Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ATHENS1475
2006-06-08 13:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE-TURKEY AEGEAN DISPUTES: A SHORT

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU GR 
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VZCZCXRO2138
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1475/01 1591300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081300Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5728
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4148
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001475 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU GR
SUBJECT: GREECE-TURKEY AEGEAN DISPUTES: A SHORT
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ICJ OPTION

REF: A. ATHENS 1450

B. ATHENS 1405 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001475 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU GR SUBJECT: GREECE-TURKEY AEGEAN DISPUTES: A SHORT RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ICJ OPTION REF: A. ATHENS 1450 ¶B. ATHENS 1405 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In the wake of the May 23 midair collision between Greek and Turkish fighters, statements by former President Stephanopoulos to refer all Greek-Turkish Aegean disputes to the ICJ caused a mini uproar here (ref B),but actually represent nothing new. Over the years, Greek government interest in going to the ICJ has waxed and waned, depending on the ebb and flow of relations with Turkey. A high point was reached in 1975, when both Greece and Turkey agreed to refer the continental shelf issue, but nothing came of it when Turkey subsequently balked. As part of his rapprochement policy, former FM Papandreou got the EU Council to bless Turkey's EU candidacy during the 1999 Helsinki EU Summit, with language that the Council would refer any outstanding differences to the ICJ by the end of 2004. With the advent of the cautious Karamanlis government in March 2004, however, neither side has made much effort to implement this so-called "Helsinki process." If the ICJ option has any utility for the GoG, it is in deflecting negative media/public opinion away from its failure to make any substantive headway in the on-going, but moribund Aegean exploratory talks with Turkey. This costs the GoG little, since FM Bakoyannis recently told us that PM Erdogan was "very far away" from discussing the ICJ (ref A). END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Former President Costis Stephanopoulos, who recently triggered a mini uproar in the media by proposing that Greece resolve all of its Aegean disputes with Turkey by referring them to the International Court of Justice at The Hague (ref B),published a follow-up to his original proposal on June 4. He maintained that, given the impasse in Greek-Turkish relations, and incidents like the May 23 mid-air collision of Greek and Turkish fighter jets, which resulted in the death of the Greek pilot, Greece must break with its diplomatic tradition and seek a solution through an international judicial verdict. Otherwise, he argued, the situation in the Aegean stands to deteriorate further, with the possibility of war increasing accordingly. Stephanopoulos also said Greece should enlist the support of EU and non-European countries to pressure T
urkey into accepting the ICJ referral. ¶3. (U) The idea of referring Greek-Turkish Aegean disputes to the ICJ is not new. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greek governments have had bouts of "Hague proposals" depending on crises and the ebb and flow of relations with Turkey. In 1975, Turkey agreed to the referral of the continental shelf dispute to the ICJ, announced in a joint statement by then PM Karamanlis (the uncle of the current PM) and PM Demirel in Brussels, but subsequently backpedaled, insisting instead on bilateral dialogue to find a "political" solution to the dispute -- a position it has maintained, with little change since that time. Greek politicians and diplomats, however, have remained divided over the wisdom of going to The Hague, even for the sole question of the continental shelf, which Greece continues to claim is the only outstanding issue between Athens and Ankara in the Aegean that is not clearly settled in international law. ¶4. (SBU) The option of going to the ICJ remained in limbo until the Imia/Kardak crisis of January 1996. With Turkish commandos occupying the larger of the two Imia rocks for several hours, U.S. diplomatic intervention defused the situation by getting Greece and Turkey to agree on a disengagement formula of "no flags, no ships, no troops." Within months of the crisis, which narrowly avoided a shooting war, Turkey was promoting the theory of "grey zones" in the Aegean and Greek PM Simitis was inaugurating a "step-by-step" approach to Greek-Turkish relations suggesting, among other things, the eventual referral of the continental shelf question to the ICJ. (Note: According to Turkey, Aegean "grey zones" encompass islets and rocks not specifically turned over to Greece by international treaty and, therefore, of disputed sovereignty) End Note). ¶5. (SBU) During the eight years between 1996 and 2004, Greek FM George Papandreou charted a major change of direction in Greek-Turkish relations. He lifted Greece's objections to Turkey's EU aspirations and energetically supported Ankara's bid for EU candidate status, a target achieved at the Helsinki EU Summit (December 1999),when the EU officially accepted this status. As part of a pre-accession phase that started at Helsinki, Turkey was expected to contribute to the peaceful resolution of Cyprus and Aegean issues and pursue good neighborly relations with Greece. In fact, the summit conclusions provided that the ATHENS 00001475 002 OF 002 European Council would review the course of Greek-Turkish relations at the end of 2004 and recommend the referral of any outstanding differences to the ICJ. ¶6. (SBU) This "Helsinki process," widely identified as the brain child of George Papandreou -- who insisted that "Europeanizing" Turkey was the best means to achieve good bilateral relations -- never truly took root, as neither Greece nor Turkey displayed much appetite to work on it. Thus, at the end of 2004, with Greece now under the cautious governance of PM Karamanlis, the European Council had little to review concerning Greek-Turkish relations, and thoughts about the ICJ were again shelved. Papandreou and his PASOK party have since charged the Karamanlis government of deliberately abandoning the Helsinki process and scuttling the only way of improving Greek-Turkish relations. ¶7. (SBU) The Stephanopoulos proposal, coming as it did only days before a June 9-10 trip to Istanbul by FM Dora Bakoyannis, has re-ignited the ICJ debate with a passion, with many, including Defense Minister Meimarakis, warning that the country's sovereign rights cannot be subject to a juridical process. PM Karamanlis, after a meeting with former FM Molyviatis, an avowed skeptic concerning the ICJ, has re-affirmed Greece's old position that the international tribunal could be an arbitration platform solely on the question of the continental shelf. ¶8. (C) Others, including opposition PASOK leader George Papandreou and many leftwing parliamentarians, warmly endorsed the proposal. Papandreou, who met June 7 with PM Karamanlis to discuss Aegean issues, was reported as supporting the extension of Greece's territorial waters under international treaty before Greece and Turkey made any decision to involve the ICJ. Asked June 7 if Papandreou was advocated extending Greek territorial seas to the 12-mile limit as provided in the Law of the Sea treaty, Papandreou foreign policy adviser Dimitris Droutsas played down the remarks to us, saying Papandreou had never mentioned any specific figure and that PASOK policy had not changed. (Comment: Most media interpreted Papandreou's remarks as extending these waters to the 12-mile limit -- a move which would likely provoke a sharp Turkish reaction (the Turkish Parliament still formally regards any such extension as a "casus belli"). Governing New Democracy politicians and the pro-ND media castigated Papandreou for irresponsibility. They argued that during his eight years as FM, he never advocated such an extreme position. Our take is that Papandreou, aware of his anemic standing in the polls and within his party, did so to bolster his position by appearing tough on Turkey. End Note.) ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Even in the unlikely event the GoG embraced Stephanopoulos' proposal to refer all outstanding Aegean disputes to the ICJ, the GoG believes that Turkey would not go along. FM Bakoyannis said as much to Ambassador at a June 5 meeting (ref A). At this point, the only utility for the GoG we see in the ICJ option is a means to deflect negative media/public attention away from its failure to produce anything substantive in the on-going Aegean exploratory talks (now in their 33rd round),compounded by the recent midair accident. COUNTRYMAN

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