SCIRI PARLIAMENTARIAN SAYS SPARE THE ROD, SPOIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000112

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SCIRI PARLIAMENTARIAN SAYS SPARE THE ROD, SPOIL
THE SUNNI ARAB

Classified By: POL Couns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: SCIRI TNA member and influential imam
Sheikh Jalal al Dien al Sagheer told PolCouns in a January
11 meeting that some Iraqi Shia are contemplating secession
from Iraq in frustration over the continued security
problems and terror attacks. Others are wondering whether
they should take up arms against Sunni Arabs, MNF-I, or
both. He said the Embassy's Sunni Arab outreach plan was
ignoring moderate Sunni Arabs and promoting extremists,
adding that the use of force is the best way to solve the
Sunni Arab-backed insurgency. Sheikh Sagheer also
expressed his support for MOI Bayan Jabr, saying that Jabr
cannot be expected to reform the ministry, as it has been
riddled with corrupt officials since the fall of Saddam.
PolCouns countered that stabilizing security required both
political and security approaches and urged the Shia
Islamist list support a national unity government that
would be accountable to all Iraqis. Sagheer has a real
following on the street, and his remarks indicate our
relations with the Shia Islamists will become bumpier
in the coming months. END SUMMARY.

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What Is On The Minds of Shia Malcontents?
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2. (C) Sagheer said that he has received many e-mails from
Shia telling him they favor seceding from the rest of Iraq
and setting up a separate Shia state. Others would like to
see Iraq turn into a loose confederation. Both views
reflect growing discontent with the state of Iraqi affairs,
and the desire of many Shia to isolate themselves from
Sunni Arabs and Kurds.


3. (C) Even more worrying, Sagheer said, are the e-mails
he claimed to have received from Shia who question whether
they should take up arms and fight MNF-I and/or Sunni
Arabs. Sagheer said the some Shia feel both MNF-I and
Sunni Arabs support terror and are destabilizing Iraq.
Such feelings are fueling a move toward civil war. Sagheer
said, however, that the Shia will not fight unless they are
told to, and Grand Ayatollah SISTANI, along with most other
imams, so far has opposed such a confrontation. He did
warn, however, that he and some other imams are not able to
fully control the Shia street. Some of the young faithful
at his Baratha mosque have told him his words are
"morphine": hard and comforting but ultimately not
changing the surrounding reality. PolCouns noted that
SISTANI and the Shia religious leadership had exercised
great patience. The U.S. had noticed and appreciated this.
It was important, he stressed, not to fall in Zarqawi's
trap. A unity government would help ensure that each side
in Iraq felt its most vital interests are protected.

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Sunni Arab Outreach Does More Harm Than Good
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4. (C) Sagheer lumped the mainline Sunni Arab political
leaders and Zarqawi all together. He criticized the
Embassy's Sunni Arab outreach efforts, saying that it
ignores moderate Sunni Arabs and promotes extremists. He
said that the Sunni Arabs with whom the Embassy has been
meeting have never fully supported the democratic process.
This has lead to more violence. Furthermore, even when
Sunni Arab groups such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
campaigned in favor of the constitution, they never really
supported it. It would be better to support moderates like
Nuri Rawi and Saadun Dulaymi who eventually can convince
the Sunni Arab community to cease violence and join the
political process. PolCouns commented that last-minute IIP
support, not support from Nuri Rawi or Saadun Dulaymi,
probably secured the margin of passage for the draft
constitution in the Ninewa referendum on October 15.
PolCouns underlined that the Embassy has consistently told
Sunni Arabs to renounce violence and stop supporting the
insurgency even while we urge them to participate in the
political process. He emphasized to Sagheer that we have
warned the Sunni Arabs that the fighting Iraq's elected,
legitimate government will be an illegitimate act and we
will label it terrorism. (Comment: Sagheer seemed
unimpressed. End Comment.)


5. (C) Sagheer said that the Shia could solve the problem
of the Sunni-backed insurgency by killing many of the Sunni
Arabs involved in it. There is, however, a political
program for Iraq, and the Shia are patiently following it.
The Shia have, for the most part, been peaceful.

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Apologia for Bayan Jabr
--------------


6. (C) Sagheer argued that the U.S. is wrong to criticize
MOI Bayan Jabr. First, Jabr has little room for maneuver
in the ministry because there are many bad elements,
including some Baathists working there since the fall of
Saddam Hussein. (He blamed post-Saddam Interior Ministers
Nuri Badran, Samir Sumaidai'e and Felah Naqib - all Sunni
Arabs - for introducing these bad elements despite Shia
warnings.) Jabr does not wish to violate human rights. He
simply cannot exercise complete control over the ministry.
Second, the U.S. should not criticize Jabr for the abuse of
prisoners who, once released, commit more crimes and acts
of terror against Iraqis. It is better to execute one
hundred criminals publicly and deter future terror, he
opined. PolCouns observed that it was important that the
one hundred executed are real criminals and had not merely
confessed under torture (here, for once, Sagheer agreed).
He cautioned that Interior Ministry practices are causing
resentment and fear in the Sunni Arab community and helping
the insurgency recruit. PolCouns noted that the Iraqi
Government could at least conduct a real investigation into
cases like the Jadriya bunker, something it has thus far
failed to do.


7. (C) COMMENT: Sagheer has been a long-time and often
acerbic Embassy interlocutor. He was especially unhappy
because he had received information via sources in the
Iraqi Defense Ministry that the U.S. military was planning
to raid his mosque - something he calmly but deliberately
warned against. There was little give in his position:
Iraq's number one problem is Sunni Arab terrorism, and that
problem has to be fixed, even with harsh means if
necessary. He also made clear he anticipates and rejects
American pressure on behalf of the Sunni Arabs in the
future government negotiations. The Baratha mosque
has a strong following, and Sagheer is one of the more
influential clerics in the SCIRI party. His remarks
indicate we can expect our relations with the Shia
Islamists to become bumpier in the coming months. END
COMMENT.
SATTERFIELD