FALLUJAH ARMY RECRUITS GRADUATE; SOME REBEL OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001555 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: FALLUJAH ARMY RECRUITS GRADUATE; SOME REBEL OVER NON-HOMETOWN ASSIGNMENTS Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4(B),( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A group of Fallujah-area Iraqi Army (IA) recruits, numbering approximately 800 out of a total of 978 in the training class (the first of several planned waves),participated in a graduation ceremony April 30, 2006 in Habbaniyah (ex-British base located in Al Anbar Province, near Taqaddum). Al Anbar PolOff attended the event with Marine commanders, Anbar Governor Ma'moun, and senior IA leaders. Most of the ceremony went smoothly; however, a few instigators among the IA recruits initiated a short-lived demonstration (throwing their army uniforms to the ground and yelling) upon being informed that some would be asked to serve outside hometowns or Anbar Province. Fallujah Police Chief, BGen Salah al-Ani (a former army colonel),prevented further disruptions and escalation. According to Marine IA trainers, several hundred refused to return to duty following the incident. PolOff spoke to several soldiers, who echoed safety concerns about service outside Anbar, fearing sectarian violence and untamed militias. One remarked, "I know my city Fallujah, and I know where the terrorists are, I would be lost in the south or even al-Qaim." Fallujah leaders discussed the situation and planned responses in a May 2 meeting with CF and PolOff. Fallujah's mayor, Sheikh Dhari Abdul Hady Al-Zobai, largely blamed Tehran and Iranian influence in Baghdad ministries. Marines are examining possible changes to training procedures and a more explicit understanding of IA service obligations for future Anbar recruits. The temporary uprising on graduation day of some recruits could poison the wider recruiting pool. City leaders, however, appear committed to prevent this from happening. END SUMMARY. -------------- GRADUATION DAY -------------- ¶2. (C) Fallujah IA recruiting, compared to other parts of Anbar, has proceeded well. City leaders long prioritized and encouraged the influx of area recruits into the new army -- after the March 2006 recruiting drive, 80 percent came from the city. Leaders raised the matter directly with PM Jaaferi, who supported efforts, in a January 2006 meeting in Fallujah. This first group of recruits constitute part of the so-called "Anbar 5,000" IA slots - - with an additional 1,500 later approved by MOD, for a current total of 6,500. (NOTE: IA recruitment efforts elsewhere in the province have not resulted in significant numbers volunteering for IA service, though efforts continue. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) The April 30 ceremony progressed smoothly for the most part, as Governor Ma'moun reinforced themes of national unity and recruits paraded orderly in front of the notables. At the end of the session, however, an IA leader announced that some assignments would fall outside Anbar and hometowns. MajGen Murthi, Division Commander, somewhat inflamed the situation by in effect signaling that disgruntled soldiers could leave ("the door is wide enough for a camel"),if they so desired. A few instigators threw their uniforms to the ground and called on others to join them. Some did. The intervention of Fallujah police chief, BGen Salah (a guest and ex-IA colonel),calmed the situation. He reminded Fallujans of the great traditions of the Iraqi Army, once feared in the region, and importance of living up to those high expectations. Salah declared: "Be honorable and put your clothes back on." "Iraq was the number one military power, did that old IA do what you are doing now," he asked. His rhetoric worked. ¶4. (C) According to Marine IA trainers, several hundred refused to return to duty following the incident. CF have begun to review procedures and discuss possible improvements, to include an increase in the number of dedicated trainers and explicit understanding of future assignment locations. -------------- SOLDIERS: TREAT US BETTER, THEN SEND US HOME, PLEASE -------------- ¶5. (C) In a series of discussions with the Fallujah recruits before, during and after the demonstration, PolOff and Marine RCT-5 counterparts heard complaints BAGHDAD 00001555 002 OF 003 mixed with sincere desires to serve, but mostly in Fallujah: -"We want to serve in Fallujah only." -"This is not the old army; we had laws then, and if you even took off your cover, you were disciplined. There is no discipline, no law and no order in the whole country now!" -"We want to go to Fallujah because we have terrorists there, and we want to clean it up or they will ruin it." -"If we go to Al-Qaim or Husaybah, we won't know who the terrorists are. The IA in Fallujah doesn't know that now. We can find them." -"During this training, we were not treated like honorable soldiers." (NOTE: Several claim that when they got sick -- later confirmed to be from bad food -- they were not given medical care. MoD-promised pay had also been delayed beyond graduation by a day; payments progressed smoothly once initiated. END NOTE.) -------------- MAYOR: IRANIAN PLOT -------------- ¶6. (C) Fallujah leaders discussed the situation in a city council session May 2 with CF and PolOff, and signaled a willingness to help bring the recruits back into service, if possible. Fallujah's Mayor, Sheikh Dhari, blamed an overt Iranian conspiracy and questioned the ability of anyone to protect the "sons of Fallujah" from Shia militias. He said the city had already lost enough martyrs to sectarianism. (COMMENT: Dhari has long advocated a national army. END COMMENT.) ¶7. (C) IA Assistant Division commander, BGen Baha (who attended the Fallujah City Council meeting),pledged to address training concerns and said he would welcome back Fallujah soldiers into the army. He claimed that only a few recruits were problems and had acted as ringleaders. Baha acknowledged an inadvertent incident of bad food that had caused some soldiers to become ill. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The reintroduction of Fallujans and other Anbaris into the army is a challenge. Fallujah recruit numbers have consistently been the highest in the province; the brief storm on graduation day among some recruits could poison the wider recruiting pool. City leaders, however, appear committed to prevent this from happening, even while the mindset of Sheikh Dhari -- Iranian "hidden hands" and plots -- pervades the area. ¶9. (C) The initial return of some "sons of Fallujah" to the city (an initial tranche of about 200) will serve as an important test case. The city is currently protected by the province's most diverse and arguably advanced mixture of ISF, the police (locally recruited Sunni-Arabs who number around 1,300),two Shia dominant IA brigades, and U.S. Marines (one company). Residents will welcome their sons' return and undoubtedly seek more. We also recall the troubling experience of the failed 2004 so- called "Fallujah Brigade". Fallujah's long-term stability will depend more on sustained police performance, not the short-term but essential IA and Marine bridge. ¶10. (C) Fallujans believe that the Americans are leaving Iraq, and sooner versus later -- opposite their shared view in 2004 or 2005. They are wary of what awaits them closer to home, in Baghdad, in the new government. The "sons of Fallujah" remain a tempting recruiting pool, for good guys (the ISF) and bad guys (AMZ and friends) alike. Fallujah's leaders have generally pushed for the former course but realize some will be lost to the city's historically rebellious tendencies, evident during the era of Britain's past rule from distant outposts such as Camp Habbaniyah. In 1920, the top British officer in Iraq, Colonel Leachman, was killed following a meeting with another Sheikh Dhari, an area tribal leader, in Fallujah. BAGHDAD 00001555 003 OF 003 SATTERFIELD