MCNS TO REVIEW SECURITY PLANS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001196

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS TO REVIEW SECURITY PLANS

REF: BAGHDAD 1169

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d
).


1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: The Ministerial Committee for
National Security (MCNS) convened the morning of April 9 at
PM Jafari's residence to follow up on discussions held the
previous evening (reftel). The Committee first addressed
Operation Scales of Justice, on which there is a difference
of opinion between MNF-I and PM Jafari about objectives and
execution. It was agreed that in the coming days MNF-I will
provide a briefing on the operation. The Committee then
began to review a draft National Emergency Response Plan
being prepared by National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak
al-Rubaie. This plan would provide a template for how the
GOI would respond to "catastrophic events," whether
security-related or natural/humanitarian. MinDef Dulime,
re-raising a point from the previous evening, stated that the
country already is experiencing a "catastrophe." Dulime
expressed concern about whether the existing security plans
for Iraq and Baghdad are effective. PM Jafari acknowledged
difficulties and said that he is not averse to re-evaluating
the plans; however, he urged Dulime and others to remember
the progress that has been made.


2. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY CONT'D: Minister of State for
National Security Affairs Karim al-Anzi urged the creation of
two new divisions to respond to emergency needs as well as
the development of a more robust intelligence capability.
Ambassador noted that a crisis in confidence may be emerging
with regard to the security plan, and he urged the committee
to address the problem head-on. He also noted that the
impending government transition provides another reason to
re-evaluate what has been accomplished and how best to
proceed. The meeting concluded with decisions to (1) embark
upon a review of the overall security plan, (2) work with
MNF-I to better understand the objectives and timeline of
Operation Scales of Justice, and (3) continue to develop the
National Emergency Response Plan. END SUMMARY.


3. (S//REL GBR AUS) The April 9 MCNS meeting was a
continuation of the meeting held the previous evening.
Members of the committee who were present: PM Jafari, MinDef
Dulime, Interior Minister Jabr, Minister of State for
National Security Affairs al-Anzi, National Security Advisor
Rubaie, Ambassador, British Ambassador Patey, and MNF-I
Deputy Commanding General (DCG) Fry. Also present were MNF-I
Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Findley and the PM's
senior military advisor Kanini.

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OPERATION SCALES OF JUSTICE, CONTINUED
--------------


4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Returning to a subject he had raised the
previous evening, PM Jafari asked for a summary of Operation
Scales of Justice, noting that he believes its objectives and
timeline need to be better defined. Jafari recalled that a
major goal of the operation is to attack terrorist
strongholds in the Abu Ghraib area and spread out from there.
In addition, Jafari added, he thought that these raids would
take place right away when the operation began early in
March. He and MinDef both said the operation is
concentrating on the center of Baghdad at the expense of the
outlying areas (locus of many of the problems).


5. (S//REL GBR AUS) DCG Fry responded that his recollection
of the genesis of the operation generally matches the PM's.
The goal, Fry explained, was to run two major operations at
one time: the security plan for Arba'en (which would rely
overwhelmingly on Iraqi Security Forces) and increased
operations in Baghdad (for which additional Coalition Forces
(CF) would be called from Kuwait to assist). This had been
done, Fry reported, with the result being a higher
concentration of CF in Baghdad than ever before. With regard
to the timing and nature of the operation, Fry recalled what
Dulime had said the previous night about having to adjust
operations to changes made by the enemy. Fry added that
Dulime's comments about the need to "close the gates" of
Baghdad are insightful and will be reflected in the
development of the operation. Fry urged the PM to keep an
open mind on how the future of the operation will develop and
said that he, CG Casey, and the MNC-I CG would discuss this
with the Ministers of Defense and Interior and then brief the
PM. The PM expressed satisfaction with this course of action
and acknowledged that it is not possible to fully appreciate
the success of the operation because there is simply no way
of telling what acts of terror it has prevented.

BAGHDAD 00001196 002 OF 003



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NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
--------------


6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Rubaie passed around a briefing paper on
a draft National Emergency Response Plan on which he has been
working. (NOTE: Although he claimed that he had mailed it to
all the committee members two weeks ago, some of them were
clearly looking at it for the first time. END NOTE.) The
idea for such a plan emerged following the February 22
bombing of the al-Askariyah mosque in Samarra. Its purpose
is to serve as a plan that can be activated immediately in
the case of a catastrophe caused either by a security
incident (e.g., another mosque attack, death of Grand
Ayatollah SISTANI) or a natural disaster (e.g., flood,
earthquake, etc.). The plan is similar to a standard
operating procedure that comprises a checklist of actions to
be taken in proper sequence, so that, in an emergency,
officials (including the highest levels of the government)
will have a plan to follow. Rubaie began to read down the
checklist but did not get far. MinDef Dulime, clearly
frustrated about a number of things, protested that it is
foolish to be planning for future "catastrophes" when the
country is already in one. He cited international and Iraqi
figures who claim that Iraq is on the verge of a civil war,
the most recent being Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Dulime said that his forces are exhausted and would be unable
to shift focus immediately to respond to the type of
emergency Rubaie's plan contemplates.

