunmen traveled in vehicles
covered in mud to match the coloring of Iraqi Army
vehicles. ISF captured three of these trucks when they
detained the gunmen, two of which were older-model Toyota
pickup trucks and one of which was a new Toyota Land
Cruiser. Sunni contacts aver that some of the other
vehicles used were also new Land Cruisers of a type they
claim is used by the Ministry of Interior. How they ended
up in the hands of gunmen working for JAM is still unknown.
(Comment: there are other unverified reports that the JAM
and Badr militias are in possession of new police vehicles.
End Comment.)

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COMMENT

BAGHDAD 00001683 002 OF 002


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7. (C) The performance of the ISF in this engagement was
very good. The local JCC effectively coordinated the
movements of Iraqi Police and Army units, which confronted
a large number of armed men without sustaining casualties.
Just as encouraging was the willingness of the mixed-
sectarian units in both the IA and IP to confront a
sectarian militia mounting an attack against a village that
has shown itself in the past as no great friend of the ISF.


8. (S) The wider story of the Khan Bani Sa'd raid leaves
questions open, however. Beyond the leakage of Iraqi Army
uniforms to the Jaysh al-Mahdi, the attackers' using Jaysh
al-Mahdi badges to ease the attackers' path through ISF
checkpoints implies that ISF manning checkpoints in eastern
Baghdad tolerated the movement of large numbers of armed
militiamen as long as those men are JAM members. (This is
a pattern seen in Baghdad too.) The pressure applied on
provincial ISF from Baghdad to release the detained
militiamen (septel) also suggests a degree of ISF
involvement. Septel will report on efforts by officials in
the ISF to secure the release of the detained JAM members
and the local political reactions to this JAM raid in
troubled Diyala province.
KHALILZAD