SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN ON HOW TO DISSOLVE JAYSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001619 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT PTER KDEM KISL IZ SUBJECT: SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN ON HOW TO DISSOLVE JAYSH AL-MAHDI BAGHDAD 00001619 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 9 meeting with PolCouns, Sadrist Council of Representatives member and Moqtada as- Sadr advisor Baha al-Araji said he expected more intense negotiations before a cabinet is agreed upon. Al-Araji said that Tawafuq has changed its mind on which ministries it wants. Al-Araji predicted that, while no agreements had been reached on any ministries yet, some current ministers, such as the Sadrist Transportation Minister Salam al-Maliki, will not serve in the next government. Al-Araji also said that a jobs creation program would be the best solution to the militias' problem, as long as it is not advertised as a program to dissolve militias. He also pushed for a meeting between a U.S. Congressional delegation and Sadrist Council of Representative members, arguing that Moqtada al-Sadr would approve of such a meeting and it would build bridges between Coalition Forces and the Sadrists. End Summary -------------- Government Formation Disputes -------------- ¶2. (C) Sadrist Council of Representatives (CoR) member Baha al-Araji told PolCouns in a May 9 meeting, that Moqtada al-Sadr gave him much authority to negotiate government formation on behalf of the Sadrist bloc, including selecting ministers. The Sadrists agreed with the broader Shia Islamist Coalition stance that the Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Electricity must be headed by non-party technocrats chosen by the Shia Coalition. According to al-Araji, one thing is for certain: Sadrist Salam al-Maliki will no longer serve as Minister of Transport, but will instead serve in the Council of Representatives. -------------- To End Jaysh Al-Mahdi -------------- ¶3. (C) PolCouns told al-Araji that the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) was clearly involved in extra-judicial killings and posed a serious threat to Iraqi national unity. It and other militias would have to be an issue for the next government. Araji did not deny JAM excesses, although he did deny that Sadr had much operational control over the armed men fighting in his name. Araji stated that any plan aimed at dissolving Shia militias should not be advertised as such because it will sound provocative. Talk of requiring the Jaysh al-Mahdi to disband will merely stir Moqtada as-Sadr to defend it publicly, he cautioned. Instead, he argued for a jobs program and avoiding any mention of militias. Araji said the JAM fighters rarely are deeply committed to the Jaysh; he boasted, "Give me 25,000 jobs and I will end Jaysh al- Mahdi." JAM members are simply young men with no money. According to al-Araji, JAM members would rather work steady, safe jobs and earn 10-15 USD per day rather than earning 200 USD for planting an improvised explosive device (IED) in the path of a Coalition Forces (CF) convoy. (Comment: In talk that reminds of old Arab socialist ideas in places like Egypt, he spoke of launching big farming projects in the desert to employ these Shia youth. End Comment.) -------------- Moqtada al-Sadr Disapproves of Sharia Courts -------------- ¶4. (C) PolCouns also cautioned that the extra-judicial "Sharia" courts operated by the Jaysh al-Mahdi represent a threat to the security of ordinary citizens. Al-Araji argued that Moqtada al-Sadr disapproves of these courts but gangs of JAM members acting independently run them, and Moqtada al-Sadr cannot stop them. "Jaysh al-Mahdi is not as well-organized as you think," he argued to PolCouns. Al-Araji cautioned against using force against these gangs because, "putting too much pressure on JAM will split the group, and neither you (i.e., CF) nor Moqtada will be able to control them." -------------- Hospitality - Moqtada al-Sadr Style -------------- ¶5. (C) Baha al-Araji told PolCouns that, despite Moqtada al-Sadr's order to his advisors not to meet with Americans, he thinks it would be possible to arrange for BAGHDAD 00001619 002.2 OF 002 a U.S. Congressional delegation to meet with Sadrist CoR members. Congressmen are not closely tied to President Bush's administration, al-Araji argued, and so it should be possible to convince other Sadrist CoR members to meet them. Moqtada al-Sadr would agree because such a meeting would make him look like a real statesman, al-Araji opined. Al-Araji even said that, perhaps eventually, U.S. Congressmen could meet with Moqtada al-Sadr himself. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Araji was adamant that our meeting be kept secret, as he worried Moqtada might react badly to hearing about it. (We had to meet at another politician's home at night.) We have seen al-Araji in many meetings with Prime Minister-designate al-Maliki as they put together the new cabinet. What is less clear to us is whether or not Sadr has really delegated wide authority to al-Araji on naming Sadrist ministers. We have seen Sadr abruptly dismiss or shelve advisors before; it is not our impression that his advisors have such a long leash. Araji's comments about a jobs program being essential to disbanding militias is not new from him, and it is a point we hear many contacts, Shia and Sunni, reiterate. What was more interesting was his point that American and other Coalition officials talking publicly about disbanding the militias will sound like a challenge to Moqtada that will actually impede efforts to disband groups like the Jaysh al-Mahdi. KHALILZAD