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DEBATE ABOUT SECURITY PLAN
--------------


7. (S//REL GBR AUS) Rubaie agreed with Dulime that Iraq is
experiencing a catastrophe but stopped short of calling it a
civil war. He said he prefers the term "civil conflict."
According to Rubaie, the problem he is trying to address is
how to be ready to respond to a crisis above and beyond what
is already taking place. In addition, Rubaie said, the
questions Dulime raised regarding the capabilities of the
forces are valid but more strategic in nature. Dulime
repeated his view that the country is already in a
catastrophe; although statistics say the number of attacks in
Baghdad is down, to him this does not signal an improvement
in the situation. Dulime urged a fundamental re-examination
of the security plan, noting that he questions the need for a
long-term plan given that the enemy is constantly changing
tactics.


8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Minister of State for National Security
Affairs al-Anzi argued that the forces are not inadequate;
instead, the problem lies in how to use them more
effectively. The Iraqi intelligence capabilities, he
explained, have not been developed quickly enough to keep
pace with the military and security forces. He then urged
the rapid development of agencies similar to the U.S. FBI or
CIA, which he said would use modern and scientific means to
more effectively guide the deployment of military forces. He
also recommended the creation of two new Iraqi Army divisions
to be held in reserve for emergency response at the behest of
the PM.


9. (S//REL GBR AUS) PM Jafari said he is not opposed to
rethinking the plan but stressed that its positive results
must be recognized. He urged the group to recall what the
security situation was like when they took office and then
compare it to today. In addition, Jafari said, each
experience and each mistake makes them wiser and more capable
of facing future problems. He urged that a lack of
performance or speed in all cases should not lead them to
doubt the merits of the plan. It is imperative, he asserted,
that the committee continue to "review, review, and review"
the plan. Responding to Dulime and al-Anzi, Jafari said that
he agrees that forces are stretched thinly and that by now
perhaps Iraq should have a more effective intelligence
community. Still, Jafari noted, security during Arba'en was
outstanding, attack levels are down, and ISF are performing
much better than before.


10. (S//REL GBR AUS) Rubaie said that, although there have
been many great security accomplishments in the past few
months, the sectarian threat (he explicitly said he is not
calling it a militia threat) has now become significant. As
a result, he said, it is necessary to reexamine the PM's
twelve-point security plan that was developed last July.
Rubaie revealed that he has been constructing a matrix of the
twelve points in order to evaluate their effectiveness (given

BAGHDAD 00001196 003 OF 003


the changing nature of the threat and the enemy). When
al-Anzi asked Rubaie to elaborate, Rubaie pointed out that
the number of car bombings is down while the number of
sectarian killings is up. Before February 22, Rubaie said,
the MCNS agreed on who the enemy was; however, he said he is
not sure all members are in agreement now.

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NEED FOR A RE-EVALUATION?
--------------


11. (S//REL GBR AUS) Ambassador observed that listening to
this conversation led him to conclude that some of the
ministers are experiencing a crisis of confidence in the
overall security plan. Day-to-day adjustments to plans must
always be made, he said, but there is nothing wrong with
periodically taking a comprehensive look at an ongoing plan
to make sure the problem it seeks to address is correctly
identified, the strategy is correctly defined, and the
resources to achieve the goals sought are adequate. The fact
that the government will be undergoing a transition is
another reason that now might be a good time to take an
honest, frank look at the way ahead, Ambassador suggested.
He likened the plan to a medical treatment: you have to
correctly diagnose the disease before you can correctly treat
a medical condition. If you get the diagnosis wrong, the
treatment could prove disastrous. Ambassador stated that the
MCNS and MNF-I together need to agree on what the problem is,
what our goals are, and what is the proper approach to
achieve those goals. British Ambassador Patey agreed that,
as our strategy against the insurgents has begun to show
results, the time is right for a review.


12. (S//REL GBR AUS) DCG Fry responded to al-Anzi's call for
increased intelligence capabilities and two additional Iraqi
Army divisions by pointing out that the keys to military
success are to fight the current fight, not blindly but in a
constantly evolving way, and to look constantly ahead. In
the meantime, Fry noted, you must fight with what you have.
DCG Fry said that it seems there is agreement that the enemy
has changed and a new approach is needed; what is yet to be
agreed upon is what changes are needed.


13. (S//REL GBR AUS) The meeting concluded with agreement
that there will be a review of the overall security plan,
that Iraqi authorities will work with MNF-I on the plan for
security in Baghdad, and that Rubaie will continue to refine
his draft emergency response plan, which will be discussed
further at a later date.

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COMMENT
--------------


14. (S//REL GBR AUS) The discussion was a healthy exchange
of views. Dulime is clearly frustrated, perhaps in part
because he knows that he may not be long for his post.
Al-Anzi sounded his familiar themes of calling for more
Iraqi-generated intelligence and for greater Iraqi
independence in the conduct of operations. Jabr sat silent
for the most part, except for protesting once that the plan
to secure Baghdad has not advanced as quickly as he would
have liked. Jafari tried to keep spirits up, and Rubaie
argued for the need for a changed approach to meet changing
circumstances. The ISF have made great strides, the battle
against the insurgents and terrorists is yielding results,
and it is positive that the MCNS is beginning to see that the
nature of the threat to long-term Iraqi stability may be
changing.
KHALILZAD