FALL-OUT FROM IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES RAID NEAR SADR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FALL-OUT FROM IRAQI SPECIAL FORCES RAID NEAR SADR
CITY

REF: BAGHDAD 1023

Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 (A),(B),(D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: At approximately 1800 on Sunday, March 26,
2006, Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) launched an
assault on a target in the Ur neighborhood near the Sadr City
area of Baghdad. The raid was planned and executed by the
Iraqi forces with the assistance of U.S. Special Forces
advisors. Persons inside and near the target building reacted
with gunfire and a firefight ensued. The ISOF entered the
target, killed 16, detained 18, and rescued one Iraqi hostage
who had been kidnapped earlier in the day. As a result of
inaccurate media reporting public outcry was immediate and
widespread, with scenes of the aftermath, including graphic
shots of bodies, broadcast late into the night on Iraqi
television. Media reports spread the rumor that the building
raided was a mosque, and that those killed were innocent
worshipers gunned down in cold blood by American soldiers.
Government and political leaders including the Prime Minister
and Ministers of Defense and Interior quickly denounced the
raid and claimed Iraqi forces were not involved. Demands for
an investigation and compensation were made. On March 27,
Baghdad provincial officials boycotted planned meetings with
Embassy officials, and the Shia Alliance walked out of
government formation talks in protest. By March 28, local
media interest in the event had died down. Shia Alliance
figures returned to government formation talks, but the
Provincial Council was still boycotting Embassy officers.
Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General have been in frequent
contact with Iraqi officials to convey the facts surrounding
the operation and to calm emotions. On March 30 the Baghdad
Governor and Provincial Council chairman were talking to us
again (SEPTEL.) Talks about the nature and scope of a
possible investigation continue. END SUMMARY.

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DETAILS OF THE RAID
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2. (S) On March 14, three ISOF soldiers were sent in plain
clothes to an area near Sadr City to reconnoiter a site where
numerous executed bodies have been dumped. They fell into
hostile hands and were brutally tortured before being
executed. The ISOF unit began to gather intelligence to
determine who was responsible. The information they obtained
pointed them to a school building complex in the Ur
neighborhood, just northwest of Sadr City. Their information
indicated the building in which their suspects were located
was a heavily defended structure no longer in use as a school
building. ISOF information also indicated the presence of a
high value individual; a former Jaysh al-Mahdi commander
wanted for attacks against Coalition Forces. (NOTE: Senior
Iraqi military officers have subsequently told us that the
building in question was used as an office by the Ba'ath
party during the Saddam regime. Following the fall of Saddam
it was converted to use as a political office and as a
husayniyah. A husayniyah, a facility unique to the Shia,
serves as a religious and social function community center.
END NOTE.) The building was watched for several days and
further intelligence was gathered. Information available to
ISOF and to their U.S. advisors indicated the building was
not a mosque, a husayniyah, or sensitive site. Current MNF-I
rules of engagement allow for entry into mosques or places of
worship if there is a reasonable belief that the facility
contains enemy forces.


3. (S) The raid was launched at 1800 hours on March 26.
Approximately 50 ISOF soldiers participated, along with about
25 U.S. forces. The ISOF was in the lead. Upon their
arrival outside the target, they were immediately fired upon
from several buildings across the street. As they dismounted
their vehicles, fire began coming from inside the target
building. The ISOF assaulted the building, gained entry, and
killed all those they encountered who were shooting at them.
A total of 16 people in the building were killed. Eighteen
occupants of the building who did not pose a threat (i.e.,
those who were not bearing a weapon) were detained. In
addition, the soldiers found an individual who was hog-tied,
a dental technician who said he had been kidnapped earlier in
the day and who was told by his kidnappers that they planned
to kill him later that evening. He subsequently identified
two of the detainees as being among those who had kidnapped
him.


4. (S) Throughout the time the soldiers were at the target,
those manning the outer cordon continued to be fired upon
from positions on surrounding buildings. Crowds of people

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began to arrive and were in a highly agitated state. The
ISOF determined the situation required them to leave the
scene quickly, before they could secure the bodies of those
killed. Prior to departing, they did destroy on scene the
weapons and bomb-making equipment they had discovered in the
building. These included 32 AK-47 rifles, five grenades,
four rocket propelled grenades with two launchers, two RPK
heavy machine guns, crush wire improvised explosive device
detonators, and several sets of body armor. There were no
religious articles found. The only friendly casualties
suffered by the assault force was a gunshot wound to the arm
of an ISOF soldier. The entire episode lasted approximately
35 minutes.

