Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ATHENS2282
2006-08-31 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #2282/01 2431235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311235Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6633
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0542
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0164
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0250
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0558
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0121
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0196
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0177
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002282 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN
ADVANCE OF UNSC PRESIDENCY

REF: A) STATE 143323 B) ATHENS 2178 C) STATE 137427

ATHENS 00002282 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002282 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS UNSC IAEA GR IS CY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON/IRAN: GREECE FOCUSES ON MIDDLE EAST IN ADVANCE OF UNSC PRESIDENCY REF: A) STATE 143323 B) ATHENS 2178 C) STATE 137427 ATHENS 00002282 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 30, DCM met with Ambassador Kostas Chalastanis, director of FM Bakoyannis' cabinet, for a readout of Bakoyannis' visit to Middle East capitals August 22-25. Chalastanis informed us that, in addition to her consultations in Beirut, Amman, and Tel Aviv, Bakoyannis would meet with the deputy directory of Iran's NSC, Mohammad Nahavandian on August 31. Prior to that meeting, post relayed ref A points to Chalastanis, emphasizing that Nahavandian should leave Athens with a clear message that the EU was united behind the P-5 1 and Iran should take up their offer. Chalastanis agreed, noting that Greece had delivered a similar message to Iranian officials in the past. Readout of FM Bakoyannis' meeting with Nahavandian will follow septel. END SUMMARY. FM BAKOYANNIS TO MEET IRANIAN NSC DEPUTY ¶2. (C) During the August 30 meeting, Chalastanis noted that the FM's trip was part of her preparation for Greece's UNSC Presidency, which starts September 1. The FM would also see the Iranian Deputy NSC director, Mohammad Nahavandian, on August 31 to discuss Iran's position vis-a-vis the 5 1 proposal. The GOG planned to emphasize the importance of Iran accepting the offer; it was not too late to reconsider. On August 31, DCM delivered ref a points to Chalastanis in advance of the meeting, stressing that Nahavandian should leave Athens with a clear message that the EU was united behind the P-5 1 proposal and that Greece strongly encouraged Iran to take up their offer. Chalastanis agreed, pointing out that Bakoyannis had delivered a similar message to the last two Iranian visitors on this topic. Chalastanis promised a readout of the discussion, which will follow septel. MIDDLE EAST TRIP: BAKOYANNIS GETS A DOWNBEAT MESSAGE . . . ¶3. (C) Reviewing the FM's visit, Chalastanis told the DCM that all leaders shared deep concern about the fragile situation in the region and the need to implement UNSC 1701. Leaders both in Arab states and in Israel feared that radicalism appeared to be gaining the upper hand over moderate forces. The Jordanians were particularly concerned �
00A;about Hezbollah's increased power; they beleived urgent reactivation of the peace process -- with U.S. support -- was essential. The Jordanians were preparing some ideas to prompt such reactivation, though it was unclear whether their proposal would be within the framework of an Arab League initiative to the U.N. ¶4. (C) However, Chalastanis noted that while the Israelis were strongly against the Arab League proposal, they seemed to be open to talks with Abbas -- provided he could form a functional government (Israeli officials were skeptical). Abbas himself told the FM that he continued efforts to form a government "on the basis of principles, not persons" and appealed for GOG support for economic development. Chalastanis admitted that Abbas "did not seem very optimistic," however. Looking ahead to Greece's UNSC presidency, Chalastanis predicted that it would be hard to avoid any UNSC discussion of Israel-Palestine should proposals be brought to the table. That said, Chalastanis agreed with DCM that it would be detrimental to all sides to hold a highly-visible UNSC discussion on the topic that achieved nothing. ¶5. (C) In Lebanon, PM Siniora was proud of the Lebanese Army's swift deployment (Chalastanis said Siniora appeared "astonished" they'd done so well). First on Siniora's agenda now was lifting the blockade. But Lebanon also badly needed UNIFIL troops on the ground and international support for the reconstruction effort. Siniora told FM Bakoyannis that he was working on efforts to fast-track reconstruction financing. He also stated that both Lebanon and Syria wanted to improve their bilateral relations. However, he believed that Syria was preoccupied with internal issues. . . . WHILE STRESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC 1701 ¶6. (C) DCM told Chalastanis that we appreciated FM ATHENS 00002282 002.2 OF 002 Bakoyannis' strong support for implementation of UNSC 1701 in her statements to the press. We remained concerned about efforts during the Donor's Conference to urge "selective" implementation -- for example, urging lifting of the blockade by Israel without reference to other provisions regarding the provision of weapons to Hezbollah. UNSC 1701 needed to be implemented fully. Chalastanis agreed, citing the GAERC statement as indicative of the EU's balanced approach. ¶7. (C) DCM probed Chalastanis on Greece's contribution to UNIFIL. Certainly we welcomed the GOG's readiness to offer naval assets; these would be important not just as a buffer but as a tool for stopping and inspecting dubious cargo. Was Greece also considering offering troops, such as an engineering battalion? Chalastanis told DCM that a commitment of Greek ground forces was not currently on the table. He welcomed the Turkish government's decision to participate in UNIFIL (particularly useful as coming from a Muslim country). COMMENT ¶8. (C) We expect that, while FM Bakoyannis may feel slightly constrained in what she can say to Nahavandian given Greece's upcoming UNSC Presidency, she will deliver a strong message of support for the P-5 1 -- emphasizing that it is not too late for Iran to take up the international community's offer. On the Arab League initiative for a Security Council discussion of Palestine: Bakoyannis' trip could not bring her any closer to defining a useful outcome for such a meeting, despite ardent efforts by the Jordanians. If the Arab League -- or Jordan -- advance the proposal, Greece will seek coordination with the U.S. on how to manage the issue constructively, but will not oppose or resist the request. The belief that Greece can play a useful role on the Palestinian issue is embedded in Greek political thought. Bakoyannis will also have an eye on domestic politics, and opposition leader Papandreou's efforts to establish himself as a mediator on a range of mid-East issues. RIES

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