JA'FARI WOOS RAMADI, ANBAR SECURITY COUNCIL WOWED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000148 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: JA'FARI WOOS RAMADI, ANBAR SECURITY COUNCIL WOWED REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 4733 ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 4788 ¶C. C) BAGHDAD 4830 ¶D. D) BAGHDAD 4935 ¶E. E) BAGHDAD 4915 ¶F. F) BAGHDAD 4981 Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b), (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Anbar Security Council warmly welcomed Prime Minister Ja'fari on January 15. The PM deftly fielded the Anbaris' complaints regarding the fate of former Iraqi military service members, the inclusion of Anbaris in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),the release of 'innocent' detainees and policies to address unemployment. The normally contentious and fractious Anbaris glowed with pleasure at the PM's description of Anbar as the cradle of the nation, the brief reign of Ramadi as capital and the renown of its people as fierce warriors. Minister of Industry and Minerals Osama al Najafi, Ambassador Khalilzad and MNF-I Commanding General Casey also spoke encouragingly of the new dialogue established with the province and the importance of re- integrating a secure and stable Anbar into the new Iraq. While there remains much work to be done, this keystone event sent a profound signal to the rebellious Anbaris who may be ready to come in from the cold. End Summary. ¶2. (C) This is a SET Ramadi Cable. The Ambassador accompanied the Prime Minister, Minister of Industry and Minerals (MoIM) and Commanding General of Multi-National Forces-Iraq to Ramadi on January 15. The visit by the PM, his first, to engage the recently formed Anbar Security Council (reftels) was remarkably congenial and substantive. The PM was well prepped for the visit, addressing in detail Anbari concerns about recruitment of locals for the ISF and the plight of former military officials afforded no pensions. (Note: The PM corrected former general Sa'ab al Rawi on his figure of former military officers, noting that he had a report citing the number as 4,500, not 5,000 like Sa'ab suggested. Sa'ab did not disagree. End Note.) Shia PM Breaks the Ice -------------- ¶3. (C) Setting a non-confrontational and intimate tone, the PM reviewed the contributions Anbaris had made to the nation. He noted the historical renown of Anbari weapons manufacturers and the reputation (referring to the first century A.D.) of their warriors. Ja'fari acknowledged that Anbar, too, had suffered under Saddam Hussein and that during his days in exile, he maintained contact with events in Ramadi, as he did with other cities. He praised the citizens for their brave participation in the elections and the Council's 'intellectual' rather than 'emotional' approach to restoring security and stability in the troubled province. The PM emphasized that Iraq is now sovereign and that the Coalition Forces (CF) remain at the request of the Government of Iraq. He defined the CF presence as solely to rebuild the country and its security forces. He urged the Anbaris to prevent the development of 'two teams', e.g. Sunni and Shia militia. Ja'fari invited the Anbari representatives to share in the new government, a government that sought results. "Your Visit Proves We're On the Right Track" -------------- ¶4. (C) The Security Council members responded well to the PM's overtures. Tribal Sheikh Anwar Kharbit described the insurgency as three groups: resistance, terrorists and criminals. Admitting the council respected the resistance, he volunteered that their one mistake had been to let the terrorists infiltrate the resistance. He suggested that the way to separate the two was for the CF to withdraw from the cities. Without an external enemy, Kharbit reasoned, the resistance could quickly throw off the terrorist yoke. He observed that neither law nor power could exist without the other, a sentiment the PM echoed. Getting More with Honey... -------------- ¶5. (C) In a stark contrast to the rancor that characterized the Anbar Security Council meeting with Minister of Defense Sadoun Dulaime on December 12, the PM hit the right chords. He agreed with the Anbaris that locals must make up the Iraqi Police force, because "they know it best". He characterized the deployment of the Special Police Commandos (so-called 'Wolf Brigade') to Ramadi as a 'temporary solution'. (Note: After less BAGHDAD 00000148 002 OF 002 than two months after they deployed, only one police battalion remains in the eastern part of the city. Locals have not complained about the unit to us. End Note.) Ja'fari emphasized their presence in the city was not an 'occupation', that they were Muslim compatriots. In response to businessman Sayid proposal to release prisoners who are 'not guilty', Ja'fari observed "we can't keep people in jail without proof". The PM also reassured the group that all detention centers were under close scrutiny, implying there would not be any further human rights abuse scandals such as the Jadriya 'Bunker'. "The Founding Fathers Didn't Use Suicide Bombers" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Ja'fari did caution the group on the use of terror. He compared Ramadi's situation with America's war for independence, noting the people of the U.S. earned their freedom through negotiation, not suicide bombers. He said once Anbaris help stand up the ISF, it would be time to shake hands and say good-bye to the CF. The Ambassador underlined that the U.S. did not intend to establish permanent bases in Iraq. MNF-I CG noted the 'occupation' ended June 28, 2004 and the 'withdrawal' was announced by Secretary Rumsfeld over a month ago. Governor Ma'moon noted that among the 50,000 unemployed, the well-funded terrorists had a ready and willing labor pool. The PM stated jobs were his next objective. Former colonel Muthar al-Qubaisy expressed concern over federalism, equating it to the division of Iraq. Ja'fari again referred the American experience. He noted that the U.S. constitution was repeatedly amended and that the drafting of the Iraqi constitution, by Iraqis, was a dynamic process. ¶7. (C) Comment. When PolOff described the radical difference in tenor and progress between the visit of the MoD and this session, the PM quipped the 'the singer is never popular in his/her hometown'. MoD Dulaime, a Ramadi native, told PolOff before the December session that he "understood his people and knew how to talk to them". That session was confrontational, bitter and ended in stalemate. It's fascinating that a Shia PM, described day to day by our contacts as running an 'Iranian government', could hit so many resonant chords in the Ramadi audience. The confidence building stretched both ways. Minister of Industry and Minerals (MoIM) Osama al Najafi thanked the Ramadi Security Council for altering his perception of Ramadi. He said that back in Baghdad, people call the city the 'battleground'. ¶8. (C) Comment Continued. Plenty of follow-up remains, and this has always been a Jafari problem. PM Ja'fari promised a response on the Council's petition (regarding Anbari representation in the ISF) and most importantly invited Anbaris to play a role in national politics. MoIM told PolOff that the ministry plans to privatize the Kusayba Cement factory and has identified a Japanese investor for the Qaim phosphate plant. General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad also said they would return. As we know from our Anbar contacts, they never forget a promise. Nonetheless, January 15 was a very promising step in Ramadi. End Comment. KHALILZAD