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MEDIA REACTION
--------------


5. (SBU) Because the ISOF were required to depart the scene
before securing the bodies, people with video cameras were
able to enter the building and take photos of the bodies and
the condition of the building. These scenes immediately made
it into the hands of the local media, who began showing them
on television in reports claiming that those slain were
innocent worshipers gunned down by American soldiers.
Al-Iraqiya reported that U.S. forces attacked a husayniyah in
the Ur neighborhood of Baghdad killing an unspecified number
of people. Other Iraqi and pan-Arab networks including
al-Massar, al-Furat, al-Sharqiya, al-Arabiya, al-Jazirah, and
others, quickly picked up the story. Iraqiya's Sunday
evening coverage focused on images of corpses, reported to be
the victims of a U.S. attack on a mosque. Al-Jazirah showed
similar images, but also reported comments from a CENTCOM
spokesperson emphasizing that U.S. forces played an advisory
role to the ISOF who had conducted the raid.


6. (SBU) Hostile commentary from Iraqi political figures
continued on Iraqi broadcast media on Monday. Iraqi
officials, including Interior Minister Bayan Jabr and Hadyar
al-Abbadi, advisor to the Prime Minister, demanded
explanations and investigations into the incident. Defense
Minister Saadoun al-Dulime, a Sunni, denied Ministry of
Defense (MOD) involvement in the operation, while Jabr also
denied involvement of his forces, claiming that the MOD and
MNF-I had control of the area in which the incident occurred.
Furat reported that U.S. forces "broke into" the husayniyah
and quoted Iraqi parliamentarian and leader of Hezhollah
movement in Iraq, Hassan al-Sari, who blamed U.S. Ambassador
Khalilzad for the attack. By Monday evening, Arabiya was
reporting that President Talabani announced the formation of
a committee, which he would head, to investigate the attack.
Iraqiya's evening broadcast showed images of Ur neighborhood
residents mourning those killed on Sunday.


7. (SBU) While the story broke in the print media on Tuesday
morning, it had lost steam in the broadcast media and was
eclipsed on the pan-Arab networks by the Khartoum Summit and
Israeli elections. Iraqi networks shifted attention back to
government formation talks with a press conference as
President Talabani's house. The Coalition views of the
incident was further clarified at a press conference, whose
presentation included video and slides of the incident. By
Tuesday afternoon, the story was no longer the focus of Iraqi
media attention.

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SHIA LEADERS STONGLY CONDEMN THE MILITARY OPERATION
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) After the operation in Ur concluded and the
aftermath was televised, but before all of the facts were
known, Shia leaders took to the airwaves to condemn the
operation and call for an investigation. Sadrist spokesman
Shaykh Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji told al-Arabiyah that "U.S.
troops went in and opened fire on the worshipers." He added
that there was "no justification" and claimed that "going
into mosque or husayniyahs on the pretext that there were
weapons inside them was a grave mistake." Haydar al-Abbadi,
advisor to Prime Minister Ja'afari, told al-Arabiyah March 27
that "there should not be death squads working alongside the
U.S. troops which execute people while they are praying
without any reason," adding that "most of these death squads
may have connections with the multinational forces." That
same day, again with al-Arabiyah, senior Da'wa leader Jawad
al-Maliki deemed the attacks "an ugly crime" and "an
organized crime that has serious political and security
dimensions which seek to trigger civil war to serve political
ends aimed at manipulating current political formulas during
critical political circumstances." Da'wa Tanzim leader

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Khudair al-Khuz'ai told western media March 26 that U.S.
forces raided their party office, "tortured" the men, dragged
them out and "executed" them.


9. (C) Khudair al-Khuz'ai angrily claimed to PolCouns March
27 that Da'wa Tanzim used the same building as the husayniyah
that was attacked, but the building is a duplex, and the
Da'wa Tanzim space was separate and has a separate entrance.
He claimed that Da'wa Tanzim was holding a cultural meeting
marking the death of the Prophet at the time of the raid -
and that American and/or Iraqi forces burst in and shot 13
Tanzim members dead. He underlined that these people had no
relation to the Jaysh al-Mahdi ("we're Da'wa Tanzim! You
know who we are!") He said he could not understand the
timing of the raid and asked why it was conducted during
prayer times. PolCouns emphasized that the raid was conducted
against an illegal armed group, but Khuz'ai would have none
of it.


10. (S) Moqtada al-Sadr called a meeting late on March 26
with his clerics and sercurity forces. During this meeting
he insisted that all JAM members show restraint, but maintain
vigilance. Sadr placed these forces on "high alert." He also
ordered members of the JAM to travel north to help secure
Sadr City and roads likely to be used by pilgrims headed
south to Najaf to mark the death of Mohammed. Sadr also said
that it was time to apply pressure to the national government
to condemn the acts of aggression against his followers and
to act to stop such attacks.


