DEVELOPMENT MINISTER FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001913 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR BRYZA AND EB GARVERICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2016 TAGS: ENRG GR SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT MINISTER FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. SOUTHERN CORRIDOR STRATEGY ATHENS 00001913 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Greek Government is committed to enhancing European energy security through promoting the Turkey-Greece-Italy natural gas interconnector as a conduit for Caspian gas. This was the message conveyed July 14 to EUR DAS Bryza by Minister of Development Sioufas, who said he wanted to move forward immediately on the necessary supply agreement with the Azerbaijani government. Flies in the ointment? Sioufas mentioned Turkey's wish to become an energy reseller (as opposed to energy transit country),and ongoing pressure from Gazprom. Sioufas was optimistic both obstacles could be overcome, and Bryza pledged U.S. support. Participation: U.S. EUR DAS Bryza Ambassador Ries Ambassador to Azerbaijan Derse Economic Counselor Price (Notetaker) Greece Minister of Development Sioufas Director General Stefanou Diplomatic Advisor Therese Angelatou Translator End Summary. ¶2. (C) Sioufas told Bryza he was optimistic about the course of energy relations with the Azerbaijanis, and noted he had said so publicly. He had conducted an intense 1.5 hour discussion with the Azeri Minister of Finance, Sharifov, whom he called "impressive and well-informed." He had also met with the Azeri Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Energy on the margins of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline first oil ceremony in Turkey July 13. As a result of these meetings, and a previous meeting with his Italian counterpart, Passani, Sioufas said he wanted to explore the possibility of a four-way agreement with Italy, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, on the provision of Caspian natgas through TGI to Italy. "We are ready to take Azeri gas tomorrow morning" Sioufas told Bryza a number of times. ¶3. (C) Sioufas was confident that the TGI infrastructure was coming along on schedule. The Turkey-Greece link would be completed by February 2007; P.M. Erdogan and FM Guler had reconfirmed their commitment to this timeline during discussions on the margin of the BTC ceremony. As for the Greece leg, Sioufas said Greece was now completing the study of the link from Thessaloniki to Despotia, and was working with Italian Edison on the underwater link from Despotia to Italy. Sioufas felt that the Italian political energy minister was following the positive line of his predecessor. EU concerns about TGI -- primarily related to whether it would go through Albania -- had been assuaged, Sioufas maintained. Although the pipeline would go through Greece, plans were well-developed to send a spur to Albania. -------------- Greek Concerns: Russia and Now Turkey -------------- ¶4. (C) Sioufas said Russia continued to press Greece to make unacceptable concessions on energy. "Over the past year, our Russian interlocutors have changed. They used to talk; now they are arrogant and try to dictate." During negotiations on the extension of the current bilateral natural gas agreement scheduled to lapse in 2016, the Russian had demanded a stake in TGI. Sioufas said he had told them: "We can talk about the provision of Russian gas to Greece's domestic market, but TGI is not an issue for Greece alone, but also for Turkey Italy and the EU." He continued to remind the Russians that the intergovernmental Greece-Italy agreement on TGI, which had been ratified by the Greek parliament in early July (and was thus now Greek law), referred specifically to TGI's role in the provision of Caspian, mid-Eastern, and other Asian gas to Europe. It did not/not mention Russian gas. ATHENS 00001913 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Nonetheless, as much as Greece insisted on its position, the Russians maintained and even expanded their own demands, and on other fronts as well. They had once again raised the ante on the Russian equity stake in the Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline, asking for 95% instead of the previously-agreed 51%. Sioufas said he had stood firm on all issues. He had flatly refused to give the Russians a stake in TGI, and he had simultaneously assured Greek firms full minority rights as well as operations management control in B-A. In the end, Russia needed B-A more than Greece. At this point, Sioufas became angry and said "although I'm at risk -- the Russians are asking what we're doing down here -- I refuse to allow Greece to be at their feet." -------------- Other Sources of Gas -------------- ¶6. (C) Sioufas said he is looking for other sources for non-Gazprom gas. He recently signed an agreement with the Egyptian Minister of Energy that aimed to deepen bilateral energy cooperation. Options included getting hydrocarbons from the Egypt-Turkey pipeline, obtaining LNG, and perhaps even developing an Egypt-Greece gas pipeline that would run through Crete. The main problem with the latter "dream" was that some of the deepest, and least stable, parts of the Mediterranean sea floor were between Crete and the Greek mainland. Sioufas was also investigating gas from Libya, although these discussions had not proceeded too far. -------------- Bryza Responds and Outlines Next Step -------------- ¶7. (C) DAS Bryza thanked Sioufas for Greece's support of European energy security. He noted that bringing Caspian gas to Europe required the coordination of many moving parts in Turkey, Italy, Greece, Azerbaijan and elsewhere. He had personally lobbied Azerbaijani President Aliyev on the importance of this goal and explained the long-term threat to Azerbaijan represented by Gazprom's aim of filling TGI with its own gas, thereby locking-out Caspian resources. These entreaties, which supported approaches by President Bush, had convinced Aliyev to reach out to Greece both publicly and privately. Greece's reaction to Russian pressure was exactly right. On Turkey, Bryza noted he had spoken with a number of officials including FM Gul, Energy Minister Guler, and the Acting Managing Director of BOTAS. Bryza had also stressed the importance of Turkey entering the South Eastern European Energy Charter (SEEC),but said that Guler had claimed the time was not right. The Ambassador noted that Canada had tried the reselling approach in the 1980s and had quickly learned that this was risky. Now Canada and the U.S. are truly partners in energy, an approach that has benefited both. ¶8. (C) Bryza listed the next steps as he saw them. First, Greece and Italy should negotiate a gas sales agreement with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, efforts needed to be made to craft a transit agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Sioufas agreed with the importance of Turkey and Azerbaijan ironing out transit issues. He played with a number of permutations on the gas sales agreement, first indicating interest in the four-way agreement, then settling on Greece inviting Azerbaijan to send another mission to Athens to hammer out a bilateral agreement. Ambassador Derse said she would help convey the Greek invitation, but counseled that Azerbaijani officials had indicated to her that they felt a transit agreement with Turkey must precede any other negotiations. All agreed that the more the parties worked together truly as partners, the less leverage Gazprom would have to pick them off one by one. Bryza ended by once again promising U.S. support for Greece generally, and for Sioufas' effort to reach a supply agreement with Azerbaijan. ¶9. (U) DAS Bryza did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. OLESEN