COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER COMPLAINS ABOUT JAFARI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001155 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2026 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER COMPLAINS ABOUT JAFARI SUPPORTERS' TACTICS REF: BAGHDAD 1086 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael J. Adler for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. CoR and Iraqiyya list member (and head of the Iraqi Communist Party) Hamid Majeed Mousa told PolOff and PolFSN April 4 that a delegation of Jafari supporters from Dawa and Dawa Tanzim had met with an Iraqiyya List delegation April 3. The Jafari supporters reportedly said the Shia Coalition will stick with Jafari, warned against his removal (threatening to bring Iraq to the ground),and said Jafari has the support of members from other lists, even pointing to Allawi's April 3 interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. The pro-Jafari delegation also reportedly interpreted Article 76 of the Iraqi constitution as not requiring a CoR vote on the choice of PM. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- Pro-Jafari Delegation Defends His Selection and Issues Threat to Iraqiyya List Delegation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) CoR and Iraqiyya list member (and head of the Iraqi Communist Party) Hamid Majeed Mousa told PolOff and PolFSN April 4 that a delegation of Jafari supporters ) Jawad al-Maliki (Dawa),Ali al-Adeeb (Dawa),and Khudayr al-Khuza'i (Dawa Tanzim) ) met with an Iraqiyya List delegation (Adnan Pachachi, Mahdi Hafith, Wa'il Abd al-Lateef, and Mufeed al-Jazaraee) April 3. They reportedly told the Iraqiyya List delegation that the Shia Coalition chose Jafari and will stick with him. Mousa then claimed the group had warned that, if Jafari is removed, the country will be brought to the ground ("destroyed and burnt to the ground"). Mousa remarked that Saddam Hussein used to make such statements and asked, "how can we accept Jafari if he is saying such things?" He added that there were no promises or guarantees, just intimidation and threats. ¶3. (C) Mousa claimed the pro-Jafari delegation then asked if the Iraqiyya List would tell the media that they are not against Jafari. They reportedly said "no," but added that if the Shia Coalition decides on the PM matter, then the Iraqiyya List will respond. The pro-Jafari delegation then remarked that they know some members of other lists support Jafari, but they cannot make statements. Mousa opined that there are probably members more interested in personal gain (ministry positions) than in the benefit of Iraq. ¶4. (C) Mousa said the Iraqiyya List delegation told the pro-Jafari delegation that Jafari will not succeed in getting the necessary number of votes. The pro-Jafari delegation responded that the vote is a vote on the cabinet, not on Jafari, arguing that the PM is not in the voting since he is chosen by the President. According to Mousa, the pro-Jafari delegation was interpreting Article 76(4) of the Iraqi constitution as a vote on individual ministers and not on the entire cabinet. Jafari supporters are hoping to keep Jafari and form a cabinet. (Note: Article 76(4) states that the PM-designate gains the confidence of the CoR upon the approval, by an absolute majority "of the individual Ministers and ministerial program." The pro-Jafari delegation's interpretation, even if it did mean that no vote on Jafari's name was necessary, does not necessarily avoid the fundamental problem that Jafari must win CoR acceptance of a Jafari-led government. For example, under this approach the rejection of a single minister would prevent a government from being formed.) ¶5. (C) Mousa speculated that the pro-Jafari delegation will not tell the Shia Coalition that they failed to convince the other lists that Jafari is acceptable; they will lie and tell the Shia Coalition that the other lists are divided, so there is no need to change Jafari. Mousa underscored his belief in the importance of the Iraqiyya list sending an unambiguous signal of opposition to Jafarri's continuation in office. He noted that the pro-Jafari delegation tried to inaccurately spin comments Allawi had made to the press into expressions of readiness to support the PM's continuation in office. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Mousa's account of this meeting admittedly may get some of its color from his strong conviction that Jafari is the wrong man for the PM job. In a subsequent conversation with PolFSN, shortly after the meeting with Mousa, Wail Abd al-Lateef said that the Iraqiyya was not against Jafari. We are seeking to triangulate details of the Iraqiyya-Jafari supporters exchange with other reported participants. KHALILZAD