SOUTHERN CORRIDOR ENERGY CONFERENCE EXAMINES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ATHENS 002078 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR (BRYZA) AND EB (GARVERICK) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016 TAGS: ENRG GR SUBJECT: SOUTHERN CORRIDOR ENERGY CONFERENCE EXAMINES EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY ATHENS 00002078 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Gazprom's growing stranglehold on European energy supplies, particularly in the area of natural gas, has the potential to reduce these countries' diplomatic freedom of movement in support of U.S. diplomatic goals. Improving these countries' energy security and diversity of supply options can therefore improve U.S. national security. One key element of this overall strategy is maximizing the opportunity provided by the new Turkey-Greece-Italy natural gas interconnector, currently under construction, to bring Caspian gas to Europe. Achieving this objective will require a number of steps, including reinforcing cooperation between the four "core" capitals of Ankara, Athens, Baku and Rome, enlisting the more active support of the EU/EC, as well as providing bridge support for vulnerable transit countries such as Georgia and Ukraine in the critical years of 2006-2007 before Azerbaijani' natural gas exports come online. These were among the key issues discussed during the "Southern Corridor" Energy Officers' Conference convoked by Embassy Athens July 14. For a list of conference participants, please see paragraph 12. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - The U.S. Strategy - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) A "Southern Ring" Energy Officers, Conference took place in Athens on July 14. Conference objectives were to discuss energy challenges within the region and to develop a comprehensive, coordinated approach to counter Gazprom,s campaign evidently aimed at vertically integrating the gas sector and preventing the emergence of non-Gazprom controlled pipeline gas routes to western Europe. All agreed that it is imperative to promote energy diversification strategies that encompass the development of additional energy sources and suppliers to provide vulnerable SE and SCE countries with alternatives to Gazprom. Our expectation is that, if exposed to real competition, Gazprom would eventually be compelled to adopt a more Western-style business model and operate according to international market principles. A direct result would be lower-cost and more secure energy in Europe, as well as improved investment in a wider range of energy suppliers, including Russia, and the Caspian states. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Caspian Gas Equals Effective Competition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) As the recent opening of the BTC pipeline had been for Caspian oil, DAS Bryza explained that a window of opportunity is opening for the West to develop a strategy for bringing central Asian gas to markets in a pro-competitive manner. Although proposals will undoubtedly be deeply political, the key will be to coordinate strategic political objectives with commercially viable projects. The USG's objective will be to bridge the political and commercial elements in a coordinated manner, with BTC,s recent success setting a precedent for the development of additional pipelines and resources (such as TGI and Shah Deniz expansion). Ultimately, the goal will be to develop alternative energy sources and supply routes to expose Gazprom to the pressures of competition and force it to fundamentally transform its modus operandi. To confront Gazprom domination, there must be a concerted effort to diversify and develop multiple gas pipelines from the Caspian to Europe. At this point, the center of attention in the Caspian regions is Azerbaijan. Bryza noted that, while Kazakhstan shares a common strategic vision with the West and possesses significant gas reserves, it is not yet prepared to confront Gazprom, particularly in terms of infrastructure. Turkmen gas remains a wild card, with quantities unknown and political leadership unreliable. Iraq could play a significant role in the future, but its current security situation is far too precarious to be reliable. Azeri gas is therefore the prime initial source to undercut Gazprom,s long-term strategy. Bryza stressed that, although Azerbaijan originally questioned why it should place such intense emphasis on developing gas supplies for onward sale to Europe, USG approaches have led the Azeri government to realize that if additional pipelines are not developed, Gazprom could position itself so that Azerbaijan would lose ATHENS 00002078 002 OF 005 the southern corridor market and ultimately be shut out as a supplier. - - - - - - - - TGI Is the Key - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The near-term way to get Azeri gas to Europe is through the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Interconnector, which is scheduled to be completed in 2012. Because it interprets the southern corridor as a challenge to its hegemony (despite its limited initial volume of 11.5 bcm),Gazprom has embarked upon an intimidation and disinformation campaign throughout the southern corridor region to ensure that it remains the sole pipeline gas supplier to Europe. Gazprom's strategy in Greece is illustrative. The GoG has told USG officials that it has come under tremendous pressure from Gazprom's hard-hitting, anti-competitive tactics. So far, Gazprom has taken three tacks in Greece. The first was to deny that there was any Caspian gas on offer: USG experts have been able convincingly to show this was pure disinformation. Second, Gazprom argued that, even if Caspian gas was available, it would come on-line much too late to make sense for TGI. Azeri efforts to ramp up Shah Deniz production have largely answered this concern. Lastly, Gazprom has linked approval for extension of the existing gas supply agreement with Greece, scheduled to run out in 2016, to an equity stake in the TGI pipeline. While GoG fears a vindictive Gazprom response if GoG pursues alternate energy supplies (GoG has a below market rate contract with Gazprom through 2016 that could be in jeopardy at the time of extension),Greece is nonetheless looking toward Azerbaijan as a key future supplier. In fact, the GoG has hosted several high-level GoAZ visits recently, citing positive discussions. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Turkey's Role -- as Transit Country or as Reseller -- Must Be Clarified - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Bryza told the group that Turkey is also on board with our "Southern Corridor" strategy, although turning the verbal commitment of Turkish officials into actual transit of large volumes of Caspian gas through Turkey will require much work. Turkey is not yet convinced the Azeri reserves are as vast as reported, and it continues to entertain the idea of supporting the expansion of the Bluestream pipeline system through which Russian gas is delivered. During the conference it became clear that the key problem vis-a-vis Turkey is its aspirations to become an energy reseller, extracting (it hopes) greater profits from gas trade than it would as a simple gas transit country. Insofar as such a stance has the potential to put Turkey at odds with Azerbaijan and others involved in TGI development, resolving Turkey's role within TGI must be one of the USG's highest priorities over the coming months. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Italian Edison On-Board ... Until 2007 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The key Italian partner in TGI, Italian Edison, supports the project strongly. Unfortunately, Italian Edison's exclusive contract with the Greek gas pipeline firm DEPA to develop a Greece-Italy underwater link expires at the end of 2006. If a project isn't presented for financing to EU authorities by then, the opportunity would be opened to participation from other Italian bidders. This would likely include Italian gas powerhouse ENI. ENI, being close to Gazprom, could then try and bring Gazprom gas into the TGI, undercutting efforts to get Caspian energy to Western Europe. To counter this possibility, it is important that the four major players, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece, and Italy, all have a political statement of interest, and at least an MOU on a transit and purchase agreement, in order to secure EU funding on the Greek portion of the pipeline construction. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Russian Strategy: Gazprom - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) The conference also examined Gazprom's likely approach ATHENS 00002078 003.2 OF 005 to alternative sources of natural gas flowing to Europe. Firstly, what kind of a company is Gazprom? According to conference participants, Gazprom,s risk-averse business model seeks to consolidate all aspects of gas production, transportation, and delivery into a vertically integrated operation. Moreover, Gazprom's predatory behavior towards potential competitors seeks to expand its reach horizontally. The result is the creation of a "super" monopoly. One Gazprom ploy is to grant concessional prices in early negotiations with consumers or potential transit countries in order to drive off competitors. Once the deal is struck, however, Gazprom has been utilizing its market power to extract concessions from the customer, whether in new pricing agreements, increased preferential access to transit capacity, or frequently, in majority or strong minority control of local gas companies. Gazprom prefers long-term contracts over volatile spot-market trading, and uses its market dominance to obtain those lengthy contracts. ¶8. (C) As one participant noted, it is very difficult to assess the true market price for natural gas in Europe because of Gazprom's dominant position -- the price of gas is largely what Gazprom considers it to be. Gazprom also goes to great lengths to minimize its dependence on any one transit route. With problems in pricing and moving gas across Ukraine, Gazprom is now contemplating its own southern corridor route to bypass it (given that 80% of Gazprom,s exports currently transit Ukraine). Gazprom is reportedly considering a $5-6 billion USD investment to expand Blue Stream instead of a $300-$400 million USD infrastructure upgrade on its Ukraine transit facilities. ¶9. (C) Conference participants discussed how we might counter Gazprom,s efforts, concluding that the single most important tactic would be to get key TGI partner countries to form a coordinated front, if possible. Other ideas discussed included embarking on a PR campaign to expose Gazprom,s unorthodox tactics and unreliability; and educating regional policy makers on the long-term merits of developing alternatives to Gazprom, including market diversity and national energy security. It was recognized that for many countries, especially emerging democracies, it is extremely difficult to contemplate resisting Gazprom -- the risk of political and economic disruption if Gazprom retaliates is very high, and Gazprom has shown itself willing to retaliate. However, that very willingness to retaliate provides the U.S. with the opportunity to stress in those vulnerable countries that there is no safety in dealing with Gazprom singly in its current market-dominant position; retaliation can occur anytime, anywhere, and the only way to alleviate this problem is for countries to reject Gazprom's short-term solutions, and focus on allowing competition into the market. - - - - - - Next Steps - - - - - - ¶10. (C) DAS Bryza closed the conference by outlining the steps necessary to realize the USG's policy goals on the Southern Corridor. All recognized this strategy would require overall Washington clearance: ¶A. EU/EC Support. EUR ERA would draft an action plan aimed at enlisting the active support of the European Commission and EU member states for the strategy of bringing Caspian gas through the Southern Corridor. Within the EC, particular emphasis would be given to enlisting the support -- both financial and political -- of RelEx and Energy Commissioners. EU/EC support is essential in helping provide TGI member states additional political backing in their efforts to combat the Gazprom monopoly. ¶B. Political/Commercial Agreements. Embassies Ankara, Athens, Rome, Tbilisi and Baku would coordinate an effort with their host governments to formulate and sign a political agreement pledging support for the Southern Corridor strategy. This political document would be supplemented by a commercial agreement specifying the business aspects of the strategy. These documents would be supplemented by any other agreements, such as a transit agreement between Azerbaijan and Ankara, necessary to achieving the overall strategy. ATHENS 00002078 004 OF 005 Again, the key is presenting a united front, which Gazprom should find harder to undermine. ¶C. Support for Georgia. DAS Bryza would take the lead in finalizing an agreement he had brokered in Istanbul July 13 between the Georgian, Turkish and Azerbaijani governments, according to which the GoT promised to transfer the rights to a portion of its 2006-2007 gas supply from Azerbaijan to Georgia. This gas would provide Georgia a much-needed supply buffer during these two critical years. Bryza would also work with the EU/EC to issue public support for Georgian energy supply during these years. ¶D. TDA Trans-Caspian Pipeline Study: DAS Bryza said he would contact TDA's Dan Stein to urge forward movement on the funding of a feasibility study for a trans-Caspian pipeline to bring Kazakh gas to Azerbaijan for onward supply to European markets. ¶E. Bring the "Shoulder" Countries on Board: DAS Bryza recognized that, while the TGI states formed the core of our short- and mid-term strategy, we had to think about a broader region over the long-term. He and Bud Coote therefore agreed to embark on a series of visits to countries linked to the Southern Corridor strategy, including Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. The aim of the visits would be to explain our policy and how over the longer-term it would contribute to these countries' energy security. It would also aim at urging these countries not to cut deals in the near-term with Gazprom that would undercut our overall strategy. ¶F. Using Other International Institutions: EUR/EB would investigate the possible role institutions such as the IEA could contribute to the Southern Corridor strategy. IEA in particular, in view of its membership (Russia is not a member),could play a positive future role. Bryza emphasized the value of recent statements by the G-8 and the "Energy Principles" enunciated at the U.S.- EU summit. - - - - - - - - - - - - Conference Participants - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (U) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza EB Robert Garverick Ankara Economic Counselor Thomas Goldberger Athens Ambassador Charles Ries Economic Counselor Clark Price Deputy Economic Counselor Robert Winchester Deputy Political Counselor Kirsten Bauman Deputy Commercial Counselor Sally Hastings Consular Officer Addie Schroeder Economic Intern Alyson Ricker Baku Ambassador Anne Derse Incoming Economic Officer Alan Eyre Bucharest Economic Officer Benjamin Rockwell Rome Economic Officer David Whiting Sofia Economic Officer Mark Johnson Tbilisi Economic Officer Robert Kiene Tirana Political Officer Paula Thiede CIA Senior Energy Analyst Bud Coote DoE Tiller Tyler Zagreb Economic Officer Nicholas Berliner ¶12. (U) DAS Bryza has not cleared this cable. ATHENS 00002078 005 OF 005 RIES