11. (C) Shia Independent and Council of Representatives (CoR)
member Muhammad Izz al-Din al-Khateeb told PolOff and PolFSN
March 27 that the force used at the Ur building was
excessive, even if the people were armed. What happened is
unexplainable, he stated. He stated his disbelief that Iraqi
soldiers were in the lead. He then complained that the
Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and Sunni mosques harbor
insurgents and weapons, but there are no operations against
their mosques like what happened in Ur. Fellow Shia
Independent and CoR member Dr Dr. Haider Karim al-Suweidi
added at the meeting that the Shia street is saying that
Americans sensed the political process was moving ahead and
wanted to hinder the process. Shia Independent and CoR
member Haider Subkhi al-Jurani told PolOff and PolFSN March
28 that there should not be attacks on militias while hotbeds
of insurgents/terrorists exist.


12. (C) As a result of the assault, Shia coalition members
angrily boycotted government formation talks scheduled for
Monday. However, the meetings resumed on Tuesday. The
Baghdad Provincial Council which on March 27 had declared it
would no longer meet with U.S. officials on March 30 sent the
Baghdad Governor and Provincial Council Chair to meetings
with U.S. officials in the International Zone. (See SEPTEL.)
Shia parliamentarian and frequent media commentator Abbas
al-Baati told us March 30 that the raid struck a raw nerve
among the Shia. However, he recognized the utility of
putting the incident behind us.

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ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY
--------------


13. (S) Since Monday, Embassy and MNF-I officials have been
engaged at the highest levels with Iraqi counterparts to
clarify the facts of what really took place. On Monday
afternoon, GEN Casey met personally with Minister of Defense
Dulime, Minister of Interior Jabr, and National Security
Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie and provided a detailed
briefing of the operation. Dulime and Jabr expressed
satisfaction with the outcome of the raid, but made it clear
they could not speak out in public for political reasons.
Jabr and Dulime also said they had known for some time that
the building in question was a site used by kidnappers to
torture and execute people, with Jabr saying that eight
intelligence officers had been killed several months earlier
in the same building. This was confirmed by Dulime, who
later told Acting PolMilCous that the building housed an
illegal Sharia court. Both, along with Rubaie, said the
decision about how to handle the media and political aspects
of the operation would have to be taken by Prime Minister
Ja'afari. Dulime counseled that it would be best to say
nothing to the press, predicting that after a few days the
matter would be forgotten. Following his meeting with the
three, GEN Casey provided a similar briefing to Ja'afari.
This was followed by a meeting between Ja'afari and the
Ambassador. (REFTEL) Following demands by Ja'afari,
Talibani, and others for an investigation, Embassy and MNF-I
are exploring with Iraqi counterparts possible options.

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COMMENT
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14. (C) While senior Iraqi officials are willing to admit in
private that the operation was a tactical success, they are
unwilling for political reasons to support it in public. In
addition, in Dulime's case, the fact that he did not know
about it in advance and rushed to condemn it in public now
makes it impossible for him to admit that MOD forces were
involved. To do so would make him look foolish and
uninformed about what his own soldiers are doing. Even if he
had known about it, Dulime is extremely averse to taking any
action against Shia militias by what are considered - rightly
or wrongly - to be "Sunni-controlled" forces.


15. (C) Sadr's muted reaction and calls for restraint
reinforces the message provided to the media that the raid
was unjustifiable, while providing cover for JAM actions that
continue to be used against its opponents as well as
potential action against CF. It is also likely that Sadr
will use the opportunity to leverage the Iraqi Government to
provide permission to expand JAM operations in Baghdad.


16. (C) From a political standpoint, the operation came when
important elements of the Shia Islamist Coalition were
dissatisfied with American pressure against Prime Minister
Jafari in the government formation process and suspicious of
American motives in our discussions with Sunni Arabs. For
some, the operation confirmed their worst suspicions that the
U.S. would not remain a neutral party in Iraq's sectarian
conflict. For others, the operation provided a golden
opportunity to burnish their credentials as Iraqi
nationalists by bashing the U.S. However, we sense the
turbulence is subsiding slightly. Public denunciations about
the attack were fewer on March 28 and the Shia Coalition was
back working on the government talks. The anger, and the
political opportunism, are not gone, however, and another
operation against a Shia militia element very likely will
cause another uproar.


KHALILZAD