CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000681 SIPDIS FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016 TAGS: PREL CY GR CYPRUS SUBJECT: CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING OF CYPRUS ISSUE Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In Athens March 7-9 on one of his frequent working visits, Cypriot President Papadopoulos met top party leaders and GoG officials, including PM Karamanlis, and got a boost for his handling of the Cyprus issue. In a joint press conference, PM Karamanlis praised the February 28 UNSYG Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris as a step toward eventual resumption of negotiations and reiterated that Turkey must meet its EU obligations. Press coverage was universally positive with the theme that the ball was now in Turkey's court. Papadopoulos was once more able to command Greek support in his efforts to place the onus on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. END SUMMARY. Papadopoulos Gets Boost From PM -------------- ¶2. (U) Cypriot President Papadopoulos, visiting Athens March 7-9, met with the top Greek leadership, including PM Karamanlis, President Papoulias and FM Bakoyannis, and got strong statements of support for his handling of the Cyprus issue and, implicitly, for his interpretation of his meeting with the UNSYG. In a joint press conference after their meeting, PM Karamanlis welcomed as an "extremely important development" the February 28 meeting between UNSYG Annan and Papadopoulos, a result of which was their proposal for technical talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The PM also stressed the need to create the proper conditions for a resumption of talks "without constricting timelines" and warned that "we do not have the luxury of another failure." Karamanlis praised Cyprus for "once again" proving that it is interested in a "just, lasting and viable" solution to the problem. ¶3. (U) For his part, Papadopoulos, in answering a press conference question, took a swipe at the U.S. interest in direct trade with Cyprus. In so doing he rejected the argument that such trade could help ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots or equalize the economic imbalance between the two sides. ¶4. (U) The visit attracted very positive and fairly extensive press coverage, with reports emphasizing Papadopoulos and Karamanlis agreeing that the ball is now in Turkey's court and highlighting the need for Turkey to implement the Ankara Protocol -- i.e., open its airports and seaports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Message to Papadopoulos -------------- ¶5. (C) In a March 8 meeting and in subsequent conversations, MFA spokesman Koumoutsakos confirmed to poloff that the private GoG message to President Papadopoulos was to push to re-start negotiations. Asked if Greece worried that Turkey's EU accession process might be in jeopardy if negotiations do not resume, Koumoutsakos responded that it was first and foremost Turkey's responsibility to honor its EU obligations. However, he did admit that the GoG was concerned that there was not a more positive environment regarding a resumption of talks, even though publicly the GoG was touting the February 28 Paris meeting as an important step in this direction. Being able to indicate such progress, he went on, would help the atmosphere within the EU vis-a-vis Turkey when the Commission issues its avis in the fall. ¶6. (C) Koumoutsakos rejected the notion that the GoG just blindly supported whatever Papadopoulos proposed, saying that former FM Molyviatis had been very active in moderating Papadopoulos' behavior in the run-up to Turkey's October 3 EU accession invitation. He added that this was in line with the GoG's continued desire to keep its relations with Turkey and the Cyprus issue on two different tracks. ¶7. (C) British Ambassador Gass told us that in his own conversations, MFA Cyprus Director George Papadopoulos (no relation) had told him that there was "understandable euphoria" in Athens regarding the Annan-Papadopoulos meeting. George Papadopoulos explained that President Papadopoulos' idea for two parallel tracks -- one on technical issues (health, the environment) and another more substantial track that would deal with sensitive issues (returns, for example) -- had essentially breathed new life into efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Annan Plan -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador met briefly with EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn, on the margins of Rehn's March 9 speech sponsored by ELIAMEP, one of Greece's premier foreign policy thinktanks. Ambassador recalled that the European Commission had decided in 2004 that the Annan Plan was not inconsistent with the EU acquis. Lately, Ambassador said, Nicosia had been making repeated assertions that its accession to the EU in 2004 totally changed the circumstances for reunification (and thereby calling into question the Annan Plan's conformity with the acquis.) Ambassador noted that, in fact, nothing had changed, and he continued to make this point from time to time. Rehn took the point and said he would similarly look for ways to recall that in its final form the Annan Plan had been found to be not inconsistent with EU norms. (Comment: Recently, FM Bakoyannis declared the Annan Plan "history," but in the context that it had been rejected in its current form by a large majority of Greek Cypriots, not because it might be inconsistent with the EU acquis or unable to serve as a framework for a solution. End Comment.) ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Papadopoulos used his February 28 meeting with Annan to leverage endorsement from PM Karamanlis and others here for his efforts to portray himself as truly interested in resuming talks under UN auspices, as well as to place the onus on Turkey/Turkish Cypriots to respond to the technical talks offer. Ries