SENATOR KERRY PUSHES NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000164 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY PUSHES NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT WITH TALABANI AND HAKIM Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA) and the Ambassador held meetings with President Jalal Talabani and Shia Alliance leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim on January 18 to push for a broad national unity government in the weeks ahead. Talabani predicted that such an alliance could be forged in "weeks" but downplayed the possibility of major changes to Iraq's constitution. Talabani said that he hopes that MNF-I forces draw down significantly by year-end, but he also hopes for long-term military bases. Talabani downplayed Iranian influence in Iraq. Hakim said he would work for an inclusive government but bridled at the limits being put on Shia majoritarian rule. Hakim warned that he expects all future cabinet members to hold clear positions on the legitimacy of Iraq's constitution, the crime of armed resistance, and the need for a break with Iraq's Ba'athist past. He did not object to a review of the constitution but was firm on the need for a federal structure, hoping that opponents would try to influence the regionalization process rather than try to abort a federal transformation supported by the large majority of Iraqis. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Senator Kerry and the Ambassador held meetings with President Jalal Talabani and Shia Alliance leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim on January 18 to push for a broad national unity government in the weeks ahead. -------------- Talabani Sees New Government in Weeks -------------- ¶3. (C) Talabani asserted that he would insist on a national unity government that draws Sunni Arabs into the cabinet. He predicted that such a government could be hammered out in "weeks". Talabani said that he is prepared to review the constitution but does not expect "fundamental changes". He downplayed the seriousness of Iranian influence in Iraq, noting that three key factors stand in the way of a major Iranian foothold here. First, Iraqi Shia oppose walayat al-faqih, "the rule of the jurisprudent", which underpins the Iranian political system, he said. Second, the presence of Najaf, the undisputed seat of Shia Islam, in Iraq ensures that Iraqi Shia need never depend on foreign religious influence. Third, the failures of the Iranian government and suffering of the Iranian people are a cautionary tale well known to any Iraqis tempted by Iranian influence. ¶4. (C) Talabani expects that the MNF-I presence could decrease substantially by year-end. However, he argued for the continued presence of at least one or two U.S. military bases in Iraq over the long term, to be modeled on the presence maintained in Turkey at Incirlik. Asked about corruption in Iraq, Talabani stated that he supports further work against what he agrees is a major problem. He criticized his predecessor, Ghazi al-Yawar, for running his office with no accountability and blocking auditing efforts. Talabani lamented that Iraqis are inheritors of a system in which Saddam Hussein "legalized corruption", offering poverty wages to all government employees with the expectation that they would supplement them through bribes and kickbacks. -------------- Hakim Bridles at Pressure For Unity -------------- ¶5. (C) Hakim said that he agrees with the goal of a broad-based government but expressed clear irritation with U.S. pressure on the issue. He argued that he knows of no other nation that requires a two-thirds majority to form its cabinet, a standard that strikes at the rights of Iraq's Shia majority. He jokingly suggested that Iraq should not be called a Republic, but rather a "State of Consensus", because of the excessive quest for unanimity in its politics. He warned that any partners in the coming government would have to agree on several key governing principles: (1) Iraq's federal structure, (2) the legitimacy of the constitution, (3) the need for de-Ba'athification and a break with the Ba'athist past, and (4) an agreement that all armed resistance is illegitimate and a form of terrorism. ¶6. (C) Hakim further warned that the Shia had already been extremely tolerant and responsive to Sunni Arab needs. He claimed that Falah al-Naqib had been allowed to bring tens of thousands of former regime elements into the security forces during Allawi's tenure and that the Iraqi intelligence service is 98 percent made up of former regime agents who used to spy on groups like his. He also asserted that the inclusion of Sunni Arabs on the constitution drafting committee had been a generous gesture made in contravention BAGHDAD 00000164 002 OF 002 of Iraqi law. ¶7. (C) Hakim stated that he does not object to a full and frank review of the constitution as long as it is confined to the constitution review committee. He also pointed out that, even if the federal provisions of the constitution are applied "as is," there still would be considerable room for determining the structure of the country, the referenda held to shape the regions, and the legislative process. KHALILZAD