GREEK DEP FM TELLS BRYZA: ON CYPRUS, NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001891 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GR CY TU SUBJECT: GREEK DEP FM TELLS BRYZA: ON CYPRUS, NO FAMAGUSTA WITHOUT VAROSHA REF: ATHENS 01852 Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Ries and EUR DAS Bryza met with Deputy FM Valynakis on July 14 to discuss Cyprus. While all praised progress on Cyprus settlement issues, discussion on compromise proposals to avert a Turkey EU train wreck this fall were less promising. Valynakis was steadfast in the position that there would be no Famagusta opening without a Varosha return. He claimed that Turkey must open its ports per acquis criteria. Should Turkey require political cover to comply with the acquis, Valynakis cited the 2004 Luxembourg proposal advanced by Papadopoulos as a balanced compromise. Later that evening in a dinner at his home, Valynakis expressed willingness to explore a broad deal involving opening of Famagusta port under EU administration, the return of Varosha properties, the opening of Ercan airport, and a moratorium on the sale of properties owned by Greek Cypriots in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. Valynakis also explained the GoG's intent to eliminate "sides" from future Cyprus texts because it "implies equality," and because the Cypriots are more confident as EU members. He said there could be no quid-pro-quo linking Halki and Thrace issues, but took on board Bryza's readout of his conversation with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul regarding simultaneous - but not explicitly linked - progress on both issues. Valynakis also provided a readout on a July 14 Iranian FM Motaki-PM Karamanlis meeting (reftel). End Summary. -------------- Cyprus settlement -------------- ¶2. (C) EUR DAS Bryza and Ambassador Ries met with GoG Deputy FM Yiannis Valynakis on July 14 to discuss Cyprus in advance of Bryza's trip to Nicosia. At the outset of the meeting, all praised Gambari's recent breakthrough ("unexpected," said Valynakis). Valynakis highlighted increased Green Line crossings and greater numbers of T/Cs receiving Cypriot social security benefits as examples of confidence building measures that signal positive trends. Bryza said he hoped to build upon Gambari's positive momentum in his upcoming "pulse-taking" trip to Cyprus. An optimal next step scenario would involve concerned parties leveraging the Gambari agreement to re-stimulate the settlement process, and build a foundation of cooperation, trust, and understanding. Valynakis said he was "optimistic but realistic." Both hoped an exchange of lists of "substantive issues" would soon occur. -------------- Turkey-EU accession -------------- ¶3. (C) Valynakis was initially less accommodating concerning Turkey. He delivered a strong message that the Greek Cypriots would not countenance an opening of Famagusta Port without (the fenced portion of) Varosha. Both Bryza and Valynakis agreed they were ultimately on the same page: the U.S. and Greece both envision a Turkey integrated into the EU as in our strategic long-term interest; both officials reiterated that Turkey is obligated to implement the Ankara Protocol without exception, as per acquis criteria agreed upon in October 2005; and both also acknowledged that Turkey would not find it politically feasible to comply without sufficient political cover. -------------- Famagusta/Varosha -------------- ¶4. (C) Valynakis derived his steadfast position on Famagusta/Varosha from the argument that Turkey is obligated to comply with the Ankara Protocol in order to meet EU accession criteria. From a practical standpoint, he recognized that Turkey will require some degree of political cover to comply. Valynakis argued that a Famagusta compromise proposal that excludes the fenced portion of Varosha is unbalanced and unfair to the Greek Cypriots. He repeatedly emphasized that the acquis is non-negotiable, the Turks must be held accountable to their October 2005 Negotiating Framework commitments, and the GoG will not permit Turkey to extract concessions through the "bilateralization" of issues. The GoG continues to support Turkey's full membership to the EU, Valynakis said, but this support is contingent upon the Turks altering their behavior to comply with EU norms and adopting reforms to conform to the EU. Valynakis urged us not to send the message that each time there is a negotiation, the Turks can "walk away with another concession." The worst scenario, in Valynakis' opinion, would be if the EU were to lower its standards to the extent that Turkey could enter the EU on its own terms. -------------- Bryza calls for compromise -------------- ¶5. (C) Bryza responded to Valynakis by saying that everyone must give way to put together a deal on ports but that the United States did not advocate loosening EU accession criteria for Turkey. The United States supported Turkey's EU accession as a way to stimulate deeper modernizing reform; relaxing EU accession criteria would undermine this goal. Bryza highlighted that the Turks feel waning support for EU accession. Under increased domestic political duress, they are unlikely to extend the Ankara Protocol to Cyprus. The Famagusta/Varosha package advanced by Papadopoulos in 2004 was rejected. A new package must emerge, with the involved parties willing to hone and adjust the details so that it can be palatable to everyone. Bryza's suggestion of opening Ercan was immediately rejected. Bryza also wondered whether the G/C would entertain individual Varosha property returns, versus a complete land parcel transfer, to which Valynakis did not have a reply. ¶6. (C) At a dinner at Valynakis' home later that evening, the Deputy FM was in more of a bargaining mood. He conceded the need to find a way forward on the ports issue. Valynakis and Bryza agreed to explore a package that might include: --Opening Famagusta port to international trade under EU administration, and with EU certificates of origin for goods produced in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots; --Returning all (or some) of the properties in the fenced area of Varosha to the Greek Cypriot owners, with the question of sovereignty of the neighborhood to be determined later; --Reopening Ercan Airport to direct flights; and --Placing a moratorium on sales and development of properties owned by Greek Cypriots in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Ries explained that EU accession negotiations are not negotiations in the normal sense in that the acquis is fixed, yet in every previous enlargement, the negotiations had concerned timing and transition periods. For example, the October 2005 Negotiating Framework did not commit GoT to a timetable for port opening, only an annual progress review. Although the fall 2006 review could adversely impact Turkey's negotiations and chapter openings/closings, suspension is not a foregone conclusion. Past examples where EU candidate countries negotiated "special deals" include, Poland (agriculture exception), Hungary (agreed to an early pharmaceutical patent provision after negotiating concessions for itself),and Sweden (where transitional periods were arranged for the alcohol monopoly). Ambassador Ries suggested that Turkey's desire to negotiate additional time for acquis compliance is substantively no different. As the Turks' perceive their EU accession prospects to be receding, the EU must make it worth Turkey's while to remain engaged. Valynakis responded with the reflexive comment that you "can't compare Turkey to Hungary or Estonia," and that Turkey cannot be permitted to conduct EU negotiations as if "horse trading." -------------- "Sides" versus "communities" -------------- ¶8. (C) DAS Bryza asked for an explanation concerning the recent UNSC discussion of the Gambari pre-visit statement whereby the Greek delegation refused to accept any text that used the term "sides." Valynakis said the GoG position was merely that "sides" incorrectly implies equality between the communities. Bryza responded that "sides" and "parties" had been used in UN statements for years, so to return to hardline positions appears to imply an attempt to push Greece and Turkey out of the UN's comprehensive settlement process and undermine the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee. Valynakis commented, "but the Cypriots are in the EU now, so are feeling more confident." -------------- Halki -------------- ¶9. (C) Bryza proposed a simultaneous strategy (not quid-pro-quo) whereby the Turks could find a legal basis to enable the re-opening of Halki, implemented in conjunction with a simultaneous, coincidental "movement" in Thrace to allow for elections of muftis without civil functions. Valynakis rejected the idea, replying per similar logic applied to Cyprus: Turkey must reopen Halki to be in compliance with EU acquis on religious freedom, and the GoG refuses to "bilateralize" these issues and set a precedent of making concessions. At dinner that evening, Valynakis seemed to take on board Bryza's account of his discussion two days earlier with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul, during which Bartholomew expressed support for pursuing simultaneous progress on both issues, though without a quid-pro-quo. ¶10. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message. RIES