SUNNI ARAB POLITICIANS ALREADY SPLIT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001360 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB POLITICIANS ALREADY SPLIT ON PARLIAMENT SPEAKER AND CABINET APPOINTMENTS Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sunni Arab politicians in Tawafuq remain internally divided about the new Iraqi government formation. A well-connected Sunni Arab politician told us April 23 that there is great resentment that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is dominating the process at the expense of the other two core groups within the Tawafuq front. Adnan Dulaymi's party feels marginalized and worries violence will erupt if IIP dominates the Tawafuq nominations for ministerial positions. A Tawafuq parliamentarian recognized this problem and said Tawafuq likely would push for Dulaymi's group to get the Defense Ministry to assuage their unhappiness. He cautioned that the IIP would likely control most Tawafuq slots in the governments since it is the key force in the front. Meanwhile, IIP officials are attempting to rein in the already controversial new Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Mahmoud Mashadani. Getting broad buy-in for the cabinet nominations from Sunni Arab politicians will certainly prove difficult and will likely be one factor that slows the whole process. END SUMMARY. -------------- ANIMOSITY TOWARD MASHADANI -------------- ¶2. (C) Dr. Hassan al-Bazazz, an advisor in Adnan Dulaymi's party, the Iraqi People's Conference (IPC), told PolOff April 23 that he is optimistic about government formation. However, he stated there is strong Sunni animosity towards the appointment of Mahmoud Mashadani as Speaker of the Council of Representatives (COR). Bazazz said he received more than 30 calls on April 22 - the day of the first COR session- from colleagues in his party who were angry about Mashhadani's selection as speaker. He explained that they worry Mashadani is an extremist who will bring dissension to the COR. They commented that Mashadani's acceptance speech and comments in television interviews the same day left many COR members with the impression of him as a callous, bribing, sectarian thug. -------------- DULAYMI'S PARTY FEELS MARGINALIZED -------------- ¶3. (C) Bazazz felt the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),led by Tariq al-Hashimi, had marginalized Dulaymi's party; the IIP had gained for its leader, Tareq al-Hashimi, a vice president position while engineering support for Mashadani from the Dialogue Council, for the speakership. This left Tawafuq's third core component, Dulaymi's group, in the cold. Bazazz opined that of the 34 ministerial positions, perhaps six would go to Tawafuq. He said there is an agreement among Tawafuq leaders to split these positions evenly - two per party. Bazazz feared that if Al-Hashimi forces Tawafuq to present ministerial candidates only from the IIP, the candidates will be killed by Sunni Arabs from the other Tawafuq parties who feel misrepresented. He maintained that Dulaymi's constituency is the "Sunni Arab street." -------------- -------------- IIP SUGGESTS DEFENSE MINISTRY FOR DULAYMI'S GROUP -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Salim Abdul al-Janabi, a Diyala IIP official and COR member, told PolOff April 24 that Tawafuq would consider Shia nominations to the ministerial positions only from Dawa or Fadhila party members - especially for the Minister of Interior position. He emphasized that Tawafuq would not accept any nominations from SCIRI or Sadrist politicians, as they would be under the control of their sectarian parties. He predicted that IIP's Tariq al-Hashimi would be sure to push for a Dulaymi- affiliated official for the Minister of Defense position to avoid just such a backlash from the Sunni Arab street over perceived marginalization of Dulaymi's constituency. Al-Janabi agreed with PolOff that it was now the responsibility of the Iraqi government to form a credible, competent Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. He downplayed divisions between Tawafuq party members, but also assumed that IIP dominance within Tawafuq was acceptable given their greater popular support and infrastructure. -------------- BAGHDAD 00001360 002 OF 002 DIVISION EVEN WITHIN PARTIES -------------- ¶5. (C) As an example of the current divisions, IIP member- and former spokesman Zafir al Ani expressed to PolOff April 24 IIP's deep displeasure with Mashadani. Al-Ani was incensed at Mashadani's recent television interviews and suggested the IIP would try to dislodge Mashadani from his new position. But one of IIP's top officials, Ayad Samarai, called PolOff minutes later to say that Al-Ani had not been the IIP spokesman for several weeks now. He explained that Tareq al-Hashimi had already called Mashadani to IIP headquarters April 24 to tell him to behave himself with the media. (Comment: The IIP was not originally very enthusiastic about Mashadani - they had hoped to get the speakership for their founder, Usama al-Tikriti. Many Sunni Arabs - as well as Shia and Kurds - view Mashadani as unproven and too sectarian. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) When asked if Tawafuq would split the potential ministerial positions equally among the three parties that comprise it, Samarai replied only that it is more important to focus on the qualifications of the candidates rather than their affiliation. ¶7. (C) COMMENT. As the majority party in Tawafuq, the Iraqi Islamic Party has the most influence and power within the coalition, and its leaders may attempt to select the Sunni ministerial candidates. They may try to nominate many - or all - of the Tawafuq ministerial positions from within the IIP. It is important to remember that the IIP is basically the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, and many Sunni Arabs here are not adherents of the Brotherhood. Thus, if the IIP secures most of the cabinet slots for Sunni Arabs, other Sunni Arabs who follow Khalif al-Ayan (Iraqi Council for National Dialogue) or Adnan Dulaymi (Iraqi People's Conference) will protest loudly. We would also not rule out Bazzaz's warning of potential intra-Sunni violence. Getting broad Sunni Arab buy-in to the cabinet nominations will certainly prove difficult and could drag the process out